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Abstract: 
People report much larger willingness to accept (WTA) than willingness to pay (WTP) 
under a broad range of circumstances. This dissertation tries to answer the question 
when people will report this gap, how large the difference between the two answers will 
be and what reasons lie behind this behavior: 
We find that uncertainty about the desire to trade a good lies at the heart of the gap 
measured in experiments. A formal model extending Prospect Theory by “aversion to 
risk changes” predicts that the endowment effect increases with uncertainty. Data from 
our own behavioral experiment confirms the uncertainty hypothesis.  
When applied to a different phenomenon, so-called “Preference Reversal”, the model 
can predict when different types of the observed reversals occur, closing an explanatory 
gap that other theories have left open. 
In surveys about valuing public goods, a much larger gap between WTA and WTP is 
found than in experiments with real transactions. Our own survey confirms that the rea-
son for this lies in participants not taking the WTA situation serious and answering like 
in an opinion poll. 
 
 
 
 
Overview:  
The General Introduction gives an overview over the experimental evidence and the 
theories that have been proposed as explanations. 
Chapter 1 introduces our own formal hypothesis for the experimental endowment ef-
fect. Competing hypotheses are tested in an own behavioral experiment. 
Chapter 2 shows how the endowment effect model can help to explain another anom-
aly, the so-called “preference reversal” phenomenon. 
Chapter 3 discusses why the gap between WTA and WTP in the valuation of public 
goods with the so-called “contingent valuation” method is so much larger than in ex-
periments. A hypothesis is tested with data from our own survey. 
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General Introduction 
 
One of the more important contradictions of conventional economic utility theory is 
that people often show significantly lower “Willingness to Pay” (WTP1) than “Willing-
ness to Accept” (WTA2). The effect is also known under the name of “endowment ef-
fect”3 or “status quo bias”. This phenomenon casts doubt on the validity of Coase’s In-
variance Theorem, which states that the initial allocation of ownership rights does not 
affect efficiency, as well as on the assumption of utility theory that preferences are in-
dependent of endowment. The Invariance Theorem is an important principle underlying 
policies such as the certificate trading resulting from the Kyoto Protocol. If the Invari-
ance Theorem did not hold, distributing pollution rights that are not traded in an effi-
cient way might not be the optimal solution compared to other solutions such as, for ex-
ample, the government selling these rights. 
Employee saving programs are a field where research about “status quo bias” is al-
ready leading to new ways of thinking and acting: If employees are given the chance to 
actively enroll in a company saving program, many choose not to participate, and if they 
do, they choose a low saving rate and rarely change it. If, on the other hand, employees 
are automatically enrolled with the possibility to opt out, the participation rate increases 
dramatically. The latest effort in this direction is a program termed “Save more tomor-
row”, where the saving rate for voluntary participants increases automatically every 
year, leading to much higher saving rates than when employees are deciding on this is-
sue alone. 
The endowment effect also touches the fundamental question of how people value 
goods in general. If this value differs in the buy and sell situation, the assumption of a 
unique and fixed value or preference that underlies microeconomic theory, needs to be 
revisited, possibly affecting many parts of economic decision theory. 
                                                 
1 Also called “compensating loss” in Hicksian theory. 
2 Also called “compensating gain” in Hicksian theory. 
3 Some authors (e.g. Plott and Zeiler, 2005a, and Brown, 2005) call the phenomenon exclusively “WTA-
WTP-gap” and use the term “endowment effect” for the explaining theory that we term “loss aversion in 
riskless choice”. We think that “endowment effect” is indeed the correct term for the phenomenon, as it 
consists of the valuation of an object being higher when it belongs to one’s endowment (WTA) than 
when it does not (WTP). 
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As more and more experimental evidence has emerged that showed the changing na-
ture of the phenomenon, the question arises whether it is possible to predict under which 
conditions the effect occurs and by how much willingness-to-accept (WTA) and will-
ingness-to-pay (WTP) will diverge. So far, existing theories do not generate satisfying 
predictions concerning existence and size of the effect.  
The following sections shall give an overview over the most important empirical 
evidence and the proposed theories. A list with all endowment effect experiments 
known to the author can be found at the end of the general introduction. 
 
I. Experiments 
The endowment effect was first found in surveys that try to elicit money values of 
public goods with the so-called “contingent valuation” method: Participants of a survey 
are asked how much they value a certain public good. In one form of this question, they 
are asked how much they would be willing to pay for an amelioration of a public good. 
In the other possible form of the question, they are asked what would be the minimum 
they would accept as a payment if the public good were deteriorated. The answers to 
these two different forms of questions correspond to a hypothetical willingness to pay 
(WTP) and hypothetical willingness to accept (WTA). Researchers found that the way 
in which they asked people to value a public good mattered greatly: hypothetical WTA 
turned out to be much greater than hypothetical WTP.  
These results finally led to economists and psychologists examining the difference 
between WTA and WTP in an experimental setting where real money and goods 
changed hands.  
Between 1984 and 2005, the phenomenon was examined in at least 83 different ex-
periments involving real payments, presented in 25 articles known to the author (see ap-
pendix of this General Introduction). In 60 % of the experiments, a significant 
WTP/WTA-gap was observed. Therefore, the existence of the phenomenon can hardly 
be denied, as well as the fact that it is not always present. 
An important insight was provided by Brookshire and Coursey (1987) who show that 
using the hypothetical surveys (the so-called “contingent valuation” method) leads to a 
much larger WTP/WTA-gap than using an experimental setting. We will focus in the 
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first two chapters on evidence resulting exclusively from experiments. Chapter 3 then 
examines the question what different and additional factors might be at work that 
enlarge the WTA-WTP-gap so drastically in the hypothetical setting. 
The most widely known experiments are those conducted by Kahneman et al. (1990). 
In their very carefully designed experiments, subjects (students) valued objects (mugs 
and pens) more highly when they owned them than when they did not. The difference is 
not trivial: Sellers stated an average WTA for a mug of 5.78 $ and buyers an average 
WTP of 2.21 $, to give only one representative example (Kahneman et al., 1990, ex-
periment 5, p. 1338). Income effects as a source of the gap have been ruled out by Mor-
rison’s (1997) experiment, compensating the WTP subjects with a money amount that 
corresponded to the average WTA of the other group. 
To test whether subjects strategically adjusted their answers in an effort to influence 
trading prices, Kahneman et al. (1990) used the so-called Becker-DeGroot-Marschak 
(BDM, Becker et al, 1964, cited by Brown, 2005, 371) mechanism (experiment 5, p. 
1336 ff). After the subjects had stated their minimum selling prices (respectively their 
maximum buy prices), the actual trading price was drawn at random out of a certain 
range of possible prices. 
If the price were higher than a seller’s minimum sale price (WTA), the individual 
would sell the good at the randomly drawn price. If the price were lower than a buyer’s 
maximum buy price (WTP), this would mean that the subject would buy at the ran-
domly drawn price.  Therefore, a seller could not make a profit by increasing the stated 
minimum sale price (WTA) beyond the true value. This would only risk situations 
where the randomly drawn price is lower than the stated WTA, but higher than the true 
WTA. A trade would not take place, although it would have been profitable for the in-
dividual. A corresponding argument is true for decreasing one’s maximum buy price 
(WTP) in comparison with the true WTP.  Under this mechanism, truth-revealing be-
havior is optimal. 
The use of the mechanism did not alter the results of the experiments, indicating that 
no strategic motives lie behind the appearance/disappearance of the endowment effect. 
All experiments were repeated several times, but no learning effect was seen to reduce 
the endowment effect. 
 General Introduction 
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Kahneman et al. (1990) found no endowment effect when the good in question was 
an “induced-value token” – a token with pre-defined value. In their experiment No. 8 (p. 
1340), this value was 3 $ for sellers and 5 $ for potential buyers. Out of 70 participants, 
58 decided to trade the token for an average price of 4.09 $. This result was interpreted 
as “no significant undertrading” in comparison to the consumption good trading ex-
periments, where only between 9 % and 45 % of the expected trades took place (e.g. in 
experiment 1, p. 1332). In experiment 1, fixed-value tokens (with the same value for all 
groups) yielded the result WTA=induced value=WTP.  
The Kahneman et al. (1990) experiments have even been exactly replicated by Plott 
and Zeiler (2005a), yielding the same results. There are, however, situations in which 
experimenters could not measure a significant endowment effect.  
Ortona and Scacciati (1992) find that there is no significant WTP/WTA-gap for 
“necessary goods”. A voucher worth 40,000 Italian Lire (approx. 20 €) in a bookstore 
was valued around 33,000 Lire (approx. 17 €) in WTP and WTA elicitation experiments 
– so no gap existed (p. 290-292). The students were actually in need of books, so the 
authors applied the label “necessary goods”.  
Plott and Zeiler (2005a) also conducted their own experiments and found no signifi-
cant endowment effect in valuing a mug when subjects were given extensive training 
and practice on the mechanism, and anonymity. 
List (2003) finds that market experience of the subjects plays a key role in eliminat-
ing the endowment effect. No undertrading was found with professional sports memo-
rabilia traders and unique goods like tickets of a famous baseball match. In contrast, 
amateur collectors of sports memorabilia items exhibit an endowment effect – under-
trading is measured. 
Although Kahneman et al. (1990) initially claimed that there should not be an en-
dowment effect with “exchange goods” (i.e. goods that are regularly bought and sold), 
there is a large body of evidence that subjects experience an endowment effect with re-
spect to all kinds of lotteries.  
 General Introduction 
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In lottery experiments, the gap has so far been shown to be significant by Knetsch 
and Sinden (1984), Singh (1991), Van Dijk and van Knippenberg (1996), Van de Ven et 
al. (2005) and Blondel and Lévy-Garboua (2005).4  
II. Theories 
The most prominent explanation of the endowment effect has been derived from 
Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Prospect Theory was initially de-
signed to account for a whole set of different evidence concerning choice under uncer-
tainty. As this initial version of Prospect Theory - not the derivation used later to ex-
plain the endowment effect – is at the basis of our own hypothesis, it is necessary to ex-
plain why and how Prospect Theory was initially designed and later transformed. 
The second part of this section will examine how other theories perform in terms of 
predicting the pattern found for the endowment effect. 
  
Prospect Theory 
Overview 
In 1979, psychologists Tversky and Kahneman published Prospect Theory. It was in-
tended to account for the following evidence that had been found contradicting Ex-
pected Utility Theory: 
• The Allais Paradox (Allais, 1953): People overweight certain events (see the 
appendix of this Genral Introduction). 
• The Reflection Effect (see Table 1 in the appendix): For lotteries involving a 
single positive payoff, people are risk-averse for medium and large winning 
probabilities and risk-seeking for small winning probabilities. This contra-
dicts Expected Utility Theory, which predicts that, if an individual is risk-
averse, this must hold for all ranges of probabilities that are different from 1 
and 0. 
                                                 
4 Only Harless (1989) finds no gap when using median (rather than mean) answers. Schmidt and Traub 
(2003) consolidate this with the other findings by showing that median answers do not differ signifi-
cantly, but mean answers do. The reason for this is that two patterns of answers dominate: One (slightly 
larger) group giving roughly equal WTA and WTP answers and a second group stating much larger 
WTA than WTP. The question remains what prompts the latter behavior and how it can be systematically 
predicted. 
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For lotteries involving a single negative payoff, people show exactly the op-
posite preference: For low probabilities of losing, they show risk-averse be-
havior, while for medium and large probabilities, they show risk-seeking be-
havior. 
• Framing of outcomes (see problem 1 and 2 in the appendix): People react 
differently to the same problem, depending on its presentation (“framing”) in 
terms of possible gains or losses. 
• Probabilistic Insurance (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979, p. 23-25): In con-
trast to Expected Utility’s prediction, a form of insurance that does reduce, 
but not eliminate the probability of damage is less attractive to people than 
the complete elimination of one risk at a proportionally higher price. 
• The Isolation Effect (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979, p. 25-27): In order to 
simplify the choice between alternatives, people often disregard components 
common to all the alternatives, and focus on the components that distinguish 
them. 
To be consistent with these phenomena, Prospect Theory was developed with the fol-
lowing key elements: 
• Editing phase:  
o Coding: The representation of outcomes in terms of gains and losses 
in comparison to a reference point that is usually taken as the current 
wealth.   
o Combination: Probabilities of identical outcomes are combined to 
form a single outcome (otherwise, probability-overweighting does not 
work properly). 
o Segregation: If a lottery contains a riskless component, i.e. all out-
comes have a minimum payoff, the lottery is decomposed into the 
sure payment (the minimum payoff) and the remaining additional 
risky payoffs. 
o Cancellation: If there are two or more lotteries, payoffs that are 
common to all lotteries are disregarded. 
o Simplification: rounding of probabilities (e.g. the rounding of the lot-
tery (101, 0.49) to (100, 0.5). 
 General Introduction 
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o Detection of dominance: An option that is inferior in at least one 
case and equal in all other cases is excluded from the optimization 
process. 
• Value/utility function:  
 (x, p; y, q) is a lottery that pays x with probability p and y with probability q. If 
no riskless component (minimum payoff or loss) is involved, i.e. either p+q<1 or 
x≥0≥y or x≤0≤y), then Prospect Theory determines the utility/value in the fol-
lowing form: 
 V(x, p; y, q) = π(p)v(x) + π(q)v(y) (1.)  
If a riskless component is involved (p+q=1 and either x>y>0 or x<y<0), the lot-
tery is split up into the riskless component y and the remaining risky component 
x-y that is obtained with probability p: 
 V(x, p; y, q) = v(y) + π(p)[v(x)-v(y)] (2.) 
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The use of the probability-weighting function π(.) means generalizing Expected Util-
ity by relaxing the expectation principle that states that expected utility is proportional 
in probabilities. The function π(.) has the following properties (see Figure 1): 
o It is increasing in p, π(0)=0 and π(1)=1. 
o For small values of p, π is a subadditive function of p, i.e. π(rp)>r π(p)  
o Overweighting of small probabilities: π(p)>p for low probabilities 
(<0.3) 
o Subproportionality: ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
pq pqr
p pr
π π
π π≤  with 0<r<1. 
o Subcertainty: for all 0<p<1, π(p)+ π(1-p)<1 
 
 
Figure 1: The probability-weighting function of Prospect Theory  
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1991, p. 60) 
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Figure 2: The value function of Prospect Theory 
 
The value function v(.) itself (see Figure 2) has the following properties: 
o Reference Point:  Carriers of utility are changes in wealth rather than 
final states. The reference point that serves as comparison is usually 
the current wealth5. There are two ways to include the reference point 
in the notation:  
 Subscripts: The state variables are still displayed in their abso-
lute level. A subscript for the utility/value function refers to 
the reference point: Vx(y) is the utility of moving from x to y. 
 Difference notation: The state variable is transformed such 
that the wealth level of the reference point is subtracted from 
all states: V(y-x) is the utility of moving from x to y. This no-
tation neglects possible wealth effects, because it treats a  dif-
ference in wealth with respect to the reference point as having 
the same effect, regardless of the amount of initial wealth. As 
                                                 
5 Other theories that adopt a reference point are Regret Theory and Reference-dependent Subjective Util-
ity Theory (see below). 
Gains 
Value 
Losses 
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the wealth/income effect measured in experiments appears to 
be quite weak (Morrison, 1997, Schmidt and Traub, 2003), 
this simplified notation is adopted throughout this dissertation. 
o Decreasing sensitivity: The function is concave for gains and convex 
for losses. 
o Loss Aversion: steeper for losses than for gains: v’(x)<v(-x) and 
v(x)<-v(-x) for all x>0. 
 
Loss Aversion in Choice under Uncertainty 
The initial purpose of loss aversion was to sustain the aversion towards symmetric 
bets (where losing as well as winning is possible) that would otherwise have been lost6: 
“A salient characteristic of attitudes to changes in welfare is that losses loom larger 
than gains. [...] Most people find symmetric bets of the form (x, .50; -x, .50) distinctly 
unattractive.” (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979, p. 33) 
The possible explanatory power of loss aversion for the endowment effect phenome-
non was stressed later by Thaler (1980)7, Knetsch and Sinden (1984) and Tversky and 
Kahneman (1991).  
Loss aversion states that the utility function has a kink at the current wealth, which is 
defined as the reference point: The marginal utility of additional wealth is strictly 
smaller than the marginal utility of the last unit of existing wealth8.  
For this explanation of the endowment effect, it is necessary that at least two goods 
enter the utility/value function, while risk does no longer play a role – so this concept is 
different from the original one that involved only one good (wealth) in a risky setting 
and has therefore been termed: 
 
Loss Aversion in riskless Choice 
In the riskless setting and applied to an exchange between two goods, the concept 
says the following: When giving away a good, its loss (“out-of-pocket expense”) is val-
                                                 
6 Due to the convexity of the value function in the domain of losses. 
7 Thaler calls the theoretical explanation „Endowment Effect“ – here, this label is used for the phenome-
non itself. 
8 The value function is always steeper for losses than for gains. 
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ued more highly than the gain of the good that is acquired in exchange, so the exchange 
rate of the two goods has to be sufficiently large to overcome this loss aversion. 
Circumstances, under which no endowment effect is observed, are explained in the 
following way: When subjects buy solely for resale, they know they will not keep the 
good they have acquired. Therefore, they do not mentally integrate it into their endow-
ment: technically speaking, they do not shift their reference point in the good to the new 
quantity. By giving away the good again, the utility decreases by the same amount by 
which it had increased before. The same price renders the individual indifferent to the 
buy and the sell transaction.  
 
Consistency with empirical Evidence 
Loss aversion in riskless choice cannot explain a number of experimental outcomes. 
The following two examples illustrate the inconsistency with the empirical evidence: 
• Lottery tickets are found to induce an endowment effect in several experiments. 
Subjects hold the lottery tickets for the sole purpose of exchanging them for a 
prize, if the lottery wins. This should lead to the situation where they do not shift 
their reference point; there should be no endowment effect.  
• List (2003) – trading experience in the sports memorabilia market. In List’s ex-
periments, 95 percent of all subjects stated that they planned to keep the good9. 
For half of the subjects, namely the experienced traders, no endowment effect 
was measured, while for the amateur collectors, a strong endowment effect 
showed up. 
Overall, at least 16 of the 83 experiments summarized in the appendix, (11 out of 25 
articles) must be seen as inconsistent with loss aversion in riskless choice: Singh (1991), 
Ortona and Scacciati (1992), Shogren et al. (1994), Van Dijk and van Knippenberg 
(1996), Morrison (1997), List (2003), Schmidt and Traub (2003), Blondel and Lévy-
Garboua (2005), Van de Ven et al. (2005) and Plott and Zeiler (2005a and 2005b) 
 
After Prospect Theory, another theory that influenced many behavioral theories was 
Regreg Theory. 
                                                 
9 After one year, 99,3 % of all subjects indeed still owned the good (p. 46). 
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Regret Theory  
In 1982, Loomes and Sugden developed Regret Theory as an alternative to Prospect 
Theory. It was designed to explain the same phenomena that Prospect Theory ex-
plained: the ‘Allais Paradox’, the ‘certainty effect’ and the ‘isolation effect’ while at the 
same time being simpler and making fewer assumptions. “We believe that against the 
complex and somewhat ad hoc array of assumptions required by prospect theory the 
principle of Occam’s Razor strongly favors the straightforwardness of regret theory” 
(p. 817). 
Unfortunately, later experiments to test the specific predictions of Regret Theory 
(Loomes et al., 1992) did not show the results the authors had hoped for. In addition, the 
theory was designed only for pairwise choices. This led to predictions of intransitive 
choices when more than two options were considered.  
Regret Theory in its original form is not consistent with the endowment effect phe-
nomenon. However, it provided an important change of the reference point concept 
known from Prospect Theory: In Regret Theory, two options are evaluated by compar-
ing them state-by-state, using the alternative that is not chosen as a reference point. The 
principle of comparing all possible end-states in a state-by-state manner proved a good 
idea and can be found in the theoretical backbone of “Reference-dependent Subjective 
Utility” (Sugden, 2003, see below), Value Uncertainty (Rankin, 1990, see below) and 
our own theory developed in chapter 1. Yet, instead of using an unchosen alternative 
option as the reference point, all these theories abandoned this principle and went back 
to Prospect Theory’s principle of using the current endowment as the reference point.  
 
Theories linking the Endowment Effect and Uncertainty 
Value Uncertainty (Rankin, 1990) 
Microeconomic theory assumes that a good has a fixed and well-defined position 
in an individual’s preference ordering. Cyert and DeGroot (1975) proposed an alterna-
tive approach, called “Adaptive Utility”: Individuals are uncertain about the utility they 
will derive from goods. After consumption, this uncertainty decreases, so they update 
their preferences. Based on this approach and Regret Theory, Rankin (1990) has tried to 
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explain the endowment effect as a consequence of this uncertainty. Individuals compare 
the consequences of every possible action like in Regret Theory. These consequences 
are not compared with each other like in Regret Theory, but with the initial state, the 
reference point, as known from Prospect Theory. For any state that is worse than the 
reference point, individuals feel additional regret. “Rejoicing”, the opposed feeling in 
cases when the consequence is better than in the reference point, is assumed to be 
zero10.  
Rankin tests his model with data from the so-called 1984 Sandhill study where 
both experimental methods and contingent valuation survey methods are used to value a 
deer hunting permit (also analyzed by Bishop et al., 1986). He finds that, with a realistic 
regret coefficient, his model can explain a large part of the WTA-WTP-gap in the ex-
perimental situations, but not the enormous gap in hypothetical “contingent valuation” 
situations. This is true also for the similar theory of imprecise preferences by Dubourg 
et al. (1994), which was only and not successfully tested with hypothetical data. 
 
Reference-dependent Subjective Utility (Sugden, 2003) 
Sugden proposed a theory that expands subjective expected utility theory to a refer-
ence-dependent setting. Preferences between so-called acts depend both on final out-
comes and on reference points (which may themselves be uncertain acts). The theory is 
characterised by a set of axioms in a Savage-style framework and is consistent with the 
endowment effect for lotteries and the preference reversal phenomenon (Lichtenstein 
and Slovic, 1971, see chapter 2). 
Sugden’s theory follows the same modification of regret theory as Rankin (1990): 
applying a regret-style “satisfaction” function to the differences between end-states and 
current endowment as the reference point with greater weight on negative changes (“re-
gret”) than positive changes (“rejoicing”) can explain the endowment effect for lotteries 
and “preference reversal” (see chapter 2). Concerning a systematic relationship between 
the characteristics of a lottery and the measured endowment effect, Sugden does not 
propose any quantifiable predictions.  
 
                                                 
10 which is not a strong assumption – regret is seen as more important than rejoicing, whether it is zero or 
positive, but smaller than the regret term, does not matter. 
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Cognitive Consistency Theory (Blondel and Lévy-Garboua, 2005) 
Blondel and Lévy-Garboua (2005, citing Lévy-Garboua, 1999, as the origin of the 
theory) propose a psychologically founded theory to explain the endowment effect for 
lotteries:  
“Let us consider that, prior to making a choice, the individual has a normative, i.e. 
procedure-invariant, preference under risk which can be represented by an EU func-
tion.[Whatever] this prior preference, it raises doubt when the subsequent choice of one 
lottery against another raises a visible objection. […] The possibility of finding an ob-
jection to one’s normative preference, which characterizes most decisions under risk or 
uncertainty, means that the decision-maker demands information. In seeking additional 
information, she must perceive the available objection to her normative preference. 
Thus she must sequentially perceive, first her normative preference, then the available 
objection to the latter. Since the objection is dissonant with the prior preference, the in-
dividual experiences cognitive dissonance and must feel uncertain of her true prefer-
ence.” (p. 6) 
The theory is tested with data from a lottery experiment together with a choice ex-
periment replicating the “preference reversal” phenomenon (see chapter 2). While the 
theory can account for many of the phenomena found, the pricing pattern found for 
WTP is not completely consistent with the theoretical predictions (see p. 109).   
 
Uncertainty / Regret (Inder and O’Brien, 2003. 
Inder and O’Brien (2003) see the endowment effect as the result of regret in con-
junction with “uncertainty about market opportunity”: When submitting their buy 
prices, subjects do not yet know the seller’s minimum sale prices. So by stating too high 
a price, there could be a situation where a subject would feel regret: If the seller accepts 
the bid right away, this could mean that she would also have accepted a lower price. The 
buyer could have made a bigger gain by stating a lower buy price. The corresponding 
effect exists on the sale side: There could be situations where the buyer’s willingness to 
pay would have permitted the seller to state a higher sale price. Not doing so could lead 
to situations of regret. The anticipation of the regret leads to an increase in the stated 
sale price and to a decrease in the stated buy price. 
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Counter-arguments: 
• The BDM mechanism employed in most experiments (see above) prevents such 
regret situations due to market uncertainty: If the randomly drawn market price 
is higher than the stated sale price, the market price is paid to the subject, and 
not her minimum sale price (and analogous on the buy side – only the randomly 
drawn price has to be paid, not the possibly higher maximum buy price). If the 
subjects did indeed state higher sale prices than their true WTA, there could only 
be regret situations of the opposite type: If the randomly drawn market price is 
lower than the “strategic WTA”, but higher than the true WTA, the subject will 
not sell, although she would have made a profit by selling. The subject would 
regret not to have stated her true, lower WTA.  
• The possible defense against this counter-argument, that subjects do not want to 
sell too cheaply (buy for too high a price) in an experiment compared to a possi-
ble trade outside of the experiment is not convincing: 
Most experiments are conducted with private goods of relatively low value such 
as a mug. The transaction costs of finding a buyer for such an item outside of the 
experiment are probably much higher than the possible gains compared to a sale 
in the experiment. It is most probable that subjects who do not sell their mug in 
the experiment will not sell it afterwards, but instead just keep it for themselves 
(this was indeed confirmed in our experiment, see chapter 1). 
 
Other Endowment Effect Theories 
Evolution and Bargaining (Carmichael and MacLeod, 2003) 
Carmichael and MacLeod see the origin of the endowment effect based in evolu-
tion: In the process of evolution, humans learned to like their property more than they 
desire their neighbour’s property, because this reduces conflicts. Carried over to bar-
gaining situations between buyer and seller, this means that nobody is willing to accept 
less than her own endowment. Evolution also brought automatic search for surplus in 
bargaining situations: More is claimed than the initial endowment. This leads to situa-
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tions where the buyer does not want to pay as much as the seller demands, although 
based on the true values a trade would be possible that is profitable for both sides. 
 
Counter-arguments 
• The use of the BDM mechanism, if understood, prevents “strategic answers” by 
subjects who state higher WTA and lower WTP than would correspond to their 
true valuation 
• Carmichael and MacLeod try to counter this argument as follows: Humans have 
two “decision devices”: The “high road”, a process where thinking and consid-
eration is involved, and a “low road” where the decision is made without much 
consideration. Thus, the “low road” automatism is seen to produce wrong deci-
sions in the endowment effect experiments: Subjects seem to wrongly assume 
that they can influence the trading price by setting strategic prices, hiding their 
true valuations for the objects. The problem with this explanation is that it pre-
dicts an endowment effect for all experiments – which is inconsistent with all 
situations where no endowment effect is found.  
 
Subject Misconceptions (Plott and Zeiler, 2005a) 
Plott and Zeiler (2005a) see individuals’ mistakes as the reason for the endowment 
effect: “By proper choice of procedures the phenomenon can be turned on and off” (p. 
23). They claim that only using anonymity, incentive-compatible elicitation, practice, 
and training together eliminates the endowment effect. 
Several arguments speak against misconceptions explaining the entire WTA-WTP-
gap: 
 
Counter-arguments 
• The proposed reason for the endowment effect – subject misconceptions – can-
not explain how the endowment effect can be both present and absent when the 
same experimental methods are used. Therefore, this argument is inconsistent 
with 10 out of the 25 studies presented in the appendix of this General Introduc-
tion, where results change from a significant WTA-WTP-gap to no gap by only 
changing the good in question and sticking to the method: Kahneman et al. 
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(199011), Singh (1991), Ortona and Scacciati (1992), Shogren et al. (1994), 
Franciosi et al. (1996), van Dijk and van Knippenberg (1996), Morrison (1997), 
List (2003), Van de Ven et al. (2005), Blondel and Lévy-Garboua (2005). Even 
in their own (unpublished) practice rounds with lotteries, Plott and Zeiler find a 
WTA-WTP-gap, although they caution that the practice rounds were not de-
signed to test for a gap.  
• A possible explanation for Plott and Zeiler’s measurement of no endowment ef-
fect for a mug that has otherwise always been found could lie in their specific 
practice rounds: “In addition, the experimenter had an opportunity to observe 
individual behavior and clear up any misunderstandings (i.e., the playing of 
dominated strategies) noted from the observations” (p. 17). If indicating lower 
WTP than WTA is seen as a sign of misconceptions that can be corrected by the 
experimenter, this could have deleted a WTP-WTA-gap that might otherwise 
have existed. 
 
                                                 
11 all experiments with induced-value tokens: exp 2, trial 1-3, exp 3, trial 1, exp 4, trial 1-2, exp 8a 
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Appendix of the Genral Introduction 
Allais Paradox (Allais, 1953) 
When asked to choose between gamble A: (4,000, .80) and certain payment B (3,000), 
most people prefer B. When asked to choose between gamble C: (4,000, .20) and gam-
ble D: (3,000, .25), most people prefer C. This violates expected utility theory which 
postulates that expected utility is linear in probability. As the payoffs in C and D are ex-
actly four times more unlikely than the same payoffs in gambles A and B, respectively, 
a preference for B in the first choice would imply preference for D in the second choice. 
Additional Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1: The Reflection Effect  
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979, p. 22) 
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List of Endowment Effect Experiments 1983 – 2005 
 
Starting on next page  
Endowment Effect Experiments 1984-2005
Name part Question under 
investigation
good result n subjects ratio 
WTA/ 
WTP
comment
Knetsch and 
Sinden 
(1984)
Test 1 Does the gap persist in 
the lab?
lottery tickets worth 
50 $ (or 70 $ 
merchandise 
voucher)
gap 76 students anonymity
Test 2 effect of experience lottery tickets for 
10 $ or 15 $ 
voucher
gap " "
Test 3 robustness check: 
different subjects
lottery $ 50/$70 
voucher
gap 79 part-time 
students
Test 4 robustness check: 
different parameters
lottery $ 50/$70 
bookstore voucher
no gap 69 " participants knew each other. "social 
pleasure of participating in the lottery with 
the group outweighted the value of the prize" 
was a typical answer in follow-up survey.
Test 5 lottery $ 70/$90 
bookstore voucher
gap 128 students
Test 6 advice to others lottery 60/70 
bookstore voucher
no gap for 
advice
90 part-time 
students
2 extra groups asked to give to a classmate 
to buy/sell
Knez et al. 
(1985) 
Series I do WTA/WTP-
responses provide 
good predictors for 
market prices?
multi-stage lottery answer to 
question: 
yes
9 to 
12
1) Deriving an equilibrium price from 
demand (WTP) and supply (WTA) yields a 
better predictor of observed trading prices 
than the expected payoff of the lottery. 2) 
"Irrational bidding": 14 % of the sell offers 
are below the own stated WTA and 46 % of 
the buy offers are above the own WTP.
Series II do subjects answers to 
WTA/WTP-questions 
change after repeated 
trading?
simple lottery no answer 
to 
question 
possible
9 1) seller and buyer surplus smaller than in 
series I. 2) 34% of lowest offers below WTA, 
47 % of highest bid above WTP. 3) 
"Irrationalities": WTA<WTP - occur mostly in 
early periods
Coursey et 
al (1987) 
Part 1 other good than lottery 
ticket - hypothetical 
question
right to avoid bitter 
lasting liquid
gap 64 full-time 
students
3.8 hypothetical question: WTA - how much 
should you be paid to make you taste the 
bitter liquid. WTP - how much would you pay 
to avoid tasting the bitter liquid. (avoiding a 
bad = acquiring a good)
Part 2 let subjects try the 
good - hypothetical 
question
right to avoid bitter 
lasting liquid
gap " " 4.2 "semi-hypothetical" question: subjects could 
tasted a few drops, then were asked again 
for their WTA/WTP (and asked if they would 
accept a further decreased WTA/increased 
WTP offer relative to their answer, which 
changed the bids slightly) 
Part 3 allow for learning - real 
auction
right to avoid bitter 
lasting liquid
no gap " " 1.8 consecutive rounds of Vickrey auctions were 
conducted, as long as subjects stated that 
they wanted to change their bids (max 10). 
Subjects decreased their WTA from 10 to 
4,8, but did not change their WTP when 
learning other subject's bids.
Brookshire 
and Coursey 
(1987)
Part 1 - 
contingent 
valuation survey
hypothetical elicitation 
vs. Marketplace
tree density in a 
public park
gap 93 households 20.8 classical contingent valuation methodology - 
all numbers for a change of 25 trees
Part 2 - "field 
Smith auction"
hypothetical elicitation 
vs. Marketplace
tree density in a 
public park
gap 94 households 2.6 field smith auction process: 
payment/compensation is made more 
concrete (=probable)
Part 3 - 
laboratory Smith 
auction with real 
payments and 
real outcomes!
hypothetical elicitation 
vs. Marketplace
tree density in a 
public park
gap 54 randomly 
selected 
individuals
1.4 laboratory smith auctions: auctions for 
separate groops that resulted in real 
payments/compensations. Numbers for final 
bids. Results: WTA decreases dramatically. 
Experiments with real transactions:
p. 1
Endowment Effect Experiments 1984-2005
Name part Question under 
investigation
good result n subjects ratio 
WTA/ 
WTP
comment
Knetsch 
(1989) 
Test 1 direct test of 
reversibility of 
indifference curves
coffee mug vs. 400-
gram Swiss 
chocolate bar
gap 218
Test 2 direct test of 
reversibility of 
indifference curves
Candy Bar vs. 
Money
gap 80
Test 3a direct test of 
reversibility of 
indifference curves
0.5 % chance of an 
accident that year
gap 295
Test 3b direct test of 
reversibility of 
indifference curves
one week of 
vacation time
gap 295
Harless 
(1989)
hints to subjects to 
reveal true values; 
within subject 
comparison
lottery tickets 
(good)
no gap 8 med 1,1 
to 2
2nd price auctions. Instructions stated that it 
is "the best strategy go make an offer equal 
to your minimal value" (and corresp. For 
WTP). WTA/WTP-ratios are calculated for 
individual subjects.
lottery tickets (bad) no gap 8 med 1,1 
to 1,5
Apparent definition of WTA for bad lottery: 
willingness to accept money and the lottery. 
WTP: Willingness to pay to rid oneself of the 
lottery. 
Kahneman 
et al. (1990)
 Exp 1, trial 1-3 control for transaction 
costs
induced-value 
token
no gap 44 students 1.0 limited monetary incentives in Exp 1&2; 
 Exp 1, trial 4-7 trading experiment coffee mugs gap " " 1.9 sell for $6.00 at the bookstore
 Exp 1, trial 8-11 trading experiment boxed ballpoint 
pens
gap " " 1.7 visible bookstore price tag of $3.98
 Exp 2,1-3 trading experiment induced-value 
token
no gap 38 " 1.0
Exp 2,4-7 trading experiment coffee mugs gap " " 2.2
Exp 2, 8-11 trading experiment folding binoculars gap " " 2.0 available at the bookstore for $4.00
Exp 3,1 control for transaction 
costs
induced-value 
token
no gap 26 "
Exp 3,2-5 questioning WTA and 
WTP directly
Pen gap 26 " 5.5 no monetary incentives
Exp 4,1-2 control for transaction 
costs
induced-value 
token
no gap 74 "
Exp 4,3.7 questioning WTA and 
WTP directly
Mug gap 74 " 2.5 no monetary incentives
Exp 5 testing for 
"misrepresentation"
mug gap 59 " 2.6 Becker-DeGroot-Marschak-Mechanism of 
randomly selected transaction price ensures 
that individual price decision has no effect on 
transaction price
Exp 6 reluctance to buy vs. 
Reluctance to sell
mug gap 77 2.5 Equivalent Gain!
 Exp 7 reluctance to buy vs. 
reluctance to sell - with 
price tags
mug gap 117 3.5 Equivalent Gain - price tag (3,98)
 Exp 8 a bilateral bargaining 
experiment
induced-value 
token
no gap 70 subjects were paired. Value of token for 
seller: 3$, for buyer 5$. 29 out of 35 possible 
trades is seen as no significant undertrading 
(compared to a ratio between 0,1 to 0,2 
trades over possible trades for the gap-
experiments)
Exp 8 b facilitate exchanges by 
earning cash before 
experiment
chocolate bar gap 70 2.8
p. 2
Endowment Effect Experiments 1984-2005
Name part Question under 
investigation
good result n subjects ratio 
WTA/ 
WTP
comment
Singh 
(1991)
Test 1a - before 
trading
do non-student 
subjects show other 
behavior?
lottery gap 42 Malaysian 
civil 
servants
median 
1,5
Test 1b - after 
trading
lottery no gap " median 
1,12
After trading, the answers converge 
sufficiently such that the 0-hypthesis 
WTA/WTP<1,1 cannot be rejected at the 1%-
level.
Test 2a - before 
trading
benchmark with 
students
lottery no gap 54 students median 
1,07
with students as subjects, the 0-hypothesis 
cannot be rejected even before trading.
Test 2b - after 
trading
lottery no gap " median 
1,03
Test 3 does asking for "advice 
to a client" produce 
different results?
lottery no gap 46 unspecifie
d
median 
1,01
no gap for "advice" answers as in Kn&S 
1984 Test 6 - author's interpretation of this 
result as "endowment effect" is misleading
Boyce et al. 
(1992)
no-kill-condition Do sellers care more 
about the survival of a 
good than buyers?
Norfolk Island pine 
tree
gap 115 univ. staff 1.7 approx. retail value of a tree: $6; BDM 
mechanism
kill-condition Do sellers care more 
about the survival of a 
good than buyers?
Norfolk Island pine 
tree
gap " 2.4 WTA-distribution bimodal: Some subjects 
cared about survival and stated high offers, 
some didn't care. Authors state that effect 
would be only a supplement to loss aversion. 
anonymity
Ortona and 
Scacciati 
(1992)
Experiment 1 Does the endowment 
effect exist for time?
one hour of leisure 
time
gap 40 local 
governme
nt 
employee
s
10.2 In three out of the four experiments (all but 
the gov. Empl.), both WTA and WTP 
questions were asked to the same persons. 
"The first answer, therefore, may have 
influenced the second one, reducing the 
disparities."
two hours in a train gap 25 university 
students
3.2
one hour of leisure 
time per month
gap 35 high 
school 
teachers
6.3
one hour of leisure 
time per month
gap 23 bank 
employee
s
4.2
Experiment 2 Looking for the effect 
of time and 
psychological 
transaction costs.
$35 book voucher no gap 34 students no significant difference between three 
rounds: immediate WTA, WTA one hour 
later and EG (taken for WTP). Features: real 
payoff, necessary good (students needed 
books), payoff substantial.
Experiment 3 not necessary goods book about military 
uniforms
no gap 33 students maket value: 70$. Unclear, what procedure 
was used in round 1 - EG? Table 2 (294) 
and text are contradicting each other.
Loewenstein 
and 
Issacharoff 
(1994)
Experiment 1 do subjects value 
objects more when 
they receive them as a 
reward for 
performance?
mug answer to 
question: 
yes; gap: 
yes
39 students "good mood" because of good performance 
is ruled out, because half of the successful 
subjects were told that they received the 
mugs because of chance and they valued it 
lower
Experiment 2 Does "self-
representation" 
influence the source 
dependence?
mug answer to 
question: 
no; gap: 
yes
67 students "Self-representation": successful subjects 
want to keep the mug because it indicates 
them as successful (other subjects did not 
know that success is connected with getting 
a mug, so this could not alter their behavior).
p. 3
Endowment Effect Experiments 1984-2005
Name part Question under 
investigation
good result n subjects ratio 
WTA/ 
WTP
comment
Shogren et 
al. (1994)
Does the degree of 
substitution play a 
role?
authors: 
yes
stage 1 regular size brand-
name candy bar 
instead of small 
candy
no gap 144 round 1: 
1.38, 
round 3-
5: 1
significant gap only in first round. WTA 
decreases and reaches WTP in round 3. 
Authors: good has close substitutes, so 
doesn't produce EE (compare Hanemann 
1991). Getting the candy bar (market price: 
0,50) was in fact an "upgrade" from a smaller 
candy (market price: 0,10).
stage 2 food-borne 
pathogen risk
gap 142 1st 
round: 
20; 7-
10:8; 17-
20:23
Authors eliminate outliers for a second table 
that still shows most of the gaps highly 
significant. Gaps seem to decline through 
trading. Information about the probability and 
severeness of the illnesses seems not to 
decrease WTA further, but instead to 
increase it again.
stage 3 coffe mug 
"upgrade"
no gap 1:2,75; 
4-10: 
approx 
1,2
Trading reduces WTA greatly in 3-4 periods, 
WTP rises moderately in the first 3 periods. 
Value of coffee mug: 5,20; plastic mug: 1,60.
Franciosi et 
al. (1996)
choice test does not using the 
words "buyer", "seller" 
and "price" alter the 
results?
mugs gap 120 2.4 Same setup as KKT (1990), except that the 
words "buying", "selling" and "price" are not 
used in the instructions. The gap is a little 
smaller than in the original KKT results, but 
still significant (factor of more than 2). 
Having been in the role of buyer or seller in 
the preceding experiment does not influence 
valuations. Amount earned in prior 
experiments does not alter the valuations = 
no "house money" effect.
exchange test 
part 1
induced values 
(randomly 
assigned between 
$0 and $9.99)
no gap 24 Uniform price double auction mechanism (4 
or 6 min bidding time). 
exchange test 
part 2
mug (w. price tag $ 
9.95)
gap 24 Uniform price double auction mechanism (4 
or 6 min bidding time). Less untertrading 
than in KKT 1990 experiments - authors: 
trading mechanism. No significant effect of 
experiment earnings on WTP or WTA. Bids 
and offers are significantly below the 
WTP/WTA answers in the corresponding 
choice experiment! Choice WTP answers 
are the best predictor for exchange price 
levels.
van Dijk and 
van 
Knippenberg 
(1996)
fixed exchange 
value
EE with "exchange 
goods" (lotteries)
induced-value 
token
no gap 66 students 1.1
uncertain value 
conditions
lottery gap 67 students 1.4 The estimated values of buyer and seller 
groups were not statistically different. 
Buyers: mean Dfl 3.34; sellers 3.27) 
Distribution of lottery (1,75; 5,25) was not 
made explicit: "any value between" - so 
could be seen as a uniform distribution with 
maybe a slightly larger standard deviation 
(more weight to the extreme values which 
can only occur with 1/350 in a uniform 
distribution).
Bateman et 
al. (1997)
testing equivalent gain 
and equivalent loss 
measures and different 
response modes
can of coke gap 156 students Numerical answers to the questions not 
published. From these answers, for every 
subjects a preference for one endowment 
point is calculated. More subjects prefer an 
endowment point when they are already in 
this endowment point. When in neither of the 
two points, preferences are in-between, so 
that WTA>EG>EL>WTP can be infered from 
the results. 
luxury chocolate gap 156 students slightly stronger preference for own 
endowment than in coke experiments, 
although not directly statistically compared
p. 4
Endowment Effect Experiments 1984-2005
Name part Question under 
investigation
good result n subjects ratio 
WTA/ 
WTP
comment
Morrison 
(1997)
Does the 
substitutability play a 
role?
chocolate bar no gap 20 3d/4th year 
students, 
taking a 
course in 
experiment
al 
economics
1.1 WTP subjects were "uncompensated": they 
did not receive a compensation equalling the 
chocolate bar that the WTA group received.
coffee mug gap 20 " 2.2 WTP subjects were "compensated": they 
received a compensation worth the average 
WTA answers of the other group, so there 
cannot be wealth effects. Author: this rules 
out substitutability as an explanation of the 
EE.
Arlen et al. 
(2002)
agency 
experiment
Does the gap exist in 
agency relationships?
coffee mug no gap 145 1st year 
law 
students
1.0 WTA subjects were asket whether they 
would "contribute" their mug to a project of 
their firm. This would allow the firm to 
possibly earn more profits, so to offer higher 
wages. If the offer was accepted, higher 
wage - base wage = WTA. WTP subjects 
were asked whether they wanted to "take" 
the mug from the firm, accepting a lower 
base wage instead of the wage indicating 
higher firm profits.
control 
experiment
Control experiment to 
ensure EE shows up.
coffee mug gap 35 " 1.9
exchange-value 
experiment
"shared-entitlement 
approach" for agency 
effect
coffee mug no gap 76 " 1.3 No mentioning of low or high profit for firm. 
Firm-contract was offered at same time as 
mug question posed, not in a sequential 
manner, as before. Authors: "Shared 
entitlements" thesis is wrong, "exchange-
value hypothesis" is right: subject only 
considers the "exchange value" instead of its 
"consumption value".
Bateman et 
al. (2002)
"money 
response mode"
"current endowment 
hyptothesis" vs. "no 
loss in buying"
luxury chocolate 
vouchers ( for 10 
pieces)
gap 200 undergr. 
Students
geom. 
Means: 
2,13
Authors see this as confirmation of "current 
endowment hypothesis" (british group) vs. 
"no loss in buying" (Kahneman).
"chocolate 
response mode"
money vs. 
Chocolates
gap 120 undergr. 
Students
"immediate 
chocolate"
real chocolate gap 107 undergr. 
Students
Packages of 10 real luxury chocolates were 
used to increase the gap (measured by 
WTA/EG) - successfully.
List (2003) market pretest choice control 
experiment
sports memorabilia 
(two different, 
"unique" goods)
50 visitors of 
sportscard 
show
Sports 
memorabilia: 
nondealer 
treatments
does market 
experience play a role?
sports memorabilia 
(two different, 
"unique" goods)
gap 74 sportscard 
show 
profession
al dealers
142 of 148 of the subjects stated that the 
planned to "consume" (keep) the good. One 
year later, only one subject had sold the 
good. Experienced nondealers (> 6 
trades/month) trade: 46,7 % while 
inexperienced nondealers: only 6,8 % trade! 
Logit estimation shows that trading 
experience has a positive effect on the 
likelihood to trade (p<0,01)! Quadratic 
experience term has negative impact: 
diminishing return to experience.
Sports 
memorabilia: 
dealer treatment
sports memorabilia 
(two different, 
"unique" goods)
no gap 74 Logit estimation shows no significant effect 
of trading experience on likelihood to trade. 
Collector pin 
market 
(nondealers 
only)
robustness test: 
market experience in 
different environment
2 different pins of 
Mickey and Minnie 
Mouse
gap 80 visitors of 
collector 
pin market
78 of 80 subjects stated that they wanted to 
"consume" (keep) the pin. Inexperienced 
consumers (<5 trades/month): 18 % trade; 
experienced consumers: 46,7 % trade! Logit 
estimation reveals sig. effect of trading 
experience (quadr. negative, third poser 
positive).
p. 5
Endowment Effect Experiments 1984-2005
Name part Question under 
investigation
good result n subjects ratio 
WTA/ 
WTP
comment
follow-up 
experiment to 
sports 
memorabilia 
exp. - 
inexperienced 
consumers
treatment effect or 
selection effect?
autographed photo 
vs. autographed 
baseball
gap 21 nondealers 
(of the 
above 
sample)
for both experiments: 52 of 53 subjects 
planned to keep the good they got 
("consume").
follow-up 
experiment to 
sports 
memorabilia 
exp. - 
experienced 
consumers
no gap 32 nondealers 
(of the 
above 
sample)
experienced: trade 7 or more times/month. 
Logit/probit estimations: trading experience 
increases likelihood to trade significantly. 
Controlling for sample selection (those 
subjects of the first experiments that 
participated again), the results are 
unchanged. Within-person analysis (whole 
group): increase in trading activity of the year 
--> significant positive influnence on 
propensity to trade! So the "selection bias" 
argument, that those subjects that do not 
have the endowment effect trade more can 
be rejected vs. the experience argument: 
more trading experience leads to a lower 
endowment effect!
fourth field 
experiment - 
nondealers
Effect of using an 
auction
sheet of basketball 
trading cards 
("unique")
gap 60 sportscard 
show 
visotors
5.6 nth-price auction (n-1 subjects get trade at 
the price given by the nth subject --> 
dominant strategy: reveal value)
fourth field 
experiment - 
dealers
Effect of using an 
auction
sheet of basketball 
trading cards 
("unique")
no gap 60 sportscard 
show 
profession
al dealers
1.3
laboratory 
experiment
evidence from non-
memorabilia collectors
mug vs. candy bar, 
ballpoint pen vs 
magic marker, can 
of coke vs. pencil, 
highlighter vs. 
letter opener
gap, 
decreasin
g in 4 
weeks
35+33 undergr. 
students
every group had four weekly sessions. 
Group 1: order ABCD; Group2 : order DCBA. 
Result: In later trading rounds, gap 
decreased. (If probable typo o p.66, 4th and 
5th line from below is taken into account: 
exchange group 1 and group 2. Otherwise 
inconsistent with statements and numbers 
given above.) If students interacted, they 
might have learned the utility the other group 
got from the goods so could better evaluate 
them in their own experiments?
Schmidt and 
Traub 
(2003)
treatments 1 and 
2
role of income effect 60 different 
lotteries
means: 
gap, 
median: 
no gap
24 students mean: 
1.88, 
median: 
1.06
second-price sealed bid/offer auction. 
Median of mean WTA/WTP-disparity: 1.88. 
Yet, the overall median is 1.06. Highly 
skewed distributions with many outliers and 
many subjects without gap. Reversed 
income effect did not delete gap. Gap 
concentrated in subsample of 60 % of the 
subjects.
treatments 4 and 
5
role of "background 
risk"
30 pairs of lotteries no gap 24 students median: 
1.00
subjects endowed with a lottery and can 
change to another lottery with additional 
payments to and from them, eliciting 
differential WTA and WTP. In 11 of 15 
cases, median = 1. No significant gap 
between DWTA and DWTP
Blondel and 
Lévy-
Garboua 
(2005)
endowment effect for 
lotteries and 
preference reversal
30 different 
lotteries
gap 62 students significant gap for all lotteries, varying with 
payoff and winning probability (see chapter 
2)
p. 6
Endowment Effect Experiments 1984-2005
Name part Question under 
investigation
good result n subjects ratio 
WTA/ 
WTP
comment
Plott and 
Zeiler 
(2005b)
baseline 
procedures
control experiment pens vs. mugs gap 129 students standard procedure of exchange experiment
transaction costs 
test
transaction cost test pens vs. mugs gap 101 students endowed good not immediately in front of 
subject at time of choice; use of forms 
instead of show of hands
standard 
procedures
control experiment pens vs. mugs gap 96 students as baseline, except that raise of hand means 
trading and not keeping
full set of 
procedural 
controls
influence of various 
signals
pens vs. mugs no gap 139 students as transaction cost test except that 1. 
endowed good is randomly chosen instead 
of chosen and given by experimenter and 2. 
experimenter did not "purposefully and 
repeatedly emphasize ownership", decision 
form resembles choice instead of exchange: 
ownership signal might have been removed 
altogether.
Plott and 
Zeiler 
(2005a)
KKT replication Does the EE ever 
exist?
mug gap 29 undergr. 
Students
2.7
Plott/Zeiler 
design 1
Is EE due to subject 
misconceptions?
mug no gap 31 students 1.1 training, practice, anonymity & binding 
outcome experience
Plott/Zeiler 
design 2
Is EE due to subject 
misconceptions?
mug no gap 26 students 0.7 training, practice, anonymity, NO binding 
outcome experience
Plott/Zeiler 
design 3
Is EE due to subject 
misconceptions?
mug no gap 17 students 0.7 training, practice, anonymity & binding 
outcome experience
Van de Ven 
et al (2005)
Experiment 1 are sellers more 
curious?
lottery 
(hypothetical)
answer: 
yes; gap
41 students 2.9 Hypothetical question. Sellers are more 
curious (mean 5.2 (scale from 1 to 7)) than 
buyers (mean 3.3).
Experiment 2, 
fixed value
control experiment fixed value token no gap 33 students 1.0 control experiment as in v. Dijk and v. 
Knippenberg (1996)
Experiment 2, 
uncertain with 
information to 
owner
control experiment lottery gap 33 students 1.3 control experiment as in v. Dijk and v. 
Knippenberg (1996)
Experiment 2, 
uncertain with 
information to all
does curiosity affect 
the gap?
lottery answer: 
yes; gap
33 students 1.2 Value of lottery ticket is revealed to 
everybody, not only to owners. WTA 
significantly lower than in control experiment 
where only owners witnessed the random 
chance procedure.
Brown 
(2005)
use of verbal protocol 
technique: find out 
subjects' motivations
chocolate gap 21 students 2.4 subjects were asked to think aloud, taping all 
comments on audio tape. 3 out of originally 
24 subjects removed, because they did not 
sufficiently understand the instructions or 
cooperate with the "think aloud" request
mug gap 21 students 1.8 seeking a good deal (20 of 24 subjects) 
mentioned most often as explanation for 
gap. Ambiguity about price or value 
mentioned by 3 subjects
notebook gap 21 students 2.3 Most subjects indicated they wanted to make 
a "good deal" and avoid a net loss in the 
transaction, i.e. not sell for much below 
market price
p. 7
Endowment Effect Experiments 1984-2005
Name part Question under 
investigation
good result n subjects ratio 
WTA/ 
WTP
comment
Einhorn and 
Hogarth 
(1985)
Exp. 4 How do ambiguous 
probabilities affect 
WTP/WTA?
insurance against 
loss (100000)
gap 
increasing 
with 
ambiguity
112 MBA 
students
Hypothetical experiments without incentive-
device. In ambiguous situations, a statement 
was added about "considerable uncertainty" 
concerning the probability estimate of the 
loss.
p(loss)=.01 1.0
p(loss)=.01 - 
ambiguous
1.7
p(loss)=.35 1.1
p(loss)=.35 - 
ambiguous
1.5
p(loss)=.65 1.0
p(loss)=.65 - 
ambiguous
1.6
p(loss)=.9 1.1
p(loss)=.9 - 
ambiguous
1.5
Viscusi et al. 
(1987)
Valuation of risk 
connected with 
consumer goods
injury risk caused 
by toilet bowl 
cleaner and 
insecticide
gap 1519 users of 
the 
products
not 
measur
able: 
very 
large
3/4 of all consumers refused to accept the 
product for free (full discount) if the risk of 
injury would be increased from 15/10,000 to 
16/10,000 - contingent valuation approach.
Dubourg et 
al (1994)
Are imprecise 
preferences the reason 
for the EE?
road safety (private 
good)
Answer to 
question: 
no
public 
sample
mean of 
individu
al:
Stage 1 slight permanent 
injury - entire life of 
car 
gap 37 2.4 same subjects answered WTA and WTP 
questions. For WTP/WTA-measures, 
answers with WTA>£75, WTP=0 were 
excluded (this lowers the ratio). H* and L* 
assign upper and lower "certainty" bounds to 
the WTP and WTA answers, elicited in the 
questionnaires. Elicitation method: rotating 
disk, 25 to 75 £.
slight permanent 
injury - one year 
gap 37 2.7
recover 1-3 years: 
entire life o.c.
gap 37 4.1
recover 1-3 years: 
1 year
gap 37 3.1
Stage 2 Under which 
circumstances do the 
WTP/WTA-ranges of 
ucertainty overlap? 
(control experiment)
as above (4 
variants)
gap 101 4.43 to 
6.16
Elicitation method: payment cards, 0 to 
500/1500 £. Respondents rather insensitive 
to the magnitude of risk reduction. For most 
subjects, WTA/WTP-intervals of uncertainty 
(personal confidence interval) do not or only 
partly overlap. --> this cannot (entirely) 
explain the EE.
Bateman et 
al. (2000)
original How do equivalent loss 
(EL) and equivalent 
gain (EG) perform?
change in local 
traffic level
gap 903 Compensating loss and gain are used 
instead of WTP and WTA, creating 
inconsistent labeling within the paper. 
Confidence intervals for EG/CL are very 
large (-10000 to 13000). No statistical 
difference between CG and EL and between 
EG and CL. 81 of 447 (18 %) did not agree 
to any compensation for traffic deterioration: 
53 of them (65 %) stated that they "would not 
accept any reduction in amenity level". 
Correction for inconsistent labels - table 7 
must probably be: CG -> WTP; EL -> EG; 
EG->EL; CL -> CG.
Hypothetical Experiments
p. 8
Endowment Effect Experiments 1984-2005
Name part Question under 
investigation
good result n subjects ratio 
WTA/ 
WTP
comment
Salkeld et 
al. (2000)
Status quo effect in 
health care.
status quo 
bias
600 bowel 
scan 
patients
Respondents face choices of new bowel 
scan methods which differ in different 
characteristics. Aggregation to a regression 
on the characteristics reveals a significant 
negative constant: Respondents prefer the 
current scan over a scan with identical 
characteristics - status quo bias.
Madrian and 
Shea (2001)
Does "automatic 
enrolment"-question 
increase the 
participation rate in 
401(k) pension plans? 
status quo 
bias
19935 emplyees 
of one 
fortune 
500 
company
"Automatic enrolment" (enrolement as 
default option with "opt-out" possibility) 
increased participation rate from 49 % to 86 
% (even more taking tenure into account). 65 
% of new employees leave contribution rate 
at default 3 % (vs. 4 % choosing it before). 
80 % of new employees invest only in money 
market (default option) vs. 6 % before.
Chen et al. 
(2005)
Do monkeys show loss 
aversion?
food vs. metal 
chips
loss 
aversion
5 capuchin-
monkeys
First experiments with non-human subjects. 
Results can be interpreted to speak for 
monkeys showing loss aversion in riskless 
and risky choice.
Other Empirical Observations
p. 9
27 
Chapter 1: 
 Uncertainty and the Experimental  
Endowment Effect 
Elsevier/SABE/IAREP “Best PhD student paper” 200412 
Abstract: Recent experiments have shown that the so-called endowment effect or 
status quo bias disappears under certain circumstances like trading experience. Ex-
isting theories fail to explain these patterns. This paper develops a simple theory 
of uncertainty about the desire to trade leading to a gap between willingness to ac-
cept (WTA) and willingness to pay (WTP).  
Our endowment effect experiment with additional psychological questions rejects 
the predictions made by “loss aversion in riskless choice”. Plott and Zeiler’s 
(2005a) misconception hypothesis and our uncertainty hypothesis are both con-
firmed.  
When subjects with apparent misconceptions are excluded from the data, the gap 
vanishes for a metro ticket, but not for a share certificate with unknown quote. The 
gap for the share collapses when the quote information is released. Overall, as un-
certainty influences the range of possible “strategic” answers as well, it can be 
seen as a main factor in order to predict the measured gap. 
 
Keywords: endowment effect, status quo bias, loss aversion, prospect theory, refer-
ence point, WTA-WTP-gap, uncertainty.  
JEL classification: D81, PsycINFO classification: 2229 
                                                 
12 A former version of the paper with the title “Caution Theory as an Explanation of the Endowment Ef-
fect” was chosen as the “Best PhD student paper” on the 2004 SABE/IAREP conference “Cross Fertili-
zation Between Economics and Psychology” in Philadelphia (SABE: Society for the Advancement of 
Behavioral Economics, IAREP: International Association for Research in Economic Psychology). 
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Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to provide a theory that explains not only the endowment 
effect without exception but cases in which it does not hold as well. We test the predic-
tions of our theory and two other theories in a behavioral experiment.  
The main characteristic that determines the variation in the gap between WTP and 
WTA is uncertainty: The more people are uncertain how much they value an object, the 
more WTP and WTA differ. If they are certain about their valuation and about whether 
they should trade or not, there is no such gap.  
A formal theory to predict the size of the gap is developed in the following section. 
Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), one of the most accurate theories that 
predict behavior under uncertainty, can be extended in a way to predict the relation be-
tween uncertainty and the WTA-WTP-gap. The only step necessary to do this is to ex-
tend the concept of a reference point in wealth to the domain of risk.  
 
I. Uncertainty about Desire to trade 
Imagine that an individual is presented with a choice between an object, say a mug, 
and different amounts of money. Imagine that our individual is certain that she prefers 
the mug over 1.00 €. Yet if the amount of money is 2.00 €, she is certain to prefer the 
money over the mug. The traditional microeconomic approach suggests that there must 
be an exact amount of money where the individual is exactly indifferent between choos-
ing the money and the mug. Imagine that our individual is indeed indifferent between 
choosing the mug and 1.50 €. Now, traditional economic theory would proceed by stat-
ing that our individual would prefer the mug over all amounts of money up to 1.49 € 
and prefer the money over the mug for all amounts above 1.50 €.  
The hypothesis presented in this article contrasts with this view and posits that due to 
uncertainty, individuals’ range of indifference might be far larger than a single price. In 
the above example, it might well be that even for all prices between 1.00 € and 2.00 €, 
our individual is not absolutely sure whether she prefers the mug or the money. There 
could be different sources of this uncertainty: 
1. Uncertainty about the market price of an object (i.e. how much one would 
have to pay in a store). 
 Chapter 1: Uncertainty and the Experimental Endowment Effect 
 29
2. Unfamiliarity with determining an exact value of an object for oneself, espe-
cially when asked to sell this good. 
3. Unfamiliarity with a good itself. 
If there is indeed uncertainty with respect to trading a good at a certain range of 
prices, the question arises whether this uncertainty leads to different reactions in a buy-
ing than in a selling situation? 
Our hypothesis is that individuals do indeed react to uncertainty differently in situa-
tions where they own something of uncertain value than when they do not own it: A 
principle of “erring on the side of caution13” leads to a “status quo bias” if there is un-
certainty. In the above example, our individual might refuse to buy the mug for more 
than 1.00 € and at the same time refuse to sell the same mug for less than 2.00 €.  
Caution corresponds to decreasing the risk of an “erroneous action”, while increasing 
the risk of letting a good opportunity pass. The risk of an “erroneous action” here is to 
buy too high and to sell too low. The risk of letting a good opportunity pass is not to 
buy or sell at a price that might later turn out to have been profitable. 
In order to treat this question formally, let us represent goods as lotteries that can 
yield a high or a low value, corresponding to the individual’s uncertainty about the 
value of the good. 
 
                                                 
13 In case of understanding problems with respect to this expression, a helpful informal discussion can be 
found under http://www.speedreading.com/phpBB2/ptopic30.html (especially the 4th posting). 
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II. A simple Model of Aversion to Risk Changes  
To explain the endowment effect in a risky setting, a model must lead to a distinction 
of two situations: The decision whether to purchase a lottery ticket (figure A) and the 
decision whether to sell a lottery ticket (figure B). The lottery pays a high (H) or low (L) 
payoff with the same probability of 0.5. The other wealth that the individual holds is 
equal to x. The money value WTP in figure A (purchase) is defined such that the indi-
vidual is indifferent between the two end-states γ (no lottery ticket) and δ (holding the 
lottery ticket – but before the lottery is resolved, so actually containing two possible 
sub-states). In the sell situation (figure B), the money value WTA is defined in the same 
way such that the individual is indifferent between the end-states γ’ (no lottery ticket) 
and δ’ (holding the lottery ticket).  
Expected Utility Theory would now compare the two end-states in both situations di-
rectly. Comparisons 1 and 1’ yield the same result14: The end-states without lottery 
ticket are less risky in both cases. So the individual has to be compensated to choose 
end-state δ and δ’: The individual must receive a risk-premium that increases the ex-
pected payoff to compensate for the larger risk. As this result is the same in both situa-
tions,  the risk-premium must be the same, leading to WTP=WTA. 
Although Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) uses relative changes in 
wealth instead of absolute wealth, this does not apply to the domain of risk. Prospect 
Theory also determines the level of absolute risk and compares this uncertainty using 
comparisons 1 and 1’. The result is the same as under Expected Utility Theory: Both 
end-states with the lottery ticket, δ and δ’, are seen as more risky than the end-states 
without lottery ticket, γ and γ’. WTP and WTA must be set such that δ and δ’ include a 
risk-premium, so that they are again of the same magnitude. 
Regret Theory (Loomes and Sugden, 1982) directly compares the consequences of 
two actions without an explicit notion of risk aversion. Instead, the wealth resulting 
from the two actions is compared for every possible state of the world separately. This 
again means using comparisons 1 and 1’, so it cannot yield different results for the pur-
chase and the sell situation. Regret Theory, as Expected Utility and Prospect Theory, 
cannot explain the endowment effect for lotteries. 
                                                 
14 Neglecting a possible income effect. 
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Now consider another method of evaluating the risk of an action. The risk of the end-
states γ (γ’) and δ (δ’) is compared with the original state ρ (ρ’), viewed from ρ (ρ’), so 
taking this point as a reference point. In the purchase situation (2 A), the resulting com-
parisons 2 and 3 yield the same result as the theories cited above, as the starting point is 
risk-free: The state with the lottery δ contains more risk than the starting point ρ without 
a lottery. The individual has to be compensated with a risk premium to choose the ac-
tion “buy lottery ticket”. 
The change this approach brings is visible by applying it to figure B, the sell situa-
tion: Comparisons 2’ and 3’ now yield a different result: Comparison 3’ shows that the 
end-state with lottery ticket, δ’, contains exactly the same risk as the starting point ρ’, 
where the lottery risk is also included. There is no difference between the two states in 
any possible state of the world. There is no change in the risk. Comparison 2’ reveals 
the opposite for state γ’: Seen from the reference point, ρ’, the risk has changed, be-
cause the lottery ticket has been sold. The conventional comparison would state that the 
risk has been reduced. However, with a relative notion of risk, one must state that the 
risk has nevertheless been changed. The difference γ’ – ρ’ is in itself a lottery: (WTA-H, 
WTA-L). In comparison with the original state, either the high payoff H is foregone or 
the low payoff L. By choosing “sell ticket“, the relative result is now “additional risk“. 
Now comparing these relative outcomes of δ’ and γ’ shows that the individual has to 
receive a risk premium to make her sell the lottery, to choose the end-state γ’ without 
the lottery. This is the opposite result of the one achieved in the buy situation, so WTP 
and WTA differ.  
We need to extend the concept of a reference point as used in Prospect Theory from 
the domain of wealth to the domain of risk. To model this in a corresponding assump-
tion, we will for a moment treat the risk of all current holdings as incorporated and ac-
cepted. Formally, the current state is risk-free. By giving up a “positive” risk, this is 
treated as if acquiring a corresponding “negative” risk. 
Assumption: Giving up the lottery (H, L) corresponds to accepting the opposite lot-
tery (-H, -L). 
This “trick” allows us to proceed with the standard framework and the conventional 
notion of risk aversion to display “aversion to risk changes”. Later, the conventional ab-
solute risk aversion will be reintroduced.  
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Compared to the other theories that link uncertainty and the endowment effect (Ran-
kin, 1990, Sugden, 2003, and Blondel and Lévy-Garboua, 2005), our approach stays 
closest to Prospect Theory by only making the single assumption stated above. 
 
Formulation of the Model 
We model one individual with a given preference set in two different situations: As a 
buyer and as a seller of a lottery that pays out money. The information the individual 
has about the good is always the same, so there is no problem of asymmetric informa-
tion15. A rational (complete, transitive) preference ordering over lotteries is assumed to 
exist. “~” displays indifference between two options. 
The discrete lottery (H, 0.5; L, 0.5) yields a high payoff H and a low payoff L with 
even probability of 50 % each. H ≥ L. (Round brackets will be used for lotteries, square 
brackets for mathematical operations. As the probabilities are always 50 %, they are 
omitted in all lottery notations: (H, L). To simplify the notation, the current wealth level 
that has to be added in all states of the world is defined as zero, so it can be left out. 
Willingness to pay (WTP) and Willingness to Accept (WTA) are the money values that 
satisfy the following conditions:  
Purchase: (H-WTP, L-WTP) ~ 0;  (3.) 
Sale: (-H+WTA, -L+WTA) ~ 0 (4.)  
The first equation, related to the buy situation, is straightforward: The price one has 
to pay for the lottery is subtracted from the payoffs in both the high and the low state. 
WTP is defined as the price at which the individual is indifferent between buying (left 
hand side) and not buying (right hand side). The second equation is related to the “aver-
sion to risk changes”. Selling the lottery (H, L) is treated as acquiring the lottery (-H, -
L). The WTA is the price attached to this lottery that makes the individual indifferent 
towards the transaction. 
It is straightforward to see that in both cases the variance of the lottery is not altered 
by the price attached to it16. The difference between the two states is H-L ≡ k in the buy 
as well as in the sell situation. The corresponding lotteries must be identical for two rea-
                                                 
15 In reality, a seller will most probably have more information than a buyer. In the experiments, this is 
not the case. 
16 The variance is [(H-L)/2]2, the standard deviation is (H-L)/2. 
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sons: First, they have the same variance (and probabilities) and second, the individual is 
indifferent between both lotteries and doing nothing (staying at current wealth, which is 
defined as zero). There cannot exist two different lotteries (a, b) and (a’, b’) such that 
both fulfill (a, b) ~ 0 ~ (a’, b’) when their payoff difference is the same a-b=k=a’-b’. 
They must be the same lotteries, a=a’ and b=b’.  
 
 
Figure 3: The resulting gap between WTA and WTP. 
 
Consider Figure 3: The lotteries (+H, +L) and (-H, -L) are both shifted towards zero 
(the reference point of actual wealth) and collapse into the lottery (a, b) that is defined 
as (a, b) ~ 0.  
Being indifferent between these two transformed lotteries and zero means (from 3. 
and 4.): 
 (H-WTP, L-WTP) ~ (-H+WTA, -L+WTA) ~ 0  (5.) 
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This can only be the case if the high and the low outcomes of the buy- and sell-
lottery are identical. The high outcome of the “buy lottery” is H-WTP, while the high 
outcome of the “sell lottery” is –L+WTA:  
H-WTP = -L+WTA and L-WTP = -H+WTA (6.) 
yielding in both equations:  
WTA+WTP = H+L (7.) 
Definition: [H+L]/2 ≡ E 
E=E(H, L) is the expected value of the lottery. The last equation can be rewritten as:  
[WTA+WTP]/2 = E (8.) 
With “aversion to risk changes” only, the midpoint of willingness to accept and will-
ingness to pay is the expected payoff of the lottery. 
 
a) Benchmark I: Neutrality towards Risk Changes 
As a benchmark, let us briefly consider the case of risk neutrality: The individual is 
indifferent between the lottery and the payment of its expected payoff: (a, b) ~ E(a, b) = 
[a+b]/2. If (a, b) ~ 0, this means that a= -b. Applying this to the lotteries in (3. and 4.) 
we get:  
H-WTP =-[L-WTP] and –H+WTA=-[-L+WTA] 17  (9.) 
WTP=E=WTA (10.) 
In case of risk neutrality, WTA and WTP fall together and correspond to the ex-
pected payoff. There is no gap between WTA and WTP.  
 
b) Benchmark II: No Uncertainty 
If there is no uncertainty, we have H=L=E. Insert into (5.): 
 (E-WTP, E-WTP) ~ (-E+WTA, -E+WTA) ~ 0  (11.) 
 (E-WTP) ~ (-E+WTA) ~ 0  (12.) 
This can only be solved for 
WTP=E=WTA (13.) 
When there is no uncertainty, there is no endowment effect. 
 
                                                 
17 One can also formulate that the expected value has to be zero: 0.5*(L-WTP)+0.5*(H-WTP)=0 and 
analogously for WTA, yielding the same result. 
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c) Uncertainty and Aversion to Risk Changes  
Now let us consider the case when there is both risk aversion and uncertainty. Risk 
aversion means that (a, b) ≺ E(a, b)=[a+b]/2 – an individual prefers the payment of the 
expected payoff to the lottery. This means that for accepting a lottery, there has to be a 
reward: the expected value of the lottery has to be positive. For a mixed lottery (a, b) 
with a>0, b<0 such that (a, b) ~ 0, this means that 0.5a+0.5b=c>0. It will depend on the 
individual risk aversion how the payoffs of the lottery have to be increased to make the 
lottery just acceptable. For a given payoff variation H-L of a lottery, there is exactly one 
such value c.  
Definition: c is the “normalized” risk premium of the lottery (H, L) such that: 
c=E(a, b)=0.5a+0.5b with (a, b) ~ 0, a>0, b<0 and a-b=H-L=k.  
We have seen that the payoff variation in both lotteries (purchase and sale) is of the 
same size H-L=k, so the expected value of both lotteries has to be the same to make 
them just acceptable.  
0.5[H-WTP] + 0.5[L-WTP] = c = 0.5[-H+WTA] + 0.5[-L+WTA]  (14.) 
WTP = [H+L-2c]/2 and WTA = [H+L+2c]/2 (15.) 
WTP = E - c and WTA = E + c (16.) 
WTA = WTP + 2c (17.) 
In case of uncertainty and aversion to risk changes, a gap arises between the willing-
ness to accept and the willingness to pay, symmetrically around the expected value of 
the lottery. WTP is equal to the expected value minus the normalized risk premium of 
the lottery. WTA is equal to the expected value plus the normalized risk premium of the 
lottery. Therefore, the size of the WTP/WTA-gap depends positively on the (relative) 
risk aversion and on the variance of the lottery.  
 
d) Reintroduction of absolute Risk Aversion  
Allowing for absolute risk-aversion together with aversion to risk changes simply 
decreases the value of the lottery in both the buy and the sell situation: The individual 
has to receive a risk premium r to hold the lottery. Applying this to (16.) yields: 
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Results: 
[WTP + WTA] / 2 = E - r  (18.) 
WTP = E - c - r    and    WTA = E + c - r  (19.) 
WTA = WTP + 2c (corresponds to 17.) 
Equation (17.) remains unchanged. “Aversion to risk changes” alone cause the en-
dowment effect.  
The results (14.) to (16.) are applied to the experimental lottery data of van Dijk and 
van Knippenberg (1996) in Appendix I. The necessary risk aversion to predict the data 
is the same as empirically found in Tversky and Kahneman (1992, p. 59). 
 
III. Experiment 
Method 
An experimental study with 60 subjects was carried out at University of Munich in 
August and September 2005. The experiment was conducted with one subject at a time 
and took approximately 60 minutes for each subject (including 4 survey questions in the 
beginning that are examined in chapter 3 of this dissertation). A detailed description of 
the experimental procedures and instructions can be found in Appendix III of this chap-
ter. 
Subjects were recruited on the location, leading to a broad mix of students of differ-
ent subjects, retired persons and others. Average age was 27,7 (median 25) and 83 % of 
the participants reported to live on 1,000 € or less per month (average net income in 
Munich is around 2,500 € per household18). Subjects received an initial fee of 3 € and 
left with an average cash of 6 € and goods worth 3 €. 
After the survey questions were finished, subjects read an introduction to the experi-
ment. Following this, the experimenter explained the Becker-de Groot-Marschak ran-
dom price mechanism (see above). As an example, subjects were asked to (hypotheti-
cally) buy an apple and sell an orange. The mechanism of comparing a randomly drawn 
transaction price with their WTP and WTA was explained with the help of a table 
drawn on the blackboard. 
                                                 
18 Source: survey from 2000: 4,870 DM (2,490 €) for all households (n=3,502). 
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Afterwards, subjects read detailed instructions on the mechanism following Plott and 
Zeiler’s (2005a) instructions – yet they were told they were free to skip them if they felt 
they did not need them. Our approach was, therefore, not to exclude misconceptions by 
declaring our instructions fool-proof. Instead, we included additional valuation ques-
tions to check for misconceptions, as explained below. 
In the experiment, subjects were asked to state a minimum selling/maximum buying 
price for the following goods: 
• A mug (a standard mug bought at Walmart for 1.47 €)  
• a metro ticket (single ride, 1 zone, valid in Munich’s public transport 
“MVV” with the official price of 2.20 € printed on it19) 
• a lipstick (bought at a local drugstore for 1.59 €),  
• a share (a real share certificate of the company Bremer Vulkan, which was 
still traded at the Frankfurt Stock Exchange at a quote of 0.11 € on 1st of Sep-
tember 2005).  
In both WTA and WTP tasks, the object was put on the subject’s table. Subjects were 
allowed to inspect the object. No questions concerning the object itself were answered 
(this was also indicated in the instructions). 
After subjects had indicated their WTA or WTP for an object, they were asked in the 
instructions whether they were sure they would not accept a slightly lower price/pay a 
slightly higher price20 and to change their WTA/WTP answer if they would. After this, 
subjects answered a question on the difficulty of determining this WTA/WTP answer 
and on the importance of their estimation of the official market price21 of the object in 
this decision. Additional questions concerning the objects themselves were postponed 
after all WTA/WTP questions had been answered, in order not to influence them. 
After indicating WTA or WTP for an object and going through the three immediate 
follow-up questions, the transaction was carried out: A random transaction price was 
                                                 
19 In a subsample, we used the same tickets with a printed price of 2.00 € (the reduction stemming from 
buying the ticket with an electronic cash card). The answers for this ticket are only analyzed together 
with the answers for the 2.20 €-tickets when checking for individual WTA-WTP-gaps (as there is no rea-
son why gaps should be different). 
20 This deviates from Plott and Zeiler (2005) who asked this verbally, giving it greater weight.  
21 For the metro ticket, they were asked about the importance of the price printed on it. For the share, sub-
jects were asked about the importance of the quote they estimated. 
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drawn from a plastic box containing small paper sheets with different prices22. If the 
price indicated that the subject would buy/sell the object, the money and the object were 
immediately transferred. 
The last five transactions were part of a randomization process, with a letter from A 
to E deciding which transaction would be carried out. This allowed eliciting both WTA 
and WTP for the same good from the same subject. Before subjects came to this ran-
domization process, they had at least answered and carried out one real selling and buy-
ing task. 
The current quote of the stock was not revealed in the beginning. After subjects had 
given all WTA and WTP answers in the five randomized tasks, they were given addi-
tional valuation questions, asking them whether they would consider buying or selling 
an object at different prices a “good deal” and how certain they were about this. We dis-
cuss these questions in more detail below. 
Before one of the randomized tasks was selected, subjects were told what the current 
quote of the stock was (0.11 €). They were then allowed to give new answers in the 
WTA and WTP conditions for the share before the random letter was drawn and one of 
the five transactions was carried out. When we refer to “share with quote information”, 
we refer to these answers, while “share” alone refers to the answers in the first WTA 
and WTP task, before this information had been released. 
After all transactions, subjects had to answer additional questions about the goods 
they had seen. The additional questions regarding the share were asked before the quote 
information was released, as subjects were asked to estimate the value (quote) of the 
share. 
As the experiment was run successively over a time span of two weeks, the experi-
menter seized the occasion to exclude questions and treatments that did not appear 
promising after a certain number of subjects, and to include additional questions and 
treatments to answer questions that had come up. Therefore, as the result tables show, 
not all treatments and questions have the full possible number of subjects. New ques-
tions and treatments were always added at the end  of the instructions in order not to in-
fluence the answers to the treatments and questions that were continued. 
                                                 
22 There was a different box with different prices for every object. In order not to influence subjects’ an-
swers, they were only told that prices always started at 0, but not what the highest price was for every 
object.  
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Results 
The most important facts about the data can be seen in Table 2 below.  
There are four different ways how to measure the gap between WTA and WTP: 
- Difference between mean WTA and mean WTP (aggregate mean gap) 
- Difference between median WTA and median WTP (aggregate median gap) 
- Mean individual gap between individual WTA and WTP from the same subject 
(mean individual gap; only possible for the subsample of subjects that have an-
swered both WTA and WTP questions for a given good) 
- Median individual gap between individual WTA and WTP from the same sub-
ject (median individual gap; only possible for the subsample of subjects that 
have answered both WTA and WTP questions for a given good) 
For all subjects together, all types of measurement of the WTA-WTP-gap show a 
significant gap for each good (see Table 5, appendix I, for the relevant tests). The larg-
est measured gap is the aggregate mean gap for the share (without quote information): 
15.99 €. The smallest measured gap is the median individual gap for the lipstick: 0.10 € 
(which is still significantly different from zero, as a Wilcoxon rank-sum test shows, see 
Table 5). 
It is not mainly the mere existence of the WTA-WTP-gap that is of interest here. We 
will also test the hypotheses formulated for three different explaining theories. 
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Table 2: Main experimental results 
  Metro ticket Mug Lipstick Share Share
         
quote 
given 
WTA No. of WTA answers 29 43 43 54 31
 mean WTA 1.79 € 1.85 € 1.51 € 21.29 € 4.61 €
 (std error) 0.15 0.29 0.29 4.67 3.21
 median WTA 2.00 € 1.00 € 0.80 € 10.00 € 0.70 €
 Importance of price 74 48 39 60  
 (std. error) 5.8 6.2 6.9 6.6  
 difficulty (mean)* 1.07 1.41 1.14 2.43  
  (std error) 0.17 0.14 0.14 0.13   
WTP No. of WTP answers 28 30 31 54 31
 WTP: mean 1.33 € 1.01 € 0.59 € 5.30 € 0.29 €
 (std error) 0.15 0.22 0.14 1.10 0.10
 WTP: median 1.50 € 0.50 € 0.20 € 2.25 € 0.10 €
 Importance of price 65 42 21 47  
 (std. error) 6.4 7.9 6.9 6.8  
 difficulty (mean)* 0.96 1.14 0.83 2.35  
  (std error) 0.14 0.15 0.17 0.16   
Aggregate gap mean 0.46 € 0.84 € 0.92 € 15.99 € 4.32 €
  median 0.50 € 0.50 € 0.60 € 7.75 € 0.60 €
Individual gaps individual gap: n 31 13 14 48 31
 individual gap (mean) 0.64 € 1.10 € 0.86 € 12.88 € 4.32 €
 (std error) 0.15 0.43 0.43 3.08 3.22
  individual gap (median) 0.30 € 0.70 € 0.10 € 4.50 € 0.20 €
Market price real price 2.20 €** 1.47 € 1.59 € 0.11 € 0.11 €
 No. of answers 41 59 58 55  
 estimated price: from 2.10 € 1.61 € 1.63 € 17.19 €  
 (std error) 0.04 0.15 0.14 5.27  
 …. to 2.27 € 4.27 € 5.05 € 49.51 €  
 (std error) 0.06 0.35 0.41 11.51  
Uncertainty No. of answers 29/21*** 6 4 31/28***  
 
Buying uncertainty at 
WTP (mean; std. error) 92 (3.5) 77 (10.5) 80 (12.2)  53 (6.6)  
  
Buying uncertainty at 
(WTP+WTA)/2 92 (3.3) 83 (6.7) 85 (9.6) 45 (6.6)   
 
Selling uncertainty at 
WTA 87 (3.0) 73 (9.2) 88 (7.5) 58 (5.9)  
 
Selling uncertainty at 
(WTA+WTP)/2 83 (4.5) 65 (10.9) 78 (8.5) 52 (6.6)  
Intention keep 64 65 18 46  
 (std error) 6 4.26 4.21 5.69  
 gift 21 32 80 12  
 (std error) 5 3.88 4.14 4.38  
 sell 13 5 3 42  
  (std error) 4 2.12 1.05 5.37   
*reported difficulty of finding the WTA or WTP answer. 0 - very easy to 4 - very hard 
**aggregate results for the ticket with a printed price of 2.20 € are shown, while results for individual gaps stem from the 
2.20 €-ticket and a ticket with 2.00 € as the printed price  
*** no. of answers for buying and selling at WTP and WTA/no. of answers for buying and selling at (WTP+WTA)/2  
 Chapter 1: Uncertainty and the Experimental Endowment Effect 
 42
 
Testing the Hypothesis of Loss Aversion in iskless Choice 
As outlined above, the hypothesis of loss aversion in riskless choice makes only one 
falsifiable prediction: an endowment effect exists for goods that individuals intend to 
keep, while no endowment effect exists for goods that individuals intend to sell. A 
somewhat extended continuous form of this prediction would state that, the more an in-
dividual intends to keep a good, the larger the endowment effect would be. 
One of the follow-up questions for every object in our experiment was about the sub-
jects’ intention with respect to the object: 
 
“Usage of the object 
Please distribute 100 % onto the three possibilities, according to how likely you 
consider them. 
If I own the object after the experiment, I will  
Keep it:                                   _________ % 
Give it as a gift to someone    _________ % 
Sell it                             :        _________ %” 
 
The aggregate answers to these questions can be found in Table 2. It is possible to 
check for a relationship between intention to keep or sell and a gap between WTA and 
WTP in different ways: 
 
Hypothesis I – relationship between intention to keep/sell and WTA-WTP-gap: 
H.I.1 - Between-goods-comparison:  
• H.I.1.a - keeping: A high average intention to keep the good leads to a sig-
nificant aggregate gap between mean/median WTA and mean/median WTP. 
(H.I.1.a’: continuous relationship: the higher the intention to keep the good, 
the higher the gap) 
• H.I.1.b - selling: A high average intention to sell the good after the experi-
ment leads to no (or only a small) gap between mean/median WTA and WTP 
(H.I.1.b’: continuous relationship)  
H.I.2 - Between-subjects-comparison: 
 Chapter 1: Uncertainty and the Experimental Endowment Effect 
 43
• H.I.2.a - keeping: a high individual intention to keep the good leads to a sig-
nificant individual gap between WTA and WTP (H.I.2.a’: continuous rela-
tionship) 
• H.I.2.b - selling: a high individual intention to sell the good after the experi-
ment leads to no (or only a small) gap between individual WTA and WTP 
(H.I.2.b’: continuous relationship) 
 
Evidence 
Aggregate data: 
Subjects indicate a significantly higher intention to keep the metro ticket (average 
answer of 63 % versus 45  % for the share, see Table 6, appendix II). The measured ag-
gregate gap is significantly larger for the share. This contradicts H.I.1.a’.  
Subjects indicate a significantly higher intention to sell the share (score of 42 versus 
11 for the metro ticket), contradicting H.I.1.b’. The low intention to sell the metro ticket 
together with a significant gap contradicts H.I.1.b. The measured intention to sell the 
share, if estimated as being “high”, must lead to another contradiction of H.I.1.b.  
 
Individual data 
Table 6shows the relevant tests (11 and 12) for testing H.I.2:  
Subjects stating almost no intention to keep the metro ticket (score ≤ 1/100) never-
theless show a mean individual gap of 0.70 €23. This contradicts H.I.2.a. 
Subjects stating a high intention to sell the share after the experiment (score ≥ 50) 
nevertheless report a significant mean individual gap of 18.56 €. This contradicts 
H.I.2.b.  
Table 7 shows the results of the relevant regressions for the continuous versions of 
H.I.2:  
For the metro ticket, there is no relationship between the selling or keeping intention 
and the individual gap. H.I.2.a’ and H.I.2.b’ are rejected. 
                                                 
23 That is different from 0 only at p=0.063 (t-test) and even higher (p=0.19) in the sign test. The low num-
ber of subjects in this category (6) must be taken into account when making conclusions from this test 
alone. Additionally, after taking out misconception answers, the remaining gap is indeed close to zero for 
the remaining (whole) sample, as shown below. 
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For the share, the relationship found in the data is of the opposite direction than hy-
pothesized: A higher intention to keep the share after the experiment is associated with a 
smaller individual gap. A higher intention to sell the share after the experiment is asso-
ciated with a larger individual gap. Again, H.I.2.a’ and H.I.2.b’ are rejected24.  
 
Overall, Hypothesis I stating that an intention to keep an object after the experiment 
leads to a significant gap and that an intention to sell an object after the experiment 
leads to no or only a small gap must be seen as strongly rejected by our data. 
 
Testing the Misconception Hypothesis (Plott and Zeiler, 2005a) 
Plott and Zeiler (2005a) state that individual misconceptions (strategic answers) are 
responsible for the WTA-WTP-gap. Subjects that completely understand the BDM-
mechanism are expected to show no WTA-WTP-gap. 
If behavior of both types is present, this could possibly be detected by answers fol-
lowing two distinct patterns. 
 
Hypothesis II - Misconceptions/incomplete understanding of the BDM mechanism 
together with strategic answers lead to the WTA-WTP-gap. 
• H.II.1 –  Subjects who do not fully understand the mechanism and are subject 
to “strategic motives” show a gap between individual WTA and WTP. 
• H.II.2 – Subjects who completely understand the mechanism do not show a 
gap between individual WTA and WTA. 
• H.II.3 – If some subjects are subject to misconceptions and strategic motives, 
while others fully understand the BDM mechanism, answers should fall into 
one of two categories: no individual gap (comparably low WTA, large WTP) 
and large individual gap (high WTA, low WTP). 
 
 
                                                 
24 The reason for this relation could lie in the correlation (0.34, significance: 0.08) between a high estima-
tion of the minimum market price (quote) for the share and the selling intention: Subjects that think the 
share is not worth a lot, rather intend to keep it as a souvenir (as the costs associated with selling the 
stock on the stock exchange might be larger than the value of the stock). Subjects, who think the share is 
worth a lot, consider selling it later more likely. More on the relationship between estimation of the mar-
ket price and the gap below. 
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Evidence – individual data 
A question on subjects’ understanding of the instructions shows that 57 of 60 sub-
jects at least believed they had understood them. Table 13 (Appendix I) shows the indi-
vidual gaps of the three subjects that did not answer the understanding questions with 
“yes” (subjects no. 46, 48 and 54). Subject 48’s behavior does clearly not fall into the 
category of strategic answers, while the answers of no. 46 and 54 are consistent with 
this pattern. Case numbers are too small for statistical tests, nevertheless one can see 
that a failure to understand can lead to high gaps. 
It is questionable whether the understanding question can be fully trusted. Subjects 
might very well pretend to fully understand the instructions, while in fact they do not 
understand them or understand them wrongly (many indeed commented something like: 
“I think I have understood, well, we will see…”). 
As an additional check on subjects’ understanding, we run additional valuation ques-
tions on the goods on which subjects had stated both WTA and WTP, investigating the 
nature of a gap between these answers. The additional questionnaire consisted of two 
buying questions and two selling questions per good. In the buying questions, subjects 
were asked whether they would consider buying the good at two different prices (in-
serted by the experimenter) as a “good deal” (or a “bad deal” or neither of the two) and 
how certain they were about their answers. In the selling questions, they were asked  
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whether they would consider selling the good (given they owned it25) at two different 
prices as a “good deal”. The four prices were inserted by the experimenter according to 
the subjects’ earlier WTP and WTA answers: The buying prices were WTP and 
(WTP+WTA)/2, the selling prices were WTA and (WTP+WTA)/2.26 Directly after each 
“good deal” question, subjects were asked how certain they were about their answers 
(on a scale from 0 to 100 %).  
If a subject indicates that buying (selling) at (WTP+WTA)/2 would be a “good deal”, 
giving a higher WTP answer (a lower WTA answer) would have been optimal with the 
employed mechanism. 41 % (12 of 29) of the subjects answering these questions for the 
metro tickets showed this kind of mistake (indicating either a good buy or a good sale at 
(WTP+WTA)/100 while being 100 % certain of it), compared to 10 % (3 of 31) for the 
share. Yet such a behavior need not be a sign of complete misunderstanding: if the WTP 
and WTA answers were quite close together, it only means that one would be willing to 
pay a little more (accept a little less) than said before. We can check for “larger” mis-
takes if we look for the same pattern of answers when the WTA-WTP-gap reported for 
the object was at least 1 € (i.e. one would have been willing to pay 0.50 € more or ac-
cept 0.50 € less). This kind of economically more significant mistakes was revealed by 
14 % for the metro ticket and 10 % for the share27.  
Although the number of subjects stating either WTA too high or WTP too low is not 
large, their answers have a large effect on measures of the gap in terms of means. Some 
very high WTA answers influence these measures greatly, such as subject 47 stating a 
WTA for the mug of 10 € and subject 38 stating a WTA of 9 € for the lipstick and WTA 
of 100 € for the share with quote information (see Table 13; subject 38 alone accounts 
for 75 % of the mean gap (individual and aggregate) for the share with quote informa-
tion).28 These case studies, also reported in Table 13, support H.II.1. 
                                                 
25 In order to diminish a felling of a sale of something one has just received always being a „good deal“, 
subjects were told they should imagine they had found the object or received it as a gift from their bank 
(share) and were now considering whether keeping or selling it. 
26 If the subject had indicated WTP=WTA, the second buying and selling question was deleted. If the sub-
ject had indicated WTA<WTP, the first buying price was set to WTA and the first selling price to WTP. 
If the subject had indicated WTP=0, the first buying price was set to 0.10 €. 
27 Case numbers for the mug and lipstick are small and biased, because additional valuation questions 
were only asked if WTA and WTP differed. Significant mistakes – mug: 1 out of 6 (17 %), lipstick 1 out 
of 4 (25 %) 
28 Subject 54 provides a typical revealing insight: For the metro ticket, she stated WTA=4 €, WTP=2 € 
(and an even larger gap for the lipstick). She later indicated that selling the ticket at 4 € would be a “bad 
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Examining the data for outliers can be helpful in judging H.II.3, whether both types 
of behavior are present. The distributions (Figure 4 to Figure 8 below) show that out-
liers seem to appear for all goods. They are particularly extreme for the mug, the lip-
stick, and the share with quote information. The largest mass of answers without out-
liers above zero is found for the share. This evidence supports a conjecture according to 
H.II.3 that some subjects were subject to misconceptions and answered strategically, 
while others understood the mechanism. 
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Figure 4: Distribution of individual gaps – metro ticket 
 
                                                                                                                                               
deal” for her, because she would have a bad conscience (as the official price, printed onto the ticket, was 
2 €). 
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Figure 5: Distribution of individual gaps – mug. 
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Figure 6: Distribution of individual gaps - lipstick 
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Figure 7: Distribution of individual gaps - share 
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Figure 8: Distribution of individual gaps – share with quote information 
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This explains the large difference between the mean and median measurements of 
the gap. The mean measures are influenced by the outliers due to these misconceptions, 
while the medians are only marginally influenced29. 
To test whether subjects, who understood the mechanism, report no gap for all 
goods, we categorized subjects into 3 different categories, according to their answers in 
the extra valuation questions: 
Category 0 – no detectable misconception: Subjects who did not say they would see it 
as a good deal to sell at their WTA or buy at their WTP with 100 % certainty. 
Category 1 – misunderstanding cannot be excluded: Subjects stating that selling at 
their WTA or buying at their WTP would be a good deal with 100 % certainty, but 
did not say the same about buying or selling at (WTP+WTA)/2. 
Category 2 – clear misunderstanding, real gap at most half as large as reported 
gap: Subjects stating that buying or selling at (WTP+WTA)/2 would be a good deal 
with 100 % certainty. 
The existence and scope of a misconception for subjects falling into category 1 can-
not be determined with the data: Stating that buying at one’s WTP would be a good deal 
with certainty could still mean that buying at “WTP+0.01 €” (or, more economically 
relevant +0.10 €) would not be perceived as a good deal. Stating as WTP the highest 
price, at which buying is still perceived as a good deal, is in fact a strategy as good as 
naming the lowest price at which the individual is indifferent between buying and not 
buying (and the same for selling). 
Table 3 shows the result of this categorization for the metro ticket and the share. The 
subjects without detectable misconception show quite a low gap for the metro ticket: the 
average individual gap is 0.28 €, the median gap is even 0.00 €. Even if these measures 
can still be shown to be somewhat significantly larger than zero (a one-sided t-test indi-
cating p=0.049 for mean>0; a sign-test indicating that median>0 with p=0.11), the size 
of the gap cannot be distinguished from mere transaction costs. The data for the metro 
ticket supports H.II.2, according to which the full understanding of the mechanism leads 
to no (or only a very small) gap. 
 
                                                 
29 As the outliers are all on the same side of the distribution (high for WTA, low for WTP), the median is 
also biased, yet only indirectly by being shifted half a rank per outlier and not directly influenced by the 
amount stated. 
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Table 3: Categorization of subjects according to possibility of misconception 
 N Average ind. 
Gap (std. error) 
Median ind. 
Gap 
95 % Conf. in-
terv 
Metro ticket     
Category 0: no 
misconception 
12 0.28 € (0.15) 0.00 € -0.06; 0.61 
Cat. 1: possible 
misconception 
5 1.12 € (0.46) 1.60 € -0.17; 2.41 
Cat. 2: sure mis-
conception 
12 0.91 € (0.25) 0.95 € 0.36; 1.46 
Share     
Category 0: no 
misconception 
24 7.15 € (2.05) 3.85 € 2.91; 11.37 
Cat. 1: possible 
misconception 
4 3.30 € (1.37) 2.95 € -1.06; 7.66 
Cat 2.: detect-
able misconcep-
tion 
3 72.57 € (13.90) 62.70 € 12.78; 132.35 
 
This cannot be said for the answers concerning the share: Subjects showing no sign 
of misconception report a significant median individual gap of 3.85 € (mean individual 
gap of 7.15 €)30. The subsample of 10 subjects showing no sing of misconception in any 
of the treatments also shows a significant gap for the share (mean 9.10 €, median 4.75 
€) that is significantly larger than zero (p-values 0.03 (t-test for mean>0) and 0.00 in  
sign-test for median>0). Therefore, the answers from the share treatment (without quote 
information) contradict hypothesis H.II.2 – at least detectable misconceptions cannot 
account for the entire gap found for the share.  
Therefore, although the misconception hypothesis can be seen as broadly confirmed, 
it can certainly not account for the entire gap. 
 
Testing the Uncertainty Hypothesis 
Following the model outlined above, we test the following hypotheses concerning 
the relationship between specific kinds of uncertainty and the WTA-WTP-gap: 
Hypothesis III – Relationship between uncertainty and WTA-WTP-gap 
H.III.1 – between goods/situations 
                                                 
30 T-test (mean>0) and sign test (median>0) show p=0.001 and p=0.000, respectively. 
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• H.III.1.a – Uncertainty about the market price increases the aggregate 
WTA-WTP gap. 
• H.III.1.b – Unfamiliarity with exact valuation of goods in the selling task 
increases the aggregate WTA-WTP-gap. 
H.III.2 – between subjects:  
• H.III.2.a - Uncertainty about the market price increases the individual 
WTA-WTP-gap. 
• H.III.2.b – Unfamiliarity with exact valuation of goods in the selling task 
increases the individual WTA-WTP-gap. 
 
Evidence 
Aggregated data 
The rationale behind the choice of a share and a metro ticket in our experiment relies 
on our presumption that subjects would be quite uncertain about the value of the share 
while they would be quite certain about the value of the metro ticket. This is indeed 
what subjects report in our experiment. The certainty reported in the additional valua-
tion questions is much higher for the metro ticket than for the share (see Table 2 and 
Table 6, test 10, Appendix I). At the same time, the gap for the share is much larger than 
the gap for the metro ticket (see test 1,  
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Table 6 in Appendix I). The fact that determining WTP and WTA for the share is 
more difficult than for the metro ticket (tests 2 and 3) also speaks in favour of subjects 
being more uncertain about the value of the share. These results support H.III.1 in gen-
eral. 
The average range of possible market prices that every subject had to indicate was 
also much larger for the share than for the metro ticket (test 5). This supports hypothesis 
H.III.1.a. 
After the stock quote had been revealed, the gap for the share decreased dramatically 
to 0.20 € (median individual gap) and 4.30 € (mean aggregate gap). This is also consis-
tent with H.III.1.a. 
Before we test whether selling might be more unfamiliar than buying, we introduce 
and test a hypothesis about how subjects decide whether to trade an object or not: 
 
The “good deal” heuristic 
From his endowment effect experiment following a “verbal protocol technique” 
(where subjects are asked to think aloud), Brown (2005) reports: 
“Overall, most subjects seemed primarily concerned with getting a good deal (or, 
conversely, avoiding a bad deal) in the transaction.” (p. 375)  
From this finding, we hypothesize that a heuristic of “getting a good deal” might ex-
ist that people use when buying and selling, without recurring to the exact value that a 
good would represent to them, by simply asking themselves more intuitively: “Would 
the proposed transaction at this price be a good deal for me?”. The answers to the fol-
lowing questions (that were asked at the end of the experiment) confirm that this heuris-
tic exists and has some importance for buying. 
 
Question: 
“When you go shopping and see an object that you did not originally intend to buy, 
how do you decide whether to buy nevertheless? 
Please distribute 100 points onto the answers, according to how correctly they repre-
sent your attitude.” 
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Answers (n=26) Score: Mean 
(std error) 
Score: 
Median
I consider whether it is a good deal or even a bargain to buy the 
object at this price 
34 
(4.9) 
30 
I consider how much the object would be worth for me and 
compare this value with the price 
47 
(4.8) 
50 
Other consideration 18 
(4.3) 
10 
 
Have you applied the concept of making a good deal/bargain in our buying tasks? 
Please answer with a number from 0 to 100, meaning: 
0 – I did not use the concept 
100 – the concept has always played an important role 
Result (n=30): Average score: 52 (std error 5.6); median score: 55. 
 
We further hypothesized that, because situations where people are deciding whether 
to sell something are much rarer, they might have more difficulty to apply the “good-
deal-heuristic” in selling situations. The answers to the following questions confirm that 
this was indeed the case at least for some subjects in our experiment. 
 
Question: 
“In the selling tasks, have you used a similar concept: the thought whether it is a 
good deal to sell at a certain price? Please distribute 100 points onto the answers, ac-
cording to how correctly they represent your attitude.” 
Answers (n=25) Score: Mean 
(std. error) 
Score: 
Median 
Yes, I can use this concept for selling as easily as for buying 37 
(7.6) 
30 
Yes, but as I am less used to selling, it is more difficult for 
me to apply the concept. 
37 
(7.3) 
30 
No, I proceed in a completely different way when selling 27 
(6.8) 
10 
 
 
Since some subjects have more difficulty applying the “good-deal-heuristic” in sell-
ing than in buying situations, the question is whether this necessarily leads to a gap be-
tween WTA and WTP? We hypothesized that subjects, as an answer to uncertainty in 
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the selling situation, might attach greater weight to what they estimate as the market 
price for the object (even if they do not intend to sell the object afterwards). Brown 
(2005, p. 375) reports from his experiment: “Although a few subjects were obviously 
cognizant of the opportunity cost of failing to sell the item, most indicated they were 
primarily concerned with not giving up the item for less than some meaningful portion 
of what it was worth in a sale situation.” 
 In the buying situation, subjects might more easily incorporate the fact whether they 
really want to own the object, i.e. how much utility they derive from owning it. In cases 
where subjects rather do not want to own an object, the bias in the selling situation to 
rely on an estimated market price could lead to a WTA-WTP gap. Therefore, we for-
mally test whether the estimated market price is more important in the selling than in 
the buying task, and whether selling is considered more difficult than buying: 
Evidence: 
• The measured mean importance that subjects attach to the estimated market 
price is indeed larger in the WTA than in the WTP task for all goods. Tests 
show a significant difference only for the lipstick and the share (see Table 5 
in Appendix I).  
• For the mug and the lipstick, selling was considered more difficult than buy-
ing (Table 5). No such difference exists for the metro ticket (possibly because 
of the printed price helping in the selling task) and the share (possibly be-
cause the quote is the only influencing factor that is equally unknown in both 
treatments).  
This evidence supports H.III.1.b, according to which unfamiliarity with exact valua-
tion of goods in the selling task increases the aggregate WTA-WTP-gap. 
 
Individual data 
In order to test H.III.2 – whether individual gaps are influenced by uncertainty -, we 
regress the individual gaps on several indicators of uncertainty (see Table 8 to Table 11 
in appendix I). It turns out that the factors significantly influencing the gap are: 
 
 Chapter 1: Uncertainty and the Experimental Endowment Effect 
 56
• Range of price estimations -  H.III.2.a 
The most influential variable in the lipstick and mug regression is the range of 
price estimations (“I estimate the price in the store to be between x and y”, taking x-y 
as the range). Yet this range of the estimated prices is only important if the official 
price of the good is important for the subject. Especially for the lipstick, many people 
show that they have no interest whatsoever to buy or keep the lipstick: they answer 
WTP and WTA as being 0.00 or 0.10 € and indicate with a low price importance that 
they do not care about the official price of the lipstick. The variable used for the re-
gression is therefore the range of market price estimations multiplied with the re-
ported price importance (sum of the scores for WTP and WTA task). If a subject 
showed no interest in the market price (score=0), her range of possible market price 
will not influence the gap (0*x=0). 
For the share, the importance of the estimated quote does not mediate the influ-
ence of the quote estimation in this way. Instead, the range of the quote estimations 
positively influences the gap directly. It is possible that subjects did not indicate how 
important the thought about the estimated quote was, but how important this quote it-
self was for them, expressing trust in their own estimation31. So, in this case, the 
score of price importance could also be understood as a willingness to take a risk 
(many subjects actually commented that they would be willing to “wager” a certain 
amount by stating it as their WTP).  
For the metro ticket, the range of price estimations does not explain any variation 
in the gap. The most probable reason is the fact that the range of estimated prices is 
close to zero (median 0.00 €, mean 0.12 €), as the official price was printed on the 
ticket. 
These results suggest that H.III.2.a is confirmed. 
 
• Selling being more difficult – H.III.2.b 
The difference in difficulty between the WTA and the WTP task is a significant 
factor influencing the gap for the lipstick positively. 
The difference in importance of the printed price is a significant factor influencing 
the gap for the metro ticket and for the share positively. 
                                                 
31 A comment by a subject: „Of course the thought about the quote is important, it is the only thought.” 
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• Familiarity with the good in general  
For the lipstick, the variables “Never uses lipstick” (dummy), sex (dummy: male), 
and “intention to give lipstick away as a gift to someone else” all increase the individual 
gap if used separately, as they are correlated. (A male subject is of course much more 
likely never to use lipstick and therefore to intend to give it away.) At least the variables 
“never uses lipstick” and sex (male) could be seen as standing for less familiarity with 
lipsticks and therefore supporting H.III.2 in general. 
 
Table 4 shows which types of uncertainty influence the gap for which good: 
Table 4: Types of uncertainty influencing the individual gaps for the different goods  
(variable used in regression in brackets) 
Type of uncertainty Metro ticket Mug Lipstick Share 
 
Market price uncer-
tainty 
- 
(no uncertainty) 
√ 
(mediated by 
sum of price im-
portance) 
√ 
 (mediated by 
sum of price im-
portance) 
 
√ 
 
Selling uncertainty 
√ 
 (difference in 
price impor-
tance) 
- √ 
(difference in 
difficulty) 
√ 
(difference in 
price impor-
tance) 
 
As the price importance has been used to mediate the market price uncertainty for the 
mug and the lipstick, it cannot be used to represent the uncertainty caused by selling be-
ing more difficult in general than buying. Instead, for the lipstick, the difference in re-
ported difficulty between WTA and WTP task is a significant factor.  
 
 
Additional observations: 
• When subjects were asked to reveal their WTP for the share (without quote 
information), some counted the money they had earned so far in the experi-
ment.32 Their comments were as follows: aware of the risk of buying a share 
that might turn out to be worthless, they would try not to leave the room with 
                                                 
32 For 4 subjects, their WTP answer for the share corresponds exactly to this amount of money. 
 Chapter 1: Uncertainty and the Experimental Endowment Effect 
 58
a loss. In the WTP condition, they were willing to “wager” the amount of 
money they had on the table in front of them. In the WTA condition, this did 
not play a visible role. This is consistent with the current endowment before 
entering the experiment was an important reference point for many subjects.33 
This observation is consistent with our notion of uncertainty being evaluated 
differently in the WTP and WTA conditions according to the principle of 
“erring on the side of caution” (aversion to risk changes). In the WTP condi-
tion, subjects did not want to lose a lot of their cash. In the WTA condition, 
they were more ready to forego higher prices for the share. The risk of keep-
ing a share that might turn out worthless was apparently seen as less severe 
than paying the same amount of money for a possibly worthless share. 
• A question about the subjects’ knowledge about the company Bremer Vulkan 
(of which the share was provided) showed that only 2 subjects considered 
themselves to be “well informed” about the company and one subject to be 
somewhat well informed. Table 12 (Appendix I) shows the answers of these 
subjects. These case studies speak for the hypothesis that the greater knowl-
edge about the company decreased the individual gaps for the share. 
 
Summarizing, the uncertainty hypothesis in its various forms is confirmed by our data. 
 
Uncertainty vs. Misconceptions 
As shown above, misconceptions can indeed account for a part of the gap and con-
trols for misconceptions can even decrease the gap to almost zero for the metro ticket, 
although not for the share. Uncertainty about the market price and selling in general has 
been identified as a significant factor influencing individual gaps positively. Neverthe-
less, the question remains which factor is more important in general, i.e. can account for 
most of the gaps that have been measured in the experiments so far.  
It is important to note here that the above controls for misconceptions are very likely 
to sort out individuals who were uncertain about selling in general. These individuals 
                                                 
33 One subject that was apparently in desperate need of money (no. 38) even claimed that he would not 
spend a cent of the 3 € participation fee after he received the money (right at the beginning of the ex-
periment). Consequently, all WTP answers were zero (except WTP for the metro ticket), indicating that 
the 3 € were seen as being part of the current endowment/reference point. 
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orient their WTA answer close to an estimated market price. When asked later whether 
they would consider selling at a lower price a “good deal”, they might only then realize 
that the most relevant influence for them should have been their own estimation for the 
object and not the market price. The larger importance of the market price in the selling 
situation can also be seen as a kind of misconception. Indeed, some subjects that had 
bought or kept an object in the experiment, realized after the experiments that they did 
not really want to have it.34 
 
Predicting the Gap 
In order to predict the occurrence and size of a WTA-WTP-gap, uncertainty seems to 
play a role in a direct, and even in an indirect way:  Also for the “strategic answers” due 
to misconceptions, uncertainty plays a role. Even a very high “strategic” WTA must be 
in a range that one can expect to obtain as a price. Consider the maximum WTA an-
swers given in this experiment: metro ticket – 4 €, lipstick – 9 €, mug – 10 €, share 
(with quote information) – 100 €, share (without quote information) – 200 €. Nobody 
would expect to receive 100 € for a metro ticket, while this cannot be seen as impossible 
for a share. So in terms of predicting the variation of the gap in different settings where 
misconceptions cannot be excluded ex ante, uncertainty plays a role directly as well as 
indirectly via influencing the strategic answers/misconceptions. 
 
IV. Discussion 
Relation to other empirical Evidence 
Our result that uncertainty is responsible for a considerable part of the endowment 
effect is consistent with the body of experimental evidence. 
List (2003) finds no gap for experienced traders of sports memorabilia. These traders 
know quite well, how valuable the “unique” good in question is – whether it is more 
valuable than the good offered in exchange or not.  The amateur traders are more uncer-
tain about the value of the good. List even finds a direct continuous relationship be-
                                                 
34 3 goods that were kept (instead of sold) and 2 goods that were bought were given back/sold back. This 
shows that this mistake is also possible in the buying task. As our price importance answers show, the 
mistake seems to be more likely in the selling task. 
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tween years of trading experience and the size of the endowment effect35 (57, 61). The 
longer the individual experience as a trader, the smaller the influence of the endowment 
effect. 
Ortona and Sccacciati (1992) find no significant gap for a book voucher. The sub-
jects (students) are mostly in need of books36, so it is not hard for them to estimate the 
value of the voucher.  
Shogren et al. (1994, stage 3) find no gap when a coffee mug is offered in exchange 
for a plastic mug. This is in line with the argument forwarded here: The plastic mug 
provides almost the same function as the coffee mug – they both are only useful if one 
needs a mug at all. The difference in functionality and design of the two mugs can 
probably be judged with relative certainty, so there is little uncertainty about whether to 
trade or not. 
“Fixed-value tokens” are often used in control experiments (e.g. Kahneman et al., 
1990, 1332 & 1340) and never induce a gap. The value of the tokens is fixed in money 
terms. Subjects know exactly what they will get out of a token. 
Our observation that uncertainty about the market price of an object influences the 
decisions in the buying and selling tasks differently, i.e. that the original form of loss 
aversion in risky choice (concerning the net result of a transaction cf. p. 17) plays a role, 
is supported by Brown’s (2005) observation: “Subjects were, to put it simply, averse to 
incurring the net loss that results from paying too much or selling too cheaply. If loss 
aversion is separated from the good per se and instead refers to the net result of the 
transaction, loss aversion may certainly play a role in the disparity.” (Brown, 2005, p. 
376).  
Simonson and Drolet (2004), researching on “anchoring effects”, find that “needs 
and values” of the respondents are more important in determining WTP (37,5 % of re-
spondents refer to them) than in WTA (15 %). For WTA judgements, 58 % of respon-
dents explain their minimum selling prices with market prices and others’ WTP com-
pared to 43 % of respondents in the WTP setting. From a different experiment, the au-
thors conclude: “The results […] suggest that anchoring effects on WTP-WTA judge-
ments and the endowment effect are related phenomena and might be moderated by a 
                                                 
35 Measured as “propensity to trade”. 
36 This leads the authors to label the book vouchers “necessary goods”. 
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similar underlying factor, namely, the level of uncertainty about the desire to trade.” (p. 
689) 
Our finding that misunderstandings are present and influential are consistent with 
Plott and Zeiler’s (2005a) results and Brown’s observations: “Many subjects’ state-
ments about what the good was worth to others or about making a profit suggest that 
they did not embrace, or perhaps even understand, the random price auction.” (Brown, 
2005, p. 376)  
Our rejection of the hypothesis of loss aversion in riskless choice is also consistent 
with Brown’s results “The most surprising finding of this study is that there was not 
more evidence of the endowment effect.” (Brown, 2005, p. 376 – his notion of the en-
dowment effect corresponds to what we call the hypothesis of loss aversion in riskless 
choice). 
In a recent study, Plott and Zeiler (2005b) investigate on the status quo bias in ex-
change experiments (where goods are exchanged for other goods instead of money, 
such as in Knetsch, 1989 and List, 2003). They show that when they incorporate several 
controls into an experiment where some subjects can exchange a mug for a pen and oth-
ers a pen for a mug, the unwillingness to exchange the good vanishes. 
The controls that Plott and Zeiler used were intended to avoid “other-regarding pref-
erences” and various signals to interfere with the exchange decision. Ownership over 
the good was randomly assigned and the experimenter did not “purposefully and repeat-
edly emphasize ownership”. In experiments without these controls, the standard status 
quo bias was found that more subjects in both groups kept their endowed good. One 
could, however, argue that Plott and Zeiler even removed ownership altogether.37 
Ownership/endowment itself must be considered rather a signal than a physical char-
acteristic. The question is why and when this signal leads to a status quo bias in trading 
behavior.  
                                                 
37 In the setting where no such status quo bias was observed, subjects had to indicate their intention to 
exchange their good by answering the following question:  “please circle the item you wish to take home 
with you: mug; pen; don’t care.” The question remains whether subjects still perceived this as exchang-
ing their endowment for something else or whether they might have perceived it as a  choice between re-
ceiving different objects? The meaning of the concept of ownership in this concept is “if you do nothing, 
you take the object home with you”. By making the question rather a choice question between two ob-
jects, this characteristic of ownership is removed. There can be no status quo bias in choice if none of the 
options is recognized as “status quo”. 
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With the results from our experiment, we think we can give an answer to this ques-
tion. When subjects are uncertain about trading the object in question, subjects are more 
likely to be influenced by any signal: by the signal of ownership, inducing the status 
quo bias and by signals such as those as singled out by Plott and Zeiler (2005b) in one 
or the other way. On the other hand, when individuals are certain about the evaluation 
of their options, any signal will hardly influence their behavior. If the two options are, 
for example, a pen and a new car, subjects would always leave the experiment with the 
car, regardless of their initial endowment.  
In our experiment, subjects indicated that they would always prefer 10 € over the 
metro ticket, regardless of whether they owned the ticket or not. Yet for the share, most 
subjects were more uncertain about preferring 10 € or the share, so the signal of owner-
ship led to the status quo bias/endowment effect. The answer to this question was dif-
ferent in the buying and selling question (11 % of the WTP answers were larger than 10 
€ and 44 % of the WTA answers). So the signal of ownership did not induce a status 
quo bias in the decision between 10 € and the metro ticket, but it did induce a bias in the 
decision between 10 € and the share. 
 
Relevance for Policy Issues 
If one accepts that individual uncertainty with respect to a decision can induce status 
quo bias, this has importance for at least two different fields of policy. 
 
Employee Saving Plans 
One of the most important applications of the status quo bias debate concerns volun-
tary saving. Many employees save less than economists think they should. Economists 
have tried a strategy called “automatic enrolment”. It consists of simply changing the 
question that firms ask their employees in a questionnaire from “Do you want to partici-
pate in the savings plan?” to “You are automatically enrolled in our savings plan, unless 
you indicate that you do not want to.” Doing this raises the participation rate dramati-
cally to over 85 % (Choi et al, 2001 and Madrian and Shea, 2001) from usually quite 
low levels below 50 %. About 80 % of participants accept both the default savings rate 
and the default conservative investment fund (Choi et al, 2001). 
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As a response and further extension to these findings, Richard Thaler and Shlomo 
Benartzi have designed a “Save more tomorrow” program: Employees are given the 
possibility to join a savings plan in which their contribution rate is automatically in-
creased every year. After the program has been in place for four annual raises, Thaler 
and Benartzi (2004) conclude that:  
“(1) a high proportion (78 percent) of those offered the plan joined, (2) the vast ma-
jority of those enrolled in the SMarT ["Save more tomorrow"] plan (80 percent) re-
mained in it through the fourth pay raise, and (3) the average saving rates for SMarT 
program participants increased from 3.5 percent to 13.6 percent over the course of 40 
months. The results suggest that behavioral economics can be used to design effective 
prescriptive programs for important economic decisions.” (p. 165) 
With the results from our experiment, the great importance of the following state-
ment from the same paper might become clear: 
“These households [that appear to be saving too little] are not sure how much they 
should be saving, though they realize that it is probably more than they are doing now; 
but they procrastinate about saving more now, thinking that they will get to it later.” 
(Thaler and Benartzi, 2004, p. 170) 
How much to save and how to save is a difficult decision for many people, especially 
for non-economists. Our experiment has demonstrated that at least for buying and sell-
ing, “status quo bias” reacts strongly to uncertainty. A transfer to the saving decision 
would state: If the employees were less uncertain about their saving decision, the prob-
lem of status quo bias would diminish. An alternative to automatic enrolment and auto-
matic rise of contribution rates that Thaler and Benartzi themselves call “libertarian pa-
ternalism” could therefore be to increase people’s knowledge about the saving decision. 
Including a single question on whether or not employees want to join a saving plan is 
certainly the minimum of information that can be given. Increasing people’s knowledge 
about how much and how to save might be no easy task, but it avoids the shortfalls of 
all prescribed programs that have to make a decision for the individuals (e.g. allocation 
of the savings to a certain fund) while it is unclear whether this is indeed the optimal 
decision for them. 
 
 Chapter 1: Uncertainty and the Experimental Endowment Effect 
 64
The Kyoto Protocol 
A second important application of the endowment effect/status quo debate concerns 
the validity of Coase’s Invariance Theorem that states that an efficient allocation of 
ownership rights will be reached regardless of the initial allocation of ownership rights. 
This theorem lies at the heart of the CO2-certificate trading resulting from the Kyoto 
protocol. The question to be answered is: Do companies experience the same status quo 
bias in trading as individuals in experiments? If this was the case, the initial allocation 
of the certificates would indeed matter and lead to different results than, say, all compa-
nies buying the certificates from the government (coming close to a tax solution).  
Given our results about uncertainty and status quo bias, we can partly answer this 
question by referring to the hope that companies should have quite a good knowledge 
about the value of their certificates and therefore not be susceptible to a strong status 
quo bias in selling. It is, on the other hand, not impossible that at least some companies 
do not invest much into research about future market values of the certificates, or that 
this research leads to a wide range of possible values. In this case, only a willingness to 
take a risk in a transaction (i.e. small or no “aversion to risk changes”) could save the 
Coase Theorem and the seamless functioning of the market for certificates. Economists 
usually assume companies to be risk neutral (in the conventional sense). Decision mak-
ers, however, are humans and might therefore nevertheless be susceptible to phenomena 
like loss aversion in risky choice, i.e. show status quo bias under uncertainty. We there-
fore conclude that research in this area might be much needed. 
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Conclusion 
The endowment effect is an influential and well-established phenomenon at the heart 
of economic decision theory. This paper provides a theory that explains the size of the 
WTP/WTA-gap as a function of uncertainty about the desire to trade.  
This risk is seen to cause the endowment effect, because here people are assumed to 
be averse to “risk changes”. They demand a premium for selling a risky asset, because 
they are averse towards a net loss in comparison to their reference point in which they 
incorporate the risky asset.  
Our experiment rejects the predictions of the prominent hypothesis of “loss aversion 
in riskless choice”, that states that a WTA-WTP-gap exists for goods which people in-
tend to keep, while no gap exists for goods that people intend to sell. This prediction is 
also inconsistent with a large body of experimental evidence. 
The predictions of Plott and Zeiler’s (2005a) “misconception hypothesis” were sup-
ported by our experimental result, although not in their entirety. The WTA-WTP-gap 
found for a metro ticket falls almost to zero when controlling for possible misconcep-
tions. Nevertheless, by deleting possible misconceptions, the gap measured for a share 
cannot be eliminated.  
Various measures of uncertainty about market prices and selling in general are found 
to influence the measured gaps positively. This confirms our uncertainty hypothesis. 
In a broader sense, status quo bias might be influenced by a decision maker’s uncer-
tainty with respect to a decision. Applied to the question how to increase voluntary sav-
ing for retirement, an alternative to “paternalistic” strategies like automatic enrolment 
and automatic increases of contribution rates would be efforts to decrease employees’ 
uncertainty with respect to the saving decision. 
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Appendix 
I. Application of the Results to Experimental Data 
Data from Van Dyk and van Knippenberg (1996): Lottery that pays between 
L=$0.96 and H=$2.89 (original values were in Dutch Guilder). Expected payoff 
E=$1.93. Subjects were told that any value between the minimum and maximum could 
be drawn; for resolving the lottery, the authors used a uniform distribution.  
Experimental results (67 student subjects): mean WTP=$1.58; mean WTA=$2.18. 
Calculations: “Absolute risk premium” r=E-[WTP+WTA]/2=$0.044 “Risk change 
premium” c=WTA-E+r=E-r-WTP=$0.303.  
Resulting “neutral” lottery: (H-WTP, L-WTP)=(-L+WTA+2r, -H+WTA+2r)=($1.31, 
–$0.62) distribution as in the experiment (unspecified/uniform). This seems indeed like 
a good candidate for a lottery towards which subjects are indifferent without compensa-
tion. The necessary risk aversion of roughly 2:1 for wins : losses corresponds to empiri-
cal findings in Tversky and Kahneman (1992, p. 59): their subjects (25 students) are in-
different to the following “50-50” discrete lotteries:  
(-$25, +$61), (-$50, $101), (-$100, +$202), (-$150, +$280). 
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II. Additional Tables & Figures 
Table 5: Tests  
(H1: first row>second row vs. H0: equality; for single rows, tests are in comparison to zero) 
  answer mean 
t-test: p-
value (one-
sided) median 
Wilcoxon rank-
sum test (p-
value) 
Metro ti-
cket WTA 1.79 € 2.00 €  
  WTP 1.33 € 0.017 1.50 €  0.048 
 Individual gap 0.64 € 0.000 0.30 € Sign test: 0.000
Mug WTA 1.85 € 1.00 € 
  WTP 1.00 € 0.011 0.50 € 0.009
 Difficulty  WTA 1.41 1 
 Difficulty WTP 1.14 0.091 1 
 Individual gap 1.10 € 0.012 0.70 € sign test: 0.020
Lipstick WTA 1.51 €  
 WTP 0.59 € 0.003  0.008
 Difficulty WTA 1.14  
 Difficulty WTP 0.83 0.087  
 
Price importance  - 
WTA 39  
 Price imp.  WTP 21 0.034  
 Indiv. gap 0.86 € 0.031 0.10 € 0.020
Share WTA 21.29 €  
 WTP 5.30 € 0.001  0.000
 Price Imp WTA 60  
 Price Imp. WTP 47 0.100  
 Indiv. Gap 12.88 € 0.000 4.50 € Sign test: 0.000
Share with 
quote WTA 4.61 € 0.70 € 
  WTP 0.29 € 0.094 0.10  € 0.001
 Ind. Gap 4.32 € 0.095 0.20 € Sign test: 0.000
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Table 6: Metro ticket vs. share  
(one-sided tests: H1: first row > second row vs. H0: equality) 
Test 
no. 
Variable Mean t-test (one-sided): 
p-value 
Sign-test: p-value 
(one-sided) 
 Ind. gap (metro t.) 0.64 €   
1 Ind. gap (share) 12,98 € 0.003 0.000 
 Selling Difficulty (share) 2.29   
2 Selling Difficulty (metro t.) 1.37 0.000 0.001 
 Buying difficulty (share) 2.37   
3 Buying difficulty (metro t.) 0.93 0.000 0.000 
 Price Imp. Selling (metro t.) 74   
4 Price Imp. Selling (share) 60 0.029  
 Price imp. Buying (metro t.) 65   
5 Price imp. Buying (share) 47 0.036  
 Range of price estimate 
(share 
30.13 €   
6 Range of price estimate 
(metro t.) 
0.12 € 0.000  
 Keeping (metro t.) 63   
7 Keeping (share) 45 0.042  
 Selling (share) 42   
8 Selling (metro t.) 11 0.000  
 Individual gap (share) 12.98 €   
9 Individual gap (share with 
quote information) 
4.31 € 0.002 0.0002 
10 Certainty of buying at WTP 
(metro ticket) 
92   
 Certainty of buying at WTP 
(share) 
55 0.000 0.000 
11 Ind. Gap (share, selling in-
tention ≥ 50) – larger than 0? 
18.56 € 0.0429 0.0078 
12 Ind. Gap (metro t., keeping 
intention ≤ 1) – larger than 
0? 
0.70 € 0.0629 0.1875 
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Table 7: Relation between individual gaps and keeping/selling intention.  
Numbers in brackets indicate p-values for normal standard errors (first number) and robust standard er-
rors (second number). 
Dependent Vari-
able 
Individual gap 
share 
Individual gap 
share 
Individual 
gap metro 
ticket 
Individual gap 
metro ticket 
Explanatory Vari-
able 
Intention to 
keep after ex-
periment 
(score from 0 
to 100) 
Intention to 
sell after ex-
periment 
(score from 0 
to 100) 
Intention to 
keep after 
experiment 
(score from 0 
to 100) 
Intention to 
sell after ex-
periment 
(score from 0 
to 100) 
Constant (p-value) 36.8  
(0.000; 0.004) 
-4.77  
(0.453; 0.403) 
0.61  
(0.064; 
0.071) 
0.64  
(0.001; 0.002) 
Coefficient (p-
value) 
-0.449  
(0.002; 0.021) 
0.441  
(0.002; 0.014) 
0.001 
 (0.769; 
0.779) 
-0.003  
(0.679; 0.435) 
Heteroscedasticity 
test: p-value* 
0.066 0.033 0.965 0.346 
Adjusted R2 0.455  0.461 -0.035  -0.034  
R2 0.491  0.497  0.003 0.007  
n 16 16 28 26 
*Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteorscedasticity. H0: Constant variance. A low p-value indicates that the hypothesis of 
homoscedasticity should be rejected (in which case p-values for robust standard errors should be looked at). 
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Table 8: Individual gap (lipstick) – regressions of influencing factors 
Dependent variable Lipstick individual gap Lipstick individual gap Lipstick ind. gap 
 Coef-
ficient 
p-
value* 
β Coeff. p-v* β Coeff. p-value* β 
Constant 0.21 0.205 
(0.126) 
 -0.394 0.133 
(0.008) 
  -.26     0.135 
(0.075) 
 
Range of estimated 
price  * price impor-
tance (sum) 
.0038 0.000 
(0.000) 
0.71 0.0038 0.000 
(0.000) 
0.7 .0037  0.000  
(0.000)     
0.67 
Difficulty (differ-
ence between selling 
and buying) 
0.540 0.000 
(0.000) 
0.53 0.511 0.000 
(0.000) 
0.5 .539  0.000  
(0.000)     
0.54 
Never uses lipstick 
(dummy; compared 
to “often” or 
“rarely”) 
      .438   0.075  
(0.031)     
0.13 
Sex: female 
(dummy) 
-0.364 0.057 
(0.020) 
-0.12       
Gift (score)    0.0052 0.122 
(0.047) 
0.1
05 
   
Adj. R2 0.965   0.9597   0.963
1 
  
Heteroscedasticity 
test: p-value** 
0.281   0.349   0.189
4 
  
n 14   13   13   
*normal p-values; p-values for robust std. errors in brackets 
**Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteorscedasticity. H0: Constant variance. A low p-value indicates that the hypothesis of 
homoscedasticity should be rejected. 
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Table 9: Individual gap metro ticket – regression of influencing factors  
Dep. Variable Metro ticket individual gap 
 Coeff p-v: n (rob) Beta 
Const -0.179 0.569 
(0.396) 
 
Has no monthly 
ticket (dummy) 
1.022 0.024 
(0.001) 
0.639 
Gift (score) 0.014 0.025 
(0.019) 
0.554 
Uses metro rarely 
or never (dummy) 
-0.602 0.167 
(0.063) 
-0.279 
Price importance 
(diff. betw. sell 
and buy; score) 
0.008 0.021 
(0.007) 
0.422 
Adj. R2 0.345   
Heteroscedasticity 
test: p-value* 
0.857   
n 26   
*Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteorscedasticity. H0: Constant variance. A low p-value indicates that the hypothesis of 
homoscedasticity should be rejected. 
 
Table 10: Individual gap mug – regression of influencing factors 
 Mug: individual gap 
 coefficient p-v (rob) Beta 
Const 0.403 0.214 (0.052)  
Range of market 
price estimation * 
price importance 
(sum) 
0.0065 0.000 (0.000) 0.964 
Gift (score) -0.019 0.014 (0.001) -0.356 
Adj. R2 0.8575   
Heteroscedasticity 
test: p-value* 
0.894   
n 12   
*Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteorscedasticity. H0: Constant variance. A low p-value indicates that the hypothesis of 
homoscedasticity should be rejected. 
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Table 11: Individual gap share – regressions of influencing factors 
Dep. variable Share: ind gap  Share: ind. Gap (gap & 
range logged) 
Only 
logged 
gap & 
range 
 Coeff p-v 
(rob) 
beta Coeff p-v 
(rob) 
beta  
Const        
Price importance 
(diff. betw. sell 
and buy) 
0.253 0.007 
(0.003) 
0.438 0.015 0.012 
(0.008) 
0.491  
Range of market 
price est. 
0.471 0.032 
(0.118) 
0.337 0.281 0.084 
(0.142) 
0.334 0.26; p: 
0.047 
(0.058); 
Certainty of buy-
ing at 
(WTP+WTA)/2 
0.263 0.015 
(0.045) 
0.384 0.009 0.182 
(0.247) 
0.236  
Adj. R2 0.4498   0.4053   0.079 
Heteroscedasticity 
test: p-value* 
0.000   0.6824   0.1773 
n 27   23   39 
*Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteorscedasticity. H0: Constant variance. A low p-value indicates that the hypothesis of 
homoscedasticity should be rejected. 
 
 
Table 12: Share: Subjects stating they are “well informed about the company” 
Subject no. Comment WTA (share) WTP (share) 
8 Only WTA elicited 0.10 €  
31  1.00 € 1.00 € 
39 Checked both “well 
informed” and 
“have heard the 
name, but are not 
well informed” 
5.00 € 2.00 € 
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Table 13: Subjects with reported understanding problems or persistently large gaps 
Subject 
no. 
comment Ind. gap 
mug 
 
Metro 
ticket 
Lipstick Share Share 
with 
quote in-
formation 
46 Understanding: 
(blank) 
5.50 € 2.00 €   4.50 €  0  
48 Understanding: 
no 
1.50 € 0.10 €  0 0  
54 Understanding: 
no 
 2.00 €  4.50 €  55 € 0.90 € 
47   2.00 €  4.00 € 6.80 € 6.90 € 
38 Did not finish; 
reported to 
desperately 
need money 
1.00 €  0.20 € WTA: 
9.00 € 
100 €  100 € 
Individual 
median 
gaps 
 0.70 € 0.30 € 0.10 € 4.50 € 0.20 € 
 
 
 
III. Own Experiment – Setup and Instructions 
 
1. Setup 
 
Overview  
(S = subject; E = experimenter): 
1 – Survey 
2 – Begin of experiment: money handed out (3.00 €) – S reads 1st page of instructions 
3 – Experimenter explains example with apple & orange at the blackboard 
4 – S continues with instructions, fills out questions about understanding and personal 
questions 
5 – E starts experiment by putting first object on S’s table. The tasks were run in the fol-
lowing order: 
E1: mug – either WTA or WTP 
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E3: lipstick – either WTA or WTP (the opposite of the previous task; sheets are 
put on the side, as their backs are needed later. E records the WTP answer. ) 
6 - Random task selection: after answers were recorded, a letter from A to E was drawn 
to decide which task was executed: 
A – share – either WTA or WTP 
B – metro ticket – WTP  
C – mug or lipstick – WTA (if E1 was WTP: mug, otherwise, E2 was WTP and 
this task was about the lipstick, such that the subject had previously answered 
the WTP question. If S did not buy the object, they were told: “If we draw 
“C”, you will own the object and you can keep or sell it.” If S had previously 
bought it, they were told: “If we draw “C”, you can sell this object that you al-
ready own. We will draw a price whether you sell it back to me or keep it.” 
D – metro ticket – WTA 
E – share – WTP or WTA (opposite of A) – the reason for switching the order of 
WTA and WTP task was to check for order effects in the answers 
The letter was not drawn yet, but first the following steps were done: 
7 – S answers additional share questions (back of sheet E) while E fills out additional 
valuation questions with S’s previous answers 
8 – S receives sheets with additional valuation questions for the share, the metro ticket 
and the mug/lipstick (only if WTA and WTP differed for the latter) 
9 – S is told the quote (value) of the stock (0.11 €) and given the chance to change an-
swers for task A and E. Afterwards, a letter is drawn and the resulting task is re-
solved. 
10 – S answers the additional questions for the mug, the lipstick and the metro ticket 
(back of E1, E3 and B). The reason for postponing the additional questions after the 
WTP/WTA answers was to prevent influence on the answers. S answers general 
questions and fills out a receipt for the goods and the money. 
 
2. Instructions viewed by Subjects 
* Comments between asterisks * 
Experiment – Introduction 
* The instructions follow those used by Plott and Zeiler (2005) as closely as possible. * 
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This is an experiment in individual decision-making. Out purpose is to study factors 
that influence buying and selling decisions. The experiment is financed by the German 
Research Foundation (graduate program „Markets, Institutions and the Scope of Gov-
ernment“). The results will be used in my dissertation in economics. 
 
The instructions are simple, and if you follow them carefully and make good deci-
sions, you might earn a considerable amount of money or other things. What you earn 
will depend on the decisions you make. There are no right or wrong decisions. Simply 
decide as you think it is right. You can ask questions concerning the procedure at any 
time. Questions concerning the objects themselves will not be answered, in order to let 
your own thoughts guide you in the valuation of the objects. You should not understand 
any instruction, example or comment as a hint on the value of an object.  
 
You will perform different buying and selling tasks. The procedure is always the 
same: 
You are shown an object. In the selling task, the object is yours, i.e. it is a gift for 
you that you can sell. In the buying task the object is not yours yet, but you can buy it. 
You name a price range. In the selling task a minimum sale price, in the buying task 
a maximum buy price.  
A transaction price is determined, that is compared to your price range.  
The purchase/sale is arranged with real money, if your price range permits this. In 
case you want to spend more than you have in cash with you or in case you do not want 
to take an object with you immediately, you can take the object and pay for it on a later 
day.  
 
Please tell the experimenter to explain the procedure with the help of 
an example.  
 
The experimenter went through the following example:  
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Example given by the experimenter 
„In case you are confused by the instructions, don’t worry, we will go through an ex-
ample together and you will see how it works. When you can buy something, it works as 
follows: I show you something (* places an apple on the subject’s table *) and you have 
the possibility to buy it with your own money, of course including the 3 Euro you got. 
(* goes to the blackboard where the following table is shown – see Table 14 :*) 
 
Table 14: Table presented to the subjects (on the blackboard) 
 Randomly drawn transaction price (other prices possi-
ble) 
Maximum buy-
ing price: 
0.10 0.50 1.00 2.00 
(I - 0.30)* (0.10) (-) (-) (-) 
1.00 0.10 0.50 1.00 - 
     
Minimum selling 
price 
    
(II - 0.40)* (-) (0.50) (1.00) (2.00) 
0.10 0.10 0.50 1.00 2.00 
2.00 - - - 2.00 
*Price named by subject. Row then filled out by experimenter (example given in 
parentheses). 
 
For buying, I ask you: “what is the maximum you would be willing to pay for this 
apple?” If you are bargaining on a bazaar, it is usually unwise to reveal the maximum 
you are willing to pay right at the beginning, because this might increase the price you 
pay. Nevertheless, I ask you here to directly name the maximum you would pay. This is 
only an example. (* Subject says an amount, typically around 0.30 €, which the experi-
menter enters in row I under “Maximum buying price”. *) 
After you have named your maximum buying price, we draw a random transaction 
price. Look, we have here these little plastic boxes with paper sheets, indicating many 
different prices. There is a different box for every object, containing different prices, 
starting at 0. (* If subjects asked for the price ranges, they were told that they went up to 
different prices for every object, but these thresholds were not revealed in order not to 
influence the subjects’ decisions. *) We would now draw such a price and compare it 
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with the maximum buying price that you have named. I have named four possible prices 
on the blackboard as an example, although many other prices are also possible. 
If we draw 10 cents as a transaction price, you buy, because you have said you would 
pay up to (0.30). The important thing is that you pay the price that we have drawn, in 
this case the 10 cents (* writes 0.10 in the first column of the first row *). If we draw a 
price of 50 cents, you do not buy, because you have said you would not pay more than 
(0.30) (* marks the second cell with a “-“ *). If we draw 1.00, you do not buy, if we 
draw for example 2.00, you do of course also not buy. (* marks next two cells with “-“ 
*) 
So the important thing is that, if you buy, you pay the price that we have drawn. The 
reason for this procedure is that by naming a high maximum buying price,, you do not 
automatically increase the transaction price, as would be the case on a bazaar. Imagine, 
for example, that I offer you something an you think “ok, I would be willing to pay up 
to 1.00 € for it”. Now your best answer would be indeed to name 1.00 € as your maxi-
mum buying price (* points at second row *). Because, if we draw a price lower than 
1.00 €, you pay this lower price. You only pay 1.00 € if we draw this as a transaction 
price. 
As it is your own money that is at stake, there is no right or wrong. You do not have 
to buy anything. If you don’t want to buy something at all, you can simply name 0.00 as 
your maximum buying price. It’s your decision. 
So let’s come to the selling task. (* replaces apple by an orange *). In the selling 
task, you receive an object from me, for example this orange. It then belongs to you, 
you can take it home with you or sell it to me. Before, I have asked you to name a 
maximum buying price. Now I am asking you to name a minimum selling price (* sub-
jects were usually nodding at this point as a sign that they anticipated that selling 
worked similar to buying *). Ok, what is the minimum that you want to have for this 
orange? It is again only an example. (* subject names a price, usually something like 
0.40 € that the experimenter enters in row II under “minimum selling price” *) Again 
we will draw a price from one of these boxes and compare it to what you have said. For 
example, if we draw 10 cents, the result is that you do not sell, as you have said that you 
want to sell for at least 40 cents. So you keep the object and I keep my money. (* marks 
the first cell in row II with a “-“ *) If we draw 50 cents as a price, this is enough, so you 
 Chapter 1: Uncertainty and the Experimental Endowment Effect 
 78
sell the object to me. The important thing is that you sell for the price that we have 
drawn, so in this case for 50 cents (* writes “0.50” in the second cell *). If we draw 
1.00, you also sell and you receive 1.00. I we draw for example 2.00, you sell and re-
ceive 2.00 (*writes the numbers in the last two cells. Subjects usually made nodding 
gestures, indicating that they understood. Little smiles sometimes seemed to indicate 
that they were positively surprised that they could indeed earn some money. *) 
Again, the purpose of the procedure is that you can name the absolute minimum that 
you would accept as a selling price without automatically reducing the amount of 
money you receive. If I give you something that you do not want to keep at all, just say 
a very low price, for example 0.10 € or 0. (* pointing to the second row under “Mini-
mum selling price” *). You will always sell in these cases. Yet, if we draw a higher 
price, say 1.00 or 2.00 €, you do receive this high price, although you have named only 
0.10 € as your minimum selling price. 
However, if you think that you like the object that I give you and want to keep it, you 
can name a higher price, for example 2.00 €. You do not increase the selling prices, but 
you will increase the chance that you keep the object. You keep it if we draw a lower 
price, for example here (* points to cells with prices of 0.10, 0.50 and 1.00 *) 
So just decide whether or not you want to have what I offer or give you and say what 
you think is right. As we are talking about your own money, it is completely up to you 
what you do. 
Everything clear so far? (* subjects usually say “yes” with varying degrees of confi-
dence *) On the next two pages there is a detailed written description of what I have just 
told you. You can go through it. If you think that you have understood the mechanism, 
you are also free to skip this part. 
 
Instructions continued: * 
 
Buying Task: 
The buying task works as follows. The experimenter will offer an item for sale. Your 
task is to write down your maximum buying price.  
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The purchase will be arranged according to the following rules. In case of a pur-
chase, you pay with your own money (of course including the 3 Euro participation fee 
that you have received) and take the object home with you. 
As you will see, your best strategy is to determine the maximum you would be will-
ing to pay for the item and offer that amount. It will not be to your advantage to offer 
more than this maximum, and it will not be to your advantage to offer less. Simply de-
termine the maximum you would be willing to pay and make that amount your offer. 
Your p will be compared to a randomly drawn transaction price. The random transac-
tion price will be drawn from a box with lottery tickets which contains a pre-determined 
range of prices. The random transaction price will be completely unrelated to your 
maximum buy price. 
After the random transaction price is drawn, it is compared with your maximum buy 
price.  
If your offer is more than or the same as the randomly drawn transaction price then 
you buy the item. You had the high offer, so you are the buyer. But, here’s the interest-
ing part. You do not pay the amount you offered. Instead, you pay the randomly 
drawn transaction price, an amount equal to or less than your offer. 
Example: if you offer 2.00 € and the randomly drawn transaction 
price is 1.00 €, you have the high offer. You buy the item but pay 
only 1.00 €. 
If your offer is less than the random transaction price,  then you do not buy the item.  
Example: if you offer 2.00 € and the random transaction price  is 
2.20 € you do not have the high offer. Therefore, you do not buy 
the item. You keep your money. 
As a buyer, you should offer exactly the maximum amount you would be willing 
to pay in exchange for the item being sold. 
Remember, there are no advantages to strategic behavior. Your best strategy is to de-
termine your personal value for the item and record that value as your offer. There is not 
necessarily a “correct” value. Personal values can differ from individual to individual. 
 
 
Selling Task 
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The selling task works as follows. The experimenter wishes to buy an item that you 
own. Your task is to write down your minimum selling price. 
The sale will also be arranged with real money. If you do not sell, you keep the ob-
ject and can take it home with you. 
As you will see, your best strategy is to determine the minimum you would be will-
ing to accept for the item. It will not be to your advantage to offer more than this mini-
mum, and it will not be to your advantage to offer less. Simply determine the minimum 
you would be willing to accept and make that amount your minimum selling price. 
Your minimum selling price will be compared to a random transaction price that is 
drawn the same way as described above. The random transaction price will be com-
pletely unrelated to your offer. 
If your minimum selling price is less than or the same as the random transaction 
price, then you sell the item. You had the low offer, so you are the seller. But, here’s the 
interesting part. You do not receive your minimum selling price. Instead, you receive 
the random transaction price, a price higher than your offer. 
Example: if you write 2.00 € as your minimum selling price and the 
random transaction price is 2.50 €, you have the low offer. You sell 
the item and you receive the random transaction price of 2.50 €. 
If your offer is more than the random transaction price then you do not sell your 
item. You keep the item and can take it home with you. 
Example: if you offer 2.00 € and the random transaction price is 
1.00 €, you do not have the low offer. Therefore, you do not sell the 
item. 
As a seller, you should offer the minimum amount you would be willing to accept 
in exchange for the item you own. 
Just as you saw in the case of the buying task, there are no advantages to strategic 
behavior in the selling task. Your best strategy is to determine your personal value for 
the item and record that value as your minimum selling price. There is not necessarily a 
“correct” value. Personal values can differ from individual to individual. 
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Have you understood the instructions completely? 
Answer:     yes      no 
 
In the following rounds, you will act as a buyer and a seller. For which object you 
have which role has been randomly determined in advance.  
 
Personal questions: 
Sex:     male           female 
Age:    ______ 
Do you live in Munich?           yes              no 
Income or received payments per month (after taxes, in Euro): 
   until 1,000          1,001 to 2,000          2,001 to 3,000           more 
than  
3,000 
 
 
Comments were to support the buying/selling task: * 
“So now we start with a buying task. You can buy this *object* (* the object was put 
on the subject’s table in both WTP and WTA tasks *). Please indicate the maximum you 
would be willing to pay on your sheet. Now please answer the next to questions. Ok, let 
us draw a random transaction price. (* holds plastic box close to subject that draws a 
small folded sheet of paper and opens it, reading and showing the price *). Ok, so you 
do/do not sell. Please write the price under “drawn transaction price” and mark pur-
chase/no purchase. (* making the transaction if there was one, immediately exchanging 
the good against money that was put onto the subject’s table *)” 
 
Comments in the selling task were the same, except that the experimenter said: * 
“this *object* is now yours, you can keep it or sell it to me. Please write down your 
minimum selling price.” 
 
*either * 
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Sale 
 
My minimum selling price is: _______   €   
Are you sure that you would not also accept a slightly lower price? If you are not 
sure, please change your price accordingly.  
 
*or * 
Purchase 
 
My maximum buy price is:  _______   €   
Are you sure that you would not also pay a slightly higher price? If you are not sure, 
please change your price accordingly.  
 
*for both treatments: * 
For me, finding this minimum selling price was 
  very easy      easy        neither easy nor difficult      difficult       very difficult 
 
Before finding your minimum selling price, you might have reasoned how much this 
object costs in a store *. 
For finding your minimum selling price, how important was this (estimated) store 
price (mug, lipstick) / printed price (metro ticket) / (estimated) stock quote (stock)? 
Please give your answer as a number between 0 and 100, following these meanings: 
0 – the (estimated) price did not play a role 
50 – the (estimated) price played as much a role as other considerations 
100 – the (estimated) price played the decisive role, was the only consideration 
Importance of the (estimated) price: ________ (number between 0 and 100) 
 
Drawn transaction price: ______  € 
 
Sale:      yes     no 
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The following five tasks will not all be executed. After you have given your answers 
to all five tasks, the draw of a lottery ticket will determine, which task will be indeed 
executed. Simply answer as if every task would indeed be executed. 
 
 
Task A - Share: Bremer Vulkan 
The share is valid, is traded on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange and can be delivered 
into a portfolio at most banks (e.g. HypoVereinsbank, but not Direct-Banks) and sold at 
the stock exchange. 
We do not give you any information about the stock quote (value of the stock at the 
stock exchange). You have to rely on your own estimations. 
 
Notes: 
Coupons are used in case of dividend payouts. (* A sheet with the coupons was ac-
companying the share *) 
For all shares that were printed before 1999, the face value (denomination; par) is 
given in DM (* currency valid in Germany until 1999/2001 *), although it has been con-
verted into Euro. The shares are nevertheless valid in their original form. 
The face value only indicates what share a stock owner owns in a company. No di-
rect conclusions can be drawn from the face value in determining the quote of a stock.  
 
 
When the subject reached the task for buying or selling the share, several points were 
always repeated verbally, to stress them: * 
“So if we might indeed do this task. If we later draw the letter “A”, we will do this 
task according to what you have written. You can buy the share with your own 
money/the share then belongs to you and you can sell it. We will draw a price and see 
what happens, as we have done before. 
The share is real and valid, but we do not tell you what it is worth at the stock ex-
change.” 
 
*After the subject had answered the pricing (and two directly following) questions 
for tasks A to E these sheets were put on the side. The subject was then asked to fill out 
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the back of sheet E, asking the additional questions about the share, while the experi-
menter read the WTA and WTP answers from the sheets that the subject had already 
answered in order to fill out the additional valuation questions. After the subject had an-
swered the back of E (the question about the estimated market price of the share had to 
be answered before the quote of the share was revealed), the additional valuation ques-
tions were given to the subject, asking whether she would consider it a good deal to 
buy/sell the objects at different prices inserted by the experimenter (see below). After 
the subject had answered these questions, the experimenter said: * 
“Ok, I did not tell you what the share is worth, this was a little unfair. So now I tell 
you the current quote (value) of the share at the Frankfurt stock exchange: It is 11 cents. 
As I do not want to betray you, you can now change your answers in the two tasks con-
cerning the share before we execute the task. (* handing back the sheets for situation A 
and E where WTP and WTA for the share were indicated *) Here you said what you 
would be willing to pay for the share if you can buy it and here you said what you 
would accept as a minimum if you sell the share. Please do not erase your original an-
swers, but write your new answers on the dotted line here. We will proceed with your 
new answers. (*Almost all subjects changed both answers. Afterwards, a letter was 
drawn and the resulting task was resolved. Afterwards, subjects were asked to answer 
the additional questions concerning the mug, lipstick and metro ticket and the general 
questions. * 
 
Additional questions  
Mug  
 
I am at the moment in need of a mug:        yes           maybe        no 
 
Metro ticket 
I use the public transport in Munich:       often               rarely               never 
I own a monthly ticket:      yes                   no 
 
Lipstick 
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I use lipstick:        often               rarely               never 
 
*All goods:* 
Market price 
I estimate the price that one usually pays for this object in a store to lie between 
______ €  and    ______ €.  
(If you are absolutely sure, you can write two times the same price.) 
 
Usage of the object 
Please distribute 100 % onto the three possibilities, according to how likely you con-
sider them. 
If I own the object after the experiment, I will  
Keep it:                                   _________ % 
Give it as a gift to someone    _________ % 
Sell it                             :        _________ % 
 
 
Value for me and others 
Even if you answered the selling question above, you are now asked at what prices you 
would buy  the object.  
In the category „for others“ please ask yourself, whether others would buy at this price. 
Please imagine “others” being the residents of Munich aged 18 and over.  
 
I: 
I would buy the object here and now at a price of up to ________ €. 
I would certainly never buy the object at a price of more than ________ €. 
 
Others: 
I think that almost everybody would buy the object at a price of up to ________ €. 
I think that almost nobody would buy the object at a price of more than _______ €. 
 
Additional Valuation Questions  
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these questions concerned the metro ticket and the share and the mug or the lipstick if 
there was a large difference between individual WTA and WTP * 
(These questions are hypothetical and have no influence on the real transaction.) 
 
Buying 
If I can buy the object at a price of __*_____ , this is for me a 
  good deal     neither a good nor a bad deal      a bad deal 
*The experimenter entered the amount that the subject had previously given as the WTP 
answer into the first buying question, (WTP+WTA)/2 into the second buying question 
(if WTA and WTP differed)* 
Please indicate how certain you are about your answer above. Please answer with a 
number from 0 to 100, meaning:  
0 – completely uncertain 
100 – completely certain 
Answer: ________  
 
Selling  - Suppose you own the object (you have found it/it was a gift from your bank - 
*share*) and you are considering whether selling or keeping it.  
If I can sell this object at a price of ___*____, this is for me a  
  good deal     neither a good nor a bad deal      a bad deal  
*The experimenter entered the amount that the subject had given as the WTA answer for this 
object into the first selling question and (WTP+WTA)/2 (if WTP and WTA differed) into the 
second selling question. In the rare cases that WTP>WTA, WTA was used in the first buying 
question and WTP in the first selling question. For WTP=WTA, the second buying and selling 
question was left out* 
 
General Questions 
When you go shopping and see an object that you did not originally intend to buy, how 
do you decide whether to buy nevertheless? 
Please distribute 100 points onto the answers, according to how correctly they represent 
your attitude. 
___ I think whether it is a good deal or even a bargain to buy the object at this price 
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___ I consider how much the object would be worth for me and compare this value  
        with the price 
___ Other consideration. 
 
 
Have you applied the concept of making a good deal/bargain in our buying tasks? 
Please answer with a number from 0 to 100, meaning: 
0 – I did not use the concept 
100 – the concept has always played an important role 
Answer: ______ (number from 0 to 100) 
 
 
In the selling tasks, have you used a similar concept: the thought whether it is a good 
deal to sell at a certain price? Please distribute 100 points onto the answers, according to 
how correctly they represent your attitude. 
___ yes, I can use this concept for selling as easily as for buying 
___ yes, but as I am less used to selling, it is more difficult for me to apply the  
       concept 
___ No, I proceed in a completely different way when selling 
 
 
*Original version in German* 
Experiment – Einleitung 
 
Dies ist ein Experiment zum Entscheidungsverhalten. Der Zweck des Experimentes ist 
es, Einflussfaktoren von Kauf- und Verkaufsentscheidungen zu erforschen. Das Expe-
riment wird von der Deutschen Forschungsgesellschaft im Rahmen des Graduiertenkol-
leg „Markets, Institutions and the Scope of Government“ finanziert und wird für meine 
Dissertation in Volkswirtschaftslehre verwendet. 
 
Die Anweisungen sind einfach. Wenn Sie ihnen sorgsam folgen, können Sie Geld oder 
verschiedene Objekte bekommen. Was Sie bekommen, hängt von Ihren Entscheidungen 
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ab. Es gibt keine richtigen oder falschen Entscheidungen. Entscheiden Sie sich einfach 
so, wie Sie es für richtig halten. Sie können jederzeit Fragen zum Ablauf des Experi-
ments stellen. Fragen zu den Objekten selbst werden Ihnen allerdings nicht beantwortet 
werden, damit Sie sich bei der Bewertung der Objekte ausschließlich auf sich selbst 
stützen. Sie sollten keine Anweisung, kein Beispiel und keine Bemerkung als Hinweis 
auf den Wert eines Objekts verstehen.  
 
Sie werden mit unterschiedlichen Kauf- und Verkaufssituationen konfrontiert. Der Ab-
lauf ist dabei immer gleich: 
Sie bekommen einen Gegenstand gezeigt. In der Verkaufs-Situation gehört der Gegens-
tand Ihnen, d.h. er ist ein Geschenk an Sie, das Sie verkaufen können. In der Kauf-
Situation gehört der Gegenstand Ihnen noch nicht, aber sie können ihn kaufen. 
Sie nennen eine Preisvorstellung. In der Verkaufs-Situation einen minimalen Ver-
kaufspreis, in der Kauf-Situation einen maximalen Kaufpreis. 
Ein Transaktionspreis wird bestimmt, der mit Ihrem Preis verglichen wird. 
Der Verkauf/Kauf wird mit echtem Geld durchgeführt, falls Ihre Preisvorstellung dies 
zulässt. Sollten Sie mehr ausgeben wollen, als Sie in bar bei sich führen, oder einen Ar-
tikel nicht sofort mitnehmen wollen, können Sie den/die Artikel auch an einem späteren 
Tag bei uns abholen und bezahlen. 
 
Bitte geben Sie dem Versuchsleiter jetzt Bescheid, damit er Ihnen den Ablauf an einem 
Beispiel erklärt. 
 
*Explanation of Example* 
Kauf-Situation: 
Die Kauf-Situation funktioniert wie folgt: Der Versuchsleiter bietet ein Objekt zum 
Verkauf. Ihre Aufgabe ist es, Ihren maximalen Kaufpreis aufzuschreiben.  
Der Kauf wird den nun folgenden Regeln tatsächlich abgewickelt. Sie bezahlen im Falle 
eines Kaufes mit Ihrem eigenen Geld (natürlich einschließlich der 3,- Euro Teilnahme-
Honorar, die Sie bekommen haben) und nehmen das gekaufte Objekt mit nach Hause.  
Wie Sie sehen werden, ist es Ihre beste Strategie, das Maximum zu bestimmen, das Sie 
für das Objekt bezahlen würden, und dieses Maximum zu bieten. Es ist weder vorteil-
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haft für Sie, mehr zu bieten als dieses Maximum, noch weniger zu bieten. Bestimmen 
Sie einfach dieses Maximum, das Sie bezahlen würden und machen Sie dies zu Ihrem 
maximalen Kaufpreis. 
Ihr Gebot wird dann mit einem zufällig gezogenen Transaktionspreis verglichen. Die-
ser Preis wird aus einem Lostopf gezogen, in dem verschiedene Preise in einer vorher 
festgelegten Spanne sind. Der Mechanismus ist von Ihrem angegebenen maximalen 
Kaufpreis unabhängig. 
 
Nach der Ziehung des zufälligen Transaktionspreises wird dieser mit dem von Ihnen 
angegebenen maximalen Kaufpreis verglichen. Wenn Ihr maximaler Kaufpreis höher 
ist, kaufen Sie das Objekt zum zufällig gezogenen Transaktionspreis. Sie bezahlen 
nicht Ihren maximalen Kaufpreis. Sie bezahlen nur den tatsächlich gezogenen Transak-
tionspreis. 
Beispiel: Wenn Sie 2,00 € bieten und der zufällig gezogene Transaktionspreis 1,00 € ist, 
kaufen Sie, und zwar zum Preis von 1,00 €. 
Wenn der zufällig gezogene Transaktionspreis höher ist als Ihr maximaler Kaufpreis, 
passiert nichts, Sie kaufen das Objekt also nicht. 
Beispiel: Wenn Sie 2,00 € bieten und der zufällig gezogene Transaktionspreis 2,20 € ist, 
kaufen Sie das Objekt nicht. 
 
Als Käufer sollten Sie genau das Maximum bieten, das Sie bereit sind für das Objekt 
zu bezahlen. 
Es hat für Sie keine Vorteile, sich „strategisch“ zu verhalten und einen niedrigeren ma-
ximalen Kaufpreis anzugeben. Ihre beste Strategie ist es, den Wert zu bestimmen, den 
das Objekt für Sie persönlich darstellt und diesen Wert als Ihren maximalen Kaufpreis 
anzugeben. Es gibt nicht notwendigerweise einen „richtigen“ Wert. Der persönliche 
Wert kann von Individuum zu Individuum verschieden sein. 
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Verkaufs-Situation 
Die Verkaufs-Situation funktioniert wie folgt: Der Versuchsleiter möchte ein Objekt 
kaufen, das wir Ihnen gegeben haben und das damit Ihnen gehört. Ihre Aufgabe ist es, 
einen Mindest-Verkaufspreis aufzuschreiben. 
Der Verkauf wird ebenfalls mit echtem Geld abgewickelt. Sollten Sie nicht verkaufen, 
behalten Sie das Objekt und können es mit nach Hause nehmen.  
Wie Sie sehen werden, ist es Ihre beste Strategie, das Minimum zu bestimmen, das Sie 
für den Verkauf des Objekts akzeptieren würden. Es ist nicht vorteilhaft für Sie, mehr 
als dieses Minimum zu verlangen, und es ist nicht vorteilhaft, weniger zu verlangen. 
Bestimmen Sie einfach das Minimum, das Sie als Verkaufspreis akzeptieren würden 
und geben Sie diesen Betrag als Mindest-Verkaufspreis an. 
 
Ihr Mindest-Verkaufspreis wird mit einem zufällig gezogenen Transaktionspreis ver-
glichen, der nach dem gleichen Verfahren wie oben generiert wird und wieder unabhän-
gig von Ihrem oder anderen Mindest-Verkaufspreisen ist. 
Wenn Ihr Mindest-Verkaufspreis kleiner oder gleich dem zufällig gezogenen Transakti-
onspreis ist, verkaufen Sie das Objekt zum zufällig gezogenen Transaktionspreis. Sie 
verkaufen also nicht zu Ihrem Mindest-Verkaufspreis, sondern stattdessen zum Transak-
tionspreis, der höher liegt als ihr Mindest-Verkaufspreis. 
Beispiel: Wenn Sie 2,00 € als Mindest-Verkaufspreis angeben und der zufällig gezoge-
ne Transaktionspreis 2,50 € ist, verkaufen Sie zum Preis von 2,50 €. 
Wenn Ihr Mindest-Verkaufspreis höher ist als der zufällig gezogene Transaktionspreis, 
verkaufen Sie das Objekt nicht, sondern können es mit nach Hause nehmen. 
Beispiel: Wenn Sie 2,00 € bieten und der gezogene Transaktionspreis ist 1,00 €, verkau-
fen Sie nicht. 
Als Verkäufer sollten Sie das Minimum angeben, das Sie als Verkaufspreis akzep-
tieren würden. 
 
Genau wie in der Kauf-Situation gibt es keine Vorteile davon, sich „strategisch“ zu ver-
halten und einen höheren Mindest-Verkaufspreis anzugeben. Ihre beste Strategie ist es, 
den Wert zu bestimmen, den das Objekt für Sie persönlich hat, und diesen Wert als Ih-
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ren Mindest-Verkaufspreis anzugeben. Es gibt nicht notwendigerweise einen „korrek-
ten“ Wert, dieser kann von Individuum zu Individuum unterschiedlich sein. 
 
Haben Sie die Instruktionen vollständig verstanden? 
Antwort:     ja      nein 
 
In den nun folgenden Runden werden Sie sowohl als Käufer, als auch als Verkäufer a-
gieren. Für welches Objekt Sie welche Rolle haben, wurde im Voraus zufällig be-
stimmt. 
 
Persönliche Angaben: 
Geschlecht:     männlich           weiblich 
Alter:    ______ 
Wohnen Sie in München?           Ja              Nein 
Einkommen / empfangene Leistungen pro Monat (nach Steuern, in Euro): 
   Bis 1.000          1.001 bis 2.000          2.001 bis 3.000           über 3.000 
 
Verkauf 
Mein minimaler Verkaufspreis beträgt: _______   €   
Sind Sie sicher, dass Sie nicht auch einen etwas niedrigeren Preis akzeptieren würden? 
Wenn Sie sich dessen nicht sicher sind, ändern Sie den Preis bitte entsprechend.  
*oder:* 
 
Kauf 
Mein maximaler Kaufpreis beträgt:  _______   €   
Sind Sie sicher, dass Sie nicht auch einen etwas höheren Preis bezahlen würden? Wenn 
Sie sich dessen nicht sicher sind, ändern Sie den Preis bitte entsprechend.  
 
*beide Treatments: * 
Die Bestimmung dieses minimalen Verkaufspreises war für mich 
  sehr leicht      leicht        weder leicht noch schwer       schwer       sehr schwer 
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Möglicherweise haben Sie, bevor Sie Ihren minimalen Verkaufspreis bestimmt haben, 
überlegt, wie viel das Objekt in einem Geschäft kostet. 
Wie wichtig war Ihnen bei der Bestimmung des minimalen Verkaufspreises dieser (ge-
schätzte) Ladenpreis (Tasse, Lippenstift)/ aufgedruckte Preis (U-Bahn-Ticket) / (ge-
schätzte) Börsenkurs (Aktie)? Bitte geben Sie Ihre Antwort als Zahl zwischen 0 und 
100. Dabei bedeuten 
0 – der (geschätzte) Preis hat gar keine Rolle gespielt 
50 – der (geschätzte) Preis hat eine genauso große Rolle gespielt wie andere Überlegun-
gen 
100 – der (geschätzte) Preis hat die entscheidende Rolle gespielt, war die einzige Über-
legung 
Wichtigkeit des (geschätzten) Preises: ________ (Zahl zwischen 0 und 100) 
Gezogener Transaktionspreis: ______  € 
Verkauf:      Ja     Nein 
 
Die folgenden fünf Situationen werden nicht alle durchgeführt. Nachdem Sie für alle 
fünf Situationen Ihre Entscheidung angegeben haben, wird stattdessen ausgelost, wel-
che Situation tatsächlich durchgeführt wird. Antworten Sie einfach so, als würde jede 
Situation tatsächlich durchgeführt. 
 
Situation A - Aktie: Bremer Vulkan 
Die Aktie ist gültig, wird an der Börse Frankfurt gehandelt und kann bei den meisten 
Banken (außer Direktbanken) in ein Depot eingeliefert (z.B. bei der HypoVereinsbank) 
und dann an der Börse verkauft werden.  
Über den Börsenkurs (Wert der Aktie an der Börse) geben wir Ihnen keine Informatio-
nen. Sie müssen sich auf Ihre eigene Schätzung verlassen. 
Hinweise: 
Ein Kupon-Bogen dient zum Einlösen bei eventuellen Dividenden-Zahlungen. 
Bei allen Aktien, die vor dem Jahr 1999 gedruckt wurden, ist der Nennwert („ist mit 50 
DM beteiligt“) noch in DM angegeben, obwohl er in Euro umgewandelt wurde. Die 
Aktien sind dennoch unverändert gültig. 
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Der Nennwert gibt lediglich an, welchen Anteil eines Unternehmens ein Anleger be-
sitzt. Es lassen sich aus dem Nennwert keine direkten Schlüsse auf den Börsenkurs ei-
ner Aktie ziehen. 
 
Zusatzfragen  
Tasse 
Ich kann zurzeit eine Tasse gut gebrauchen:        ja            vielleicht             nein 
U-Bahn-Ticket 
Ich benutze den MVV:          häufig               selten               nie 
Ich besitze eine Monatskarte:      ja                    nein 
Lippenstift 
Ich benutze Lippenstift:          häufig               selten                    nie 
Aktie 
Wie gut sind Sie über die Gesellschaft Bremer Vulkan informiert?  
  gut informiert              
  habe den Namen schon gehört, bin aber nicht gut informiert          
  nie gehört 
 
Marktpreis 
Ich schätze, dass man üblicherweise in einem Geschäft (*Fahrkartenautomaten; Börse – 
Kurs *) für dieses Objekt  
einen Preis zwischen ______ €  und    ______ €  bezahlt 
(Wenn Sie sich ganz sicher sind, können Sie auch zweimal den gleichen Preis angeben.) 
 
Verwendung des Objekts 
Bitte verteilen Sie 100 % auf die drei Möglichkeiten, je nachdem für wie wahrscheinlich 
sie sie halten. 
Wenn ich das Objekt nach dem Experiment besitze, werde ich es  
behalten:           _________ % 
verschenken:    _________ % 
verkaufen:        _________ % 
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Wert für mich und andere 
Auch wenn Sie oben die Verkauf-Frage beantwortet haben, geht es hier nur darum, zu 
welchen Preisen Sie und andere Menschen das Objekt kaufen würden.  
In der Kategorie „für andere“ fragen Sie sich bitte, ob andere zu diesem Preis kaufen 
würden. Unter „andere“ stellen Sie sich bitte die Bewohner Münchens über 18 Jahre 
vor. 
 
Ich: 
Ich würde das Objekt hier und jetzt kaufen bei einem Preis bis zu ________ €. 
Ich würde das Objekt sicher niemals kaufen bei einem Preis über ________ €. 
Andere: 
Ich denke, dass so gut wie jeder das Objekt kaufen würde 
                                                                    bei einem Preis bis zu ________ €. 
Ich denke, dass so gut wie niemand das Objekt kaufen würde  
                                                                      bei einem Preis über ________ €. 
 
Zusatzfragen * misconception checks * MVV-Ticket, Aktie, Lippenstift, Tasse 
(Diese Fragen sind hypothetisch und haben keinen Einfluss auf die tatsächliche Trans-
aktion.) 
 
Kaufen 
Wenn ich dieses *Objekt* zum Preis von _______ kaufen kann, ist das für mich ein 
  gutes Geschäft     weder gutes, noch schlechtes Geschäft      schlechtes Geschäft 
Bitte geben Sie an, wie sicher Sie sich Ihrer obigen Antwort sind. Bitte antworten Sie 
mit einer Zahl von 0 bis 100. Dabei bedeutet  
0 – völlig unsicher 
100 – völlig sicher 
Antwort: ________  
 
Wenn ich dieses *Objekt* zum Preis von _______ kaufen kann, ist das für mich ein 
  gutes Geschäft     weder gutes, noch schlechtes Geschäft      schlechtes Geschäft 
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Bitte geben Sie an, wie sicher Sie sich Ihrer obigen Antwort sind. Bitte antworten Sie 
mit einer Zahl von 0 bis 100. Dabei bedeutet  
0 – völlig unsicher 
100 – völlig sicher  
Antwort: ________  
 
Verkaufen  - Nehmen Sie an, Ihnen gehört das *Objekt* (Sie haben es gefunden)  
*Aktie: Sie haben es von Ihrer Bank geschenkt bekommen* und Sie überlegen sich, ob 
Sie es verkaufen oder behalten wollen.  
Wenn ich dieses *Objekt* zum Preis von _______ verkaufen kann, ist das für mich ein 
  gutes Geschäft     weder gutes, noch schlechtes Geschäft      schlechtes Geschäft 
Bitte geben Sie an, wie sicher Sie sich Ihrer obigen Antwort sind. Bitte antworten Sie 
mit einer Zahl von 0 bis 100. Dabei bedeutet  
0 – völlig unsicher 
100 – völlig sicher 
Antwort: ________  
 
Wenn ich dieses *Objekt* zum Preis von _______ verkaufen kann, ist das für mich ein 
  gutes Geschäft     weder gutes, noch schlechtes Geschäft      schlechtes Geschäft 
Bitte geben Sie an, wie sicher Sie sich Ihrer obigen Antwort sind. Bitte antworten Sie 
mit einer Zahl von 0 bis 100. Dabei bedeutet            0 – völlig unsicher 
100 – völlig sicher 
Antwort: ________  
 
Allgemeine Fragen 
Wenn Sie einkaufen und einen Artikel sehen, den Sie ursprünglich nicht kaufen wollten, 
wie entscheiden Sie, ob sie es doch tun? 
Bitte verteilen Sie insgesamt 100 Punkte auf die Antworten, je nachdem wie zutreffend 
sie für Sie sind. 
___ Ich überlege, ob es ein gutes Geschäft oder sogar ein „Schnäppchen“ ist, den Arti-
kel zu diesem Preis zu kaufen 
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___ Ich überlege, was der Artikel für mich wert wäre und vergleiche diesen Wert mit 
dem Preis 
___ Andere Überlegung 
 
Haben Sie das Konzept, ein gutes Geschäft/“Schnäppchen“ zu machen, auch bei unse-
ren Kauf-Experimenten angewendet? Bitte geben Sie Ihre Antwort als Zahl von 0 bis 
100, dabei bedeuten: 
0 – habe das Konzept nicht angewendet 
100 – das Konzept hat immer eine große Rolle gespielt 
Antwort: ______ (Zahl von 0 bis 100) 
 
Haben Sie bei den Verkaufs-Experimenten auf ein ähnliches Konzept zurückgegriffen, 
also die Überlegung angestellt, ob es ein gutes Geschäft ist, zu einem bestimmten Preis 
zu verkaufen? 
Bitte verteilen Sie insgesamt 100 Punkte auf die Antworten, je nachdem wie zutreffend 
sie für Sie sind. 
___ ja, ich kann dieses Konzept beim Verkaufen genauso leicht anwenden wie beim 
Kaufen 
___ ja, da ich das Verkaufen weniger gewöhnt bin, fiel es mir jedoch schwerer, dieses 
Konzept anzuwenden 
___ nein, beim Verkaufen gehe ich ganz anders vor 
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Chapter 2:  
Can we predict  
Preference Reversal? 
 
Abstract: Experiments show that people reverse their preferences over lotteries 
when they are asked to price the lotteries, instead of making direct choices be-
tween them. Psychologists and economists have studied this phenomenon, termed 
"preference reversal", for more than 30 years. Recent evidence contradicts existing 
explanations. This article argues that a prediction of the phenomenon is possible 
without giving up transitivity of preferences. A model of "aversion to risk 
changes", corresponding to a reference point in risk, together with over-weighting 
of low probabilities, is consistent with the body of empirical evidence and cor-
rectly predicts the pattern of experimental outcomes of an experiment by Blondel 
and Lévy-Garboua (2005). 
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JEL classification: D81 
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Introduction 
„Phenomena that appear anomalous from the perspective of standard preference 
models are in fact predictable – indeed, inevitable – consequences of well-established 
rules of judgement and valuation, which apply in domains that are beyond the reach of 
choice theory.“ (Kahneman et al., 1999, p. 230, emphasis added) 
Is microeconomic choice theory with its stringent assumptions doomed to fail in the 
light of the growing experimental evidence from behavioral economics and economic 
psychology? 
This article argues that, at least for a certain class of anomalies concerning gambles, 
this need not be the case. Keeping the rationality assumptions intact, but modifying 
other parts of the theory can be a way to predict anomalies such as preference reversal 
and the endowment effect. 
The anomaly in the focus of this article, the “preference reversal” phenomenon, has 
its name from a perceived inconsistency of subjects’ choices with the stability of their 
preferences. Psychologists Lichtenstein and Slovic (1971, 1973) were the first to ob-
serve it in experiments with gambles. Subjects are asked to make a choice between two 
gambles with similar expected value, one relatively risky bet and one relatively safe bet. 
From this choice, one gets a direct measure of preferences. Subjects are then asked to 
evaluate the same bets in a pricing treatment, i.e. to state minimum selling prices for 
each bet. From these minimum selling prices, one can infer an “indirect” measure of 
preferences, by comparing the answers for the different lotteries. When comparing these 
direct and indirect measures of preferences, it turns out that, very often, they contradict 
each other: A majority of those subjects, who prefer the relatively safe bet in choice, at-
tach a higher price to the risky gamble. 
Although economists were at first very reluctant to accept these experimental results, 
a great number of subsequent experiments conducted by economists themselves (start-
ing with Grether and Plott, 1979) have confirmed the robustness of the phenomenon. 
For an overview, see Seidl (2002). 
The most prominent explanations of preference reversal have proposed that, when 
choosing between gambles, people regard a high probability of winning as more impor-
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tant than a high stake. When it comes to pricing, it is argued that the stake plays a larger 
role than the probability of winning. 
Over the last years, evidence has been found, which contradicts these prominent ex-
planations. This article tests an alternative hypothesis proposed in chapter 1 of this dis-
sertation.  
We proceed as follows: Part I briefly summarizes the predictions that Expected Util-
ity makes. Part II shows the most important experimental evidence and the proposed 
explanations. In part III we slightly expand and test the model (introduced in Chapter 1) 
to the data from Blondel and Lévy-Garboua (2005).  
 
I. Expected Utility: Choice vs. Pricing 
Let there be a lottery where a high payoff (H) and a low payoff (L) can be won with 
equal chances of 50 %: (H, 0.5; L, 0.5). The expected value of this lottery is 
E=(H+L)/2. Expected Utility Theory posits that there is a certainty equivalent (CE) 
such that an individual is indifferent between receiving the lottery and the certain 
amount of money: 
 CE = E – r, (20.) 
with r denoting the risk premium. 
 
Choosing 
Imagine there are now two lotteries: One more risky lottery (HR, 0.5; LR, 0.5), and 
another, relatively safe lottery (HS,  0.5; LS, 0.5), with the risky lottery having a larger 
payoff variation: HR-LR>HS-LS (see Figure 9). Let EU(.) indicate expected utility. 
If an individual is indifferent between the two lotteries, this corresponds to: 
 EU(risky) = EU(safe) and CE(risky) = CE(safe) (21.) 
If one of the lotteries, say the risky lottery, is preferred, it must be that 
 EU(risky) > EU(safe) and CE(risky) > CE(safe) (22.) 
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Figure 9: Pricing of lotteries in Expected Utility Theory  
(here for indifference between both lotteries) 
Pricing 
When deciding whether or not to sell or to buy a lottery, the individual compares the 
lottery with receiving/paying a certain amount of money. The price at which the indi-
vidual is indifferent between keeping and selling (between not buying and buying) is 
again the certainty equivalent: 
Minimum selling price (willingness to accept): WTA = CE 
Maximum buy price (willingness to pay): WTP = CE 
When comparing the different measures, one has to take into account different 
wealth positions. Let x be current wealth: 
• Choice: The individual starts with {x} and ends with {x + lottery}  
• Selling: The individual starts with {x + lottery} and ends either with {x + lot-
tery} or {x + selling price} 
ER
LR
ES 
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• Buying: The individual starts with {x} and ends with either {x} or {x - buying 
price + lottery}. 
In Expected Utility Theory, individuals compare end-states, regardless where they 
start. Therefore, the choice and selling decision are equivalent, while in the buying deci-
sion the end-state is lower. It is therefore possible that when comparing CE or WTA to 
WTP, they are different due to an income effect: As the individual is slightly richer in 
the choice and selling condition, this might induce a higher valuation of the lottery. 
With income effect: CE = WTA ≥ WTP. 
Empirically, it is easy to test for this income effect by giving some subjects an addi-
tional amount of money and look for significant changes in their answers. For the 
amounts of money at stake in lottery experiments (typically <100 €), no income effect is 
detected (Schmidt and Traub, 2003). Therefore it must hold: 
Neglecting the income effect: CE = WTA = WTP. 
It follows that if a lottery, say the relatively safe lottery, is preferred in choice, it 
must also be priced more highly: 
CE(safe) > CE(risky) Æ WTA(safe )> WTA(risky) and WTP(safe) > WTP(risky). 
Expected Utility predicts that preferences are identical, whether measured directly in 
a choice experiment or indirectly in a pricing treatment. 
 
II. Empirical Evidence 
Experiments have cast doubt on the propositions of Expected Utility Theory. Hence, 
we will now review the empirical evidence. 
Preference Reversal in the Selling Treatment 
Lichtenstein and Slovic (1971, 1973) presented their subjects 6 sets consisting each 
of two different gambles (lotteries), a relatively safe and a risky bet. A typical pair was:  
• Relatively safe bet (called “P-Bet” for “high probability”): “win $4 with 
probability 0.8 or lose38 $0.5 with probability 0.2“ – short notation: ($4, 0.8; -
$0.5, 0.2) 
                                                 
38 In latter experiments, the possibility of losing a small amount of money was discarded in favour of just 
receiving nothing, as this did not seem to be essential for the results. 
 Chapter 2: Can we predict Preference Reversal? 
 102
• Risky bet (“$-Bet” for “high stake”): “win $40 with probability 0.1 or lose $1 
with probability 0.9” – short notation: ($40, 0.1; -$1, 0.9) 
Both gambles of such a pair are constructed such that they yield a similar expected 
value (here it is $3.10 for both lotteries).  
Lichtenstein and Slovic first presented such a pair of lotteries to the subjects and 
asked them to choose one of them. Later, the same gambles were presented to the sub-
jects one at a time. Subjects were now asked to state the minimum selling price (will-
ingness to accept – WTA), at which they would just be indifferent between selling and 
keeping the lottery. Treatments with real gambling and real payments were used: After 
subjects indicated their price, a random transaction price was drawn. Subjects sold at the 
transaction price if it was larger than their stated WTA. With this method, also known 
as Becker-de-Groot-Marschak mechanism (BDM), true revelation of minimum selling 
and maximum buying prices is optimal. 
Lichtenstein and Slovic observed that a significant share39 of the subjects showed the 
same pattern of behavior towards all 6 lottery pairs: They preferred the relatively safer 
(P-) bet in the pairwise choice, but priced the risky ($-) bet higher. For the purpose of 
further analysis, let us call this pattern “type 1 reversal”. The opposite pattern of behav-
ior (“type 2 reversal”), in contrast, was very rare, contradicting a possible hypothesis 
that subjects were indifferent between the gambles and made random choices with er-
rors.40 Only a small proportion of subjects showed the behavior predicted by Expected 
Utility Theory41.   
Table 15 summarizes the two types of possible preference reversals.  
                                                 
39 73 % of subjects in experiment I (without real monetary payoff, 173 subjects) and 42 % in experiment 
III (with real payoffs, 14 subjects). 
40 83 % of subjects (experiment I) and slightly less in experiment III (no exact number given) never 
showed this pattern. 
41 27 % of subjects (experiment I) show stable preferences towards at least 1 of 6 lottery pairs. In experi-
ment III, 36 % of the subjects show stable preferences sometimes and 21 % always. 
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Table 15: Types of preference reversal 
 Preferred lottery in: 
 Choice  
(direct preference) 
Pricing  
(indirect preference) 
Type 1 Preference Reversal  
(also termed “Predicted Prefer-
ence Reversal” in the literature) 
Relatively safe bet Risky bet 
Type 2 Preference Reversal  
(also termed “Unpredicted” or 
“Reversed Preference Reversal”) 
Risky bet Relatively safe bet 
 
The puzzle consists of explaining why people show the opposite preference when 
measured in an indirect way (pricing) than when measured in a direct way (choice). 
This behavior can be seen to contradict the most basic microeconomic definitions and 
assumptions about preferences. 
 
Preferences: Definitions and Assumptions 
The definition of preference relations states: 
1. Indifference relation „~“:  A ~ B Ù  ~A B;   and  ~B A;   
2. Strict preference relation „;“ : A ; B  Ù  ~A B;    but not  ~B A;   
If one observes that A is chosen over B, this would in any case satisfy weak prefer-
ence: ~A B; . Whether strict preference is satisfied must be inferred from whether indif-
ference and/or the opposite choice can be observed. 
The two most basic assumptions about preferences that together constitute the ra-
tionality of a set of preferences are the transitivity and the completeness assumption 
(from which then follow other properties like reflexivity and the existence of a represen-
tation in form of a utility function). Only the transitivity assumption is of interest here: 
Transitivity Assumption: If A ; B  and B ; C    ⇒   A ; C z  
The behavior forming the preference reversal pattern described above (type 1 rever-
sal) would lead to the following conclusions: 
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For $ (risky lottery) and P (relatively safe lottery), we get as a result of the choice 
treatment: P ~; $. The result of the pricing treatment must be interpreted as $ ; P.42 
Therefore, either the transitivity assumption must be violated or preferences must be 
seen as “unstable”, i.e. changing from one moment to the other (contradicting the exis-
tence of strong preference as described in definition 2). 
Yet, giving up the transitivity or stability assumption would clearly lead to a great 
loss in predictive power. In order to yield falsifiable predictions, a theory needs strict 
preference and the transitivity assumption. 
Instead of giving up the strict definition of preferences or the transitivity assumption, 
extending the theory of choice can bring results back in line with a theory of rational 
behavior. 
 
Prominent Explanations of Preference Reversal 
Lichtenstein and Slovic were the first to assure that: “One need not call this behavior 
irrational, but it casts doubt on the descriptive validity of expected utility models of 
risky decision making.” (Lichtenstein and Slovic, 1971, p. 46). They already propose 
adaptations to the theory other than giving up the transitivity assumption.  
There are at present three explanations that can probably be seen as the most widely 
accepted explanation of the preference reversal phenomenon. In terms of predictions, 
these explanations are quite similar and differ mainly in terms of unobservable charac-
teristics. 
• “Anchoring-Adjustment”: Lichtenstein and Slovic (1971) propose that subjects 
follow different anchoring-adjustment-procedures in choice and pricing tasks. 
When making a choice between lotteries, they pay most attention to the probabil-
ity of winning the prize. When asked to price the lotteries, they start with the pos-
sible prize as an “anchor” and adjust this prize downward, so attaching more 
weight to the prize in the pricing condition43. 
                                                 
42 For WTA($)=x1, WTA(P)=x2 x1>x2, we have: $ ~ x1, P ~ x2. So $ ; (x1+x2)/2 ; P and therefore $ ; P 
must be true. 
43 Lichtenstein and Slovic already showed direct evidence in form of correlations: The higher the amount 
to win of the risky lottery compared to the amount to win in the safe lottery, the more subjects priced the 
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• “Scale Compatibility”:  Tversky et al. (1990) state that subjects attach greater 
weight to payoffs in pricing: The “output” in the pricing task is expressed in dol-
lar terms. The “input”, the lottery, has two components, probability and payoff. 
As the component payoff is also expressed in dollar terms, it is compatible with 
the output and therefore given more weight by the decision maker.  
• “Prominence Hypothesis” (Slovic, 1975, cited by Seidl, 2002, p. 639): A certain 
aspect of an object is seen as more prominent as other aspects if the decision 
maker demands a minimum level of this aspect: When subject choose between 
gambles, the “minimum feature” they want to have in this case is a large prob-
ability of winning.  Therefore, when choosing between lotteries, probability is 
seen as the more prominent (i.e. important) dimension. Slovic et al. (1990, cited 
by Seidl, 2002, p. 640) conclude that both scale compatibility and prominence 
determine preference reversal. 
All three hypotheses are almost identical in their predictions: Subjects prefer a higher 
probability of winning when choosing between gambles. When asked to name a price, 
they price risky gambles higher, because in this gamble the stake to be won is higher.  
However, although the experimental results were robust to a number of variations, 
using buy-prices instead of sell-prices brought different evidence that contradicted the 
above explanations: 
 
Preference Reversal in the Buying Treatment 
In the experiments described so far, the mechanism used in the pricing treatment was 
that of asking a selling question (and therefore getting willingness to accept – WTA – as 
an answer). There is, however, a second way to elicit valuations in a pricing treatment: 
If one constructs a possible buying situation, one can elicit willingness to pay (WTP) 
instead of willingness to accept. 
Already Lichtenstein and Slovic (1971) noted a difference between using a buying 
and a selling treatment. By using the buying treatment instead of the selling treatment to 
                                                                                                                                               
risky lottery higher (correlation .55). For the choice task, no such dependence existed (correlation -0.03). 
(Lichtenstein and Slovic 1971, p. 50). In the light of the evidence of this paper, one might argue that 
these results could also have been due to over-weighting of low probabilities in pricing, as lower prob-
abilities go hand in hand with higher stakes, if the expected value is kept constant. 
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measure “indirect preferences”, the proportion of subjects that always show a “type 1 
reversal” fell from 73% to around 10%, the proportion of subjects never committing a 
“type 2 reversal” fell from 83% below 20%44. The decrease in type 1 reversals and the 
increase in type 2 reversals were both significant at the 1%-level.  
Only 20 years later, more empirical evidence about using the buy treatment emerged. 
It highlights that overlooking the impact of using WTP means to neglect quite a differ-
ent pattern of responses: 
• Casey (1991): When stakes are high and buy prices are used, type 2 reversals 
are significantly more often than type 1 reversals: When the risky bet was 
chosen, the relatively safe bet received a higher bid in 71 % of the cases. 
When the relatively safe bet was chosen, the risky bet received a higher bid in 
only 21 % of the cases. In control experiments, Casey finds out that using the 
buy instead of the sell treatment together with relatively high stakes (expected 
value of around $100 - but only hypothetical payoffs) are responsible for this 
“reversal of the preference reversal phenomenon”. When using rather small 
payoffs and the buy treatment, type 1 reversals dominate.  
• Schmidt and Hey (2004) conduct experiments using both buy and sell treat-
ments in addition to choices between lotteries. They find that in buy treat-
ments, the rate of “type 1 reversals” decreases and the rate of “type 2 rever-
sals” increases. “While for asks [sell treatment], the frequency of [type 1 re-
versals] is roughly two times higher than the frequency of [type 2 reversals], 
both frequencies are nearly identical for bids [buy treatment].” (p. 215).  
• Blondel and Lévy-Garboua (2005) conduct buy and sell treatments and 
choice treatments with a large set of different lotteries. They find type 1 re-
versal dominating, though the type 2 pattern dominates under some circum-
stances, creating an ambiguous pattern. 
• Hamm (1979) uses buy treatments throughout his extensive study and finds 
the traditional pattern of type 1 reversal only. 
                                                 
44 reading from their Fig. 1, p. 49 
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The findings of “Type 2 reversal” contradict the prediction of the prominent explana-
tions cited above, that probability is more important in choice and the size of the stake 
more important in pricing. For type 2 reversal in buy treatments, the opposite seems to 
be true: Probability would have to be even more important than in choice, as the rela-
tively safe (P-) bet was preferred by more subjects in the buy condition than in the pair-
wise choice. 
Schmidt and Hey (2004) claim that errors are responsible for preference reversals. 
They do not, however, answer the critical question why one kind of error, namely type 1 
reversal for selling, occurs much more often than type 2 reversal for selling. Lichten-
stein and Slovic (1971, 53) already tested for the possibility of errors being responsible 
for the outcome and concluded that the pattern of results deviated systematically from 
the necessary pattern. 
Several of the endowment effect theories claim a relationship between the endow-
ment effect and uncertainty. This hypothesis can also account for some of the preference 
reversal evidence:  
 
Endowment Effect Theories and Preference Reversal  
Three theories can predict the endowment effect for lotteries:  
• A mixture of Adaptive Utility and Regret Theory (Rankin, 1990, see General 
Introduction, p. 19): People are uncertain about their preferences. The result-
ing uncertainty has different effects in the buy and sell situation, as people 
evaluate the possible results in comparison to their current wealth (the refer-
ence point). 
• “Reference-dependent subjective expected utility” (Sugden, 2003, see p. 20): 
Also uses the reference point concept known from Regret Theory (Loomes 
and Sugden, 1982), yet not with the alternative results as reference points, but 
current wealth.  
• “Cognitive Consistency Theory” (Blondel and Lévy-Garboua, 2005, Lévy-
Garboua and Montmarquette, 1996, see p. 21): When deciding, people try to 
find a compromise between their normative preferences and the action that 
would be optimal in rational choice.   
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Though giving different intuitions, all theories have in common that they predict that 
the WTA-WTP-gap depends positively on uncertainty. Rankin's model was unsuccess-
fully tested with inappropriate data from a hypothetical survey (see chapter 3 for further 
details on the different nature of the WTA-WTP-gap in contingent valuation surveys). 
“Cognitive Consistency” was successfully tested with lottery pricing data, yet is (as 
“Reference-dependent subjective expected utility”) not consistent with all of the lottery 
choice evidence, as will be shown below. 
 
Figure 10: The endowment effect and preference reversal 
 
Consider Figure 10: The scale is one-dimensional, with money in the vertical axis. 
Two lotteries are described. The left-hand lottery is the more risky lottery with a larger 
variation between the highest possible prize HR and the lowest possible prize LR. The 
expected value is ER. The lottery at the right-hand side is less risky and therefore termed 
“relatively safe” lottery, with the payoff variation between highest prize (HS) and lowest 
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prize (LS) smaller. The lottery is chosen such that it offers a slightly lower expected 
value ES, such as to make individuals on average indifferent when choosing between the 
two lotteries (i.e. they are willing to accept a lower expected value for an increase in 
safety – the certainty equivalents of the two lotteries are considered to be identical). In 
most preference reversal experiments, the risky and the relatively safe lotteries are in-
deed created such that roughly half of the subjects in the choice condition choose the 
risky, and the other half the relatively safe lottery. 
Now consider the predictions of the endowment effect theories mentioned above: An 
increase in risk drives WTA and WTP further apart. It is straightforward to see that this 
leads to two different outcomes in the two pricing conditions: 
1. WTA: WTAR > WTAS:  In the selling treatment, the risky lottery is priced 
higher than the relatively safe lottery. 
2. WTP: WTPR < WTPS: In the buying treatment, the relatively safe lottery is 
priced higher than the risky lottery. 
The first result corresponds to the “type 1 reversal”, where those who prefer the rela-
tively safe lottery in choice price the risky lottery higher, and is consistent with the fact 
that for WTA, this pattern is indeed observed, while “type 2 reversal” almost never oc-
curs for WTA.  
The second result corresponds to the reversed pattern of “type 2 reversal”, where 
those who prefer the risky lottery in choice price the relatively safe lottery higher. Yet, 
as outlined above, the empirical evidence indicates that this is pattern is not always 
dominating for WTP. The evidence of “type 1 reversal” dominating under some circum-
stances for WTP is contradicting the second statement.  
The endowment effect theories can explain the traditional pattern of type 1 reversal 
for selling (WTA), as did the older theories. They add an explanation of the new pattern 
of type 2 reversals for buying (WTP). They cannot account for type 1 reversal in buy-
ing. Our theory will fill this gap by predicting both types of reversal correctly. 
 
 
                                                 
45 “Entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem” (entities are not to be multiplied beyond necessity). 
Attributed to the Oxford Franciscan scholasticist William of Ockham (1285-1349). 
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III. Test & Calibration of own Model 
The purpose of this section is to show that our model can account for all instances of 
type 1 and 2 reversals encountered so far. 
A detailed description of the model that we will test here can be found in Chapter 1. 
Here, only the model formulation and the predictions are given. 
 
Model Formulation 
The model builds on the central principles of Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tver-
sky, 1979) that are extended in the following way:  
1. The current wealth level functions as a reference point, i.e. all outcomes are 
evaluated as changes in comparison to this point.  
Extension: The current risk of the assets in possession is also taken into this 
reference point, creating a second form of risk aversion: aversion to risk 
changes (representing the principle of “erring on the side of caution”). 
2. Probability-weighting is used instead of utility being linear in probabilities. 
Extensions: “Constant joy of gambling” (see below), leading to 
a) Over-weighting of low probabilities decreases when payoffs become larger. 
b) Probability-weighting stronger in pricing than in choice (see below).  
In order to test the model, we have to specify a parametric and well-defined util-
ity/value function out of the class of possible functions. We choose the function yielding 
the certainty equivalent to be the utility function at the same time.  
There are four different forms of certainty equivalent, of which we specify three: 
1. Equivalent gain (EG) – direct choice between lotteries. Definition: An individual 
is indifferent between receiving the sure amount EG and the lottery (specification fol-
lows below).  
2. Equivalent loss (EL) – direct choice between lotteries. Definition: An individual is 
indifferent between giving up the sure amount EL or the lottery: here unspecified (as 
empirical results are lacking). 
3. Willingness-to-pay (WTP). Definition: The individual is indifferent between buy-
ing the lottery for WTP and doing nothing. Specification: WTP = E – r - c  
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4. Willingness-to-accept (WTA). Definition: The individual is indifferent between 
selling the lottery for WTA and doing nothing. Specification: WTA = E - r + c 
From which follows: WTA – WTP = 2c, c = (WTA - WTP)/2; r = E - (WTA+WTP)/2 
E: expected value of lottery  
c: gap parameter of “aversion to risk changes”, positively dependent on the risk of 
the lottery (specification below). 
r: conventional risk aversion, depends differently on the risk of the lottery, including 
payoff-dependent over-weighting of low probabilities (specification below). 
 
 
Hypotheses: 
1. The gap between WTA and WTP increases with the risk (payoff variation) of a 
lottery.  
2. If the probability of winning and stake to be won are small, people show risk-
seeking behavior. 
3. The variation of WTA and WTP responses predicted by our model are sufficient 
to explain different types of preference reversal. 
 
Data 
The experimental data to be explained comes from experiments run by Blondel and 
Lévy-Garboua (2005), investigating at the same time the endowment effect for lotteries 
and preference reversal. Summary statistics of their experimental results are given in 
Table 16. 
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Table 16: Endowment effect for lotteries / preference reversal.  
(Data in columns 1-4 and 7-8 from Blondel and Lévy-Garboua, 2005) 
Column: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
No. stake (€); win probability 
Expected 
Value 
Mean WTA 
(n=32) 
Mean WTP 
(n=30) r c 
Selling: 
type 1 rev.
Buying: 
type 1 rev.
$1 10; .8 8.0 € 7.1 € 4.1 € 2.4 € 1.5 € 
P1 8; .95 7.6 € 6.6 € 4.5 € 2.1 € 1.1 € 49 
  
-2 
$2 10; .7 7.0 € 6.6 € 3.2 € 2.1 € 1.7 € 
P2 7; .95 6.7 € 5.9 € 3.9 € 1.8 € 1.0 € 69 
  
-13 
$3 10; .6 6.0 € 6.0 € 2.9 € 1.6 € 1.6 € 
P3 6; .95 5.7 € 5.1 € 3.4 € 1.5 € 0.9 € 50 
  
-9 
$4 10; .5 5.0 € 5.5 € 3.0 € 0.8 € 1.3 € 
P4 5; .95 4.8 € 4.4 € 2.7 € 1.2 € 0.9 € 74 
  
13 
$5 10; .4 4.0 € 4.6 € 2.6 € 0.4 € 1.0 € 
P5 4; .95 3.8 € 3.5 € 2.1 € 1.0 € 0.7 € 62 
  
28 
$6 10; .3 3.0 € 4.0 € 2.2 € -0.1 € 0.9 € 
P6 3; .95 2.9 € 2.7 € 1.4 € 0.3 € 1.2 € 77 
  
60 
$7 10; .2 2.0 € 3.5 € 1.5 € -0.5 € 1.0 € 
P7 2; .95 1.9 € 2.0 € 0.9 € 0.5 € 0.6 € 69 
  
89 
$8 20; .4 8.0 € 8.3 € 3.5 € 2.1 € 2.4 € 
P8 8, .9 7.2 € 6.4 € 4.1 € 2.0 € 1.2 € 42 
  
-20 
$9 20; .3 6.0 € 6.8 € 2.9 € 1.2 € 2.0 € 
P9 6, .9 5.4 € 4.7 € 3.4 € 1.4 € 0.7 € 82 
  
-11 
$10 20; .2 4.0 € 6.0 € 2.6 € -0.3 € 1.7 € 
P10 4, .9 3.6 € 3.2 € 1.9 € 1.1 € 0.7 € 81 
  
23 
$11 20; .1 2.0 € 4.7 € 1.6 € -1.2 € 1.6 € 
P11 2, .9 2.7 € 1.9 € 0.7 € 1.4 € 0.6 € 78 
  
58 
$12 30; .2 6.0 € 8.2 € 3.1 € 0.4 € 2.6 € 
P12 7; .8 5.6 € 5.4 € 2.9 € 1.5 € 1.3 € 52 
  
7 
$13 30; .1 3.0 € 7.3 € 2.1 € -1.7 € 2.6 € 
P13 3; .8 2.4 € 2.7 € 1.3 € 0.4 € 0.7 € 80 
  
61 
$14 40; .2 8.0 € 11.2 € 3.6 € 0.6 € 3.8 € 
P14 9; .8 7.2 € 6.4 € 3.8 € 2.1 € 1.3 € 71 
  
8 
$15 40; .1 4.0 € 9.6 € 2.5 € -2.1 € 3.6 € 
P15 4,5; .8 3.6 € 3.6 € 1.6 € 1.0 € 1.0 € 81 
  
34 
Mean, $-lotteries 5.1 € 6.6 € 2.8 € 0.37 € 1.93 €   
Mean, P-lotteries 4.7 € 4.4 € 2.6 € 1.26 € 0.90 €   
Overall Mean 4.9 € 5.6 € 2.7 € 0.8 € 1.4 € 68 22 
 
 
Blondel and Lévy-Garboua used 30 different lotteries. The properties of the lotteries 
– probability of winning and amount to be won - are given in column 1 (with the re-
maining probability, nothing was won). The lotteries were created to form 15 pairs, each 
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pair consisting of one relatively risky ($) and one relatively safe (P) lottery. The 15 lot-
teries with low/medium winning probabilities (0.1 to 0.8) are classified as risky/$-
lotteries, while the 15 lotteries with high winning probability (0.8 to 0.95) are classified 
as relatively safe/P-lotteries.46 Column 2 shows the expected value of the lotteries. The 
lottery pairs were constructed such that in the latter choice condition, roughly half of the 
subjects would choose the relatively safe/P lottery and half would choose the risky/$ 
lottery. This leads to slightly lower expected value of the relatively safe/P-lotteries due 
to conventional risk aversion. 
Columns 3 and 4 show the mean answers of two different groups of subjects. One 
group (n=32) answered in the selling condition, while the other group (n=30) answered 
in the buying condition (both with the incentive compatible BDM-mechanism, see 
above). It is straightforward to see that the endowment effect is confirmed with mean 
WTA-answers being much larger than mean WTP-answers. For every lottery, WTA is 
significantly higher (p<0.05) than WTP. 
Column 5 and 6 give the two parameters of our model, calculated directly from the 
aggregated data: The risk aversion parameter [r=E-(WTP+WTA)/2] and the gap pa-
rameter [c=(WTA-WTP)/2, giving half of the gap]. Both parameters are significantly 
different in the two groups47:  
• For the risky lotteries, the gap is more than twice as large as for the relatively 
safe lotteries (p<0.01).  
• Absolute (conventional) risk aversion is more than three times larger for the 
relatively safe than for the risky lotteries! (p<0.0548) 
While the first statement is consistent with the endowment effect theories mentioned 
above, the second statement might be surprising at first sight. Closer inspection shows 
that it stems mainly from some risk premia being negative, indicating risk-seeking be-
havior. This is consistent with over-weighting of low probabilities. 
The results of the preference-reversal experiments are given in Table 16, columns 7 
and 8. In addition to pricing the different lotteries, subjects had to make choices be-
                                                 
46 One lottery ($1) with p=0.8 is classified as risky/$, while the other lotteries with p=0.8 (P12-P15) are 
classified as safe/P due to the pairwise setting of the authors. This categorization is kept here and should 
make comparing the means of the two groups more difficult (i.e. less significant differences).  
47Two-tailed t-tests for different variances. 
48 For difference of means. 
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tween the $ and P lottery of every pair. The resulting choice preference was then com-
pared to the preference that followed from comparing the stated prices. As there were 
two different pricing conditions (selling treatment: giving WTA and buying treatment: 
giving WTP), there are also two different rates of preference reversal for every pair of 
lotteries.  
As described above, there are two possible directions for such a preference reversal: 
“type 1 reversal”: This counts the percentage of those who choose the relatively safe/P 
bet, but priced the risky/$ bet higher. “Type 2 reversal” counts those who choose the 
risky/$ bet, but price the relatively safe/P bet higher. Both percentages can be combined 
as “Rate of type 1 minus rate of type 2 reversals” to give an indication which pattern, if 
any, dominated in one setting. This is the number given in column 7 for the selling 
treatment/WTA and in column 8 for the buying treatment/WTP (Table 16). A high posi-
tive number means that type 1 strongly dominated, while a negative number means that 
the rate of type 2 reversal was actually higher than the rate of type 1 reversal. 
Over all settings, type 1 reversal dominates in the WTA condition (mean of 68 per-
centage points more type 1 than type 2), while this dominance is much weaker for WTP 
(mean of 22 percentage points more type 1 than type 2). The difference between WTA 
and WTP setting is significant (p<0.01). The fact that the variance in the WTP setting is 
much larger corresponds to the observation that there are both kinds of results for WTP: 
type 1 reversal dominating strongly (e.g. in set 7) and type 2 reversal dominating 
weakly (e.g. in set 8). 
A first fruitful way to predict this variation is by looking at the probability of win-
ning in the risky $-bet: The smaller the probability, the more “over-weighting of small 
probabilities” becomes important. Its influence seems to strike in pricing much more 
than in direct choice between the lotteries. In addition, it seems to be stronger for 
smaller stakes (10 €) than for larger stakes (20, 30 and 40 €). Figure 17 to Figure 19 in 
the appendix provide an overview of how this helps in predicting preference reversal. 
The relation between this effect and the dominance of type 1 reversal is particularly 
strong for the two WTP settings: Over-weighting of low probabilities will be used in 
determining our risk-aversion parameter r. 
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Model Testing / Estimation of Parameters 
A first overview over the relation between the WTA-WTP-gap and the characteris-
tics of the lotteries can be gathered from Figure 11 and Figure 12. The gap increases 
with the payoff variation (Figure 11) and decreases with probability (Figure 12). 
 
 
Figure 11: Relation between payoff and WTA-WTP-gap 
                                                 
49 At least 90 % of the endowment effect experiments listed in chapter 1 follow this design. Exceptions 
are Harless (1989) and Brown (2005) who elicit both WTA and WTP from every subject.  
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Figure 12: Relation between winning probability and WTA-WTP-gap 
 
Gap parameter c  
Notation: Lottery: (H, p; L, p-1) H – high payoff, L – low payoff (here always = 0). 
The prediction of our model is that c varies with the uncertainty of the lottery, i.e. 
mainly the payoff variation H-L (here =H). A simple linear form would be: 
 Specification 1: cij = β1i + β2iH + εij (23.) 
with i=1…n denoting individuals (buying group: n=30, selling group: n=32) and 
j=1…30 denoting lotteries. 
In contrast to the formulation of the model in chapter 1, lotteries are not exclusively 
in the form of 50-50 gambles here. This allows checking for dependence of c on the 
winning probability p. 
To refine the prediction of c, we include the winning probability p and its quadratic 
term p2:  
 Specification 2: cij = β1i + β2iHj + β3ip + β4ip2  + εij (24.) 
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Conventional Risk Aversion r & Probability Overweighting 
The parameter r of absolute risk aversion is defined as: 
r = E – CE, 
with CE: certainty equivalent of a lottery, either equivalent gain, equivalent loss, 
WTA or WTP. 
As the difference between the measured certainty equivalent in buying and selling is 
already measured by the gap parameter c, we can assume that the remaining risk aver-
sion is equal in both occasions, while the risk aversion in the choice occasion (equiva-
lent gain) is seen to follow another process (making no statement about equivalent loss 
here). 
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A central element in determining the risk aversion in pricing is over-weighting of low 
probabilities: 
 
Figure 13: Overweighting of low probabilities  
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1992, p. 57) 
 
Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) states that individuals show risk-
seeking behavior towards lotteries with low winning probabilities (0.25 or below): Peo-
ple indicate certainty equivalents for these lotteries that are higher than the expected 
values of the lotteries.  
The evidence (e.g. in Tversky and Kahneman, 1992) stems from experiments where 
subjects had to indicate preferences over lotteries and fixed amounts on a computer 
screen, narrowing down to a single amount at which the subjects were indifferent be-
tween receiving the fixed amount or the lottery. The over-weighting of small probabili-
ties decreases if payoffs are increased, reaching risk-neutrality for payoffs of $200 and 
above. 
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For near-certain events (probability around 0.9), individual valuation is most de-
pressed in comparison to the expected value. When rising from impossibility to possi-
bility (from 0 to >0) and from near-certainty to certainty (from <1 to 1), valuations in-
crease more than when intermediate probabilities are increased. This leads to the S-
shaped probability-weighting function of Prospect Theory (see Figure 13). 
The evidence of the preference reversal in Table 16 strongly indicates that for pric-
ing, overweighting of low probabilities is much more pronounced than for choice.  
We make here two adaptations to the concept of probability-overweighting: 
1. Probability-overweighting is more important in pricing than in choice. 
2. Probability-overweighting is more important for small than for large payoffs. 
The first property is consistent with a view that probability-overweighting is con-
nected with the avoidance of losses, that are only possible in buying and selling. A con-
cept of “constant joy of gambling” would say: 
- general principle: People are especially unwilling to carry a risk if this 
involves a possible loss in comparison to the status quo. 
- exception: if the winning probability is low, people are more willing 
to carry the risk of losing a small amount of money and the chance to 
win a comparably large amount of money – risk-taking might be seen 
here as something good (bringing a certain “constant joy of gam-
bling”, that loses its relative importance as payoffs grow larger). 
For testing the model, we will make the following simplifying assumptions: 
1. No probability-overweighting in choice (equivalent gain). 
2. No concavity in the utility/value function in buying and selling. 
The second assumption is due to the size-dependence of probability-overweighting. 
Having concavity (decreasing sensitivity to gains) at the same time as probability-
overweighting already poses problems for estimating the parameters (cf. Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1992, p. 59). If one introduces size-dependence of probability-
overweighting, this problem increases. Therefore, concavity is abandoned here. 
Notation: Following Prospect Theory, utility U is calculated as follows:  
 U(H, p; L, 1-p )= w(p)v(H) + w(1-p)v(L),  (25.) 
 Chapter 2: Can we predict Preference Reversal? 
 120
with v(.) being the wealth-utility function and w(.) being the probability-weighting 
function. 
 
Choice:  
In direct choice between two lotteries, let w(p)=p (so there is no probability-
weighting) and v(x)=xα. The utility in the choice setting is then given by the equivalent 
gain:  
 EG = [pHα + (1-p)Lα]1/α  (26.) 
Fitting to the data: The results of the direct choice treatment are not shown here, as 
the pairs have been constructed such that roughly half of the subjects choose the P and 
half choose the $ lottery. Over all treatments, on average 47 % of the subjects choose 
the P lottery. No systematic changes in preference can be observed even for lower win-
ning probabilities in the $-lottery, indicating that probability-overweighting is weak (see 
also Figure 20 in the appendix). 
A value of α that leads to utility/equivalent gain for $ slightly higher in all pairs than 
for P is 0.95 (slightly higher than 0.88 proposed by Tversky and Kahneman, 1992, 
p.59). 
 
Pricing 
For buying and selling decisions, we assume v(x)=x (linear value function).  
So in pricing we have 
 EG=w(p, H)H + w(1-p, L)L (27.) 
As in this experiment, we have L=0 (low payoff = zero), the last part vanishes. 
This simplification of a linear value function allows more detailed estimation of w(p, 
H). Indeed, probability-weighting can be used to model small- and medium-scale risk 
aversion. 
For r, we get: 
 r = E – CE = pH - w(p,H)H  ⇔  r/H = p - w(p, H) (28.) 
Prospect Theory assumes a formulation of probability-overweighting that is not well-
suited for size-dependence, so we recur to a linear-quadratic form: 
 rij/Hj= δ1i + δ2i pj + δ3i pj2 + δ4i Hj + δ5 Hj2 + ε’ij (29.) 
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We will now try to test our model and to estimate the parameters c and r. 
We use the following regressions in order to estimate the parameters: 
 
Individual regressions 
 For the buying group (n=30) and the selling group (n=32), we run one regression for 
every individual.  
As for every individual, only WTA or WTP is known for a lottery, the individual re-
gressions have to recur to the average price answer of the other group: 
Buying group: cij=(WTAj-WTPij)/2. and rij=Ej-(WTAj+WTPij)/2 
With 
1
1 n
j ij
i
WTA WTA
n =
= ∑ the mean of the other (selling) group, Ej: expected value of 
lottery j. Correspondingly for the selling group:  
cij=(WTAij-WTPj)/2 and rij=Ej-(WTAij+WTPj)/2 
In order to find single parameters, we aggregate the results from the individual re-
gressions. Table 17, Table 18 and Table 19 present the results. In each group, we aggre-
gate the coefficients and p-values (for robust standard errors) of these regressions to the 
medians and means for the buying group (column 7 and 8, standard errors of this aggre-
gation to mean: column 9) and the selling group (columns 12-14). Additionally, we 
weight the coefficients of the individual regressions with (1-“p-value”). The weighted 
mean coefficients of the individual regressions for the buying and selling group can be 
found in column 10 and 16. As an indication of significance of the coefficients in the 
individual regressions, columns 11 and 16 display in how many of the individual re-
gressions the coefficient significant at the 5 %-level. For every parameter, we get 6 dif-
ferent estimates, resulting from 62 individual regressions (so 186 regressions alto-
gether). 
 
Regressions with aggregated data:  
Columns 1-6 show the results of different regressions with take the data for the de-
pendent variables c and r from the following sources: 
o 1: Buying group – average parameters (cj , rj) for each lottery calcu-
lated from individual cs: 
1
1 n
j ij
i
c c
n =
= ∑ and the same for r. 
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o 2: Buying group – median 2: median individual cj and rj for every lot-
tery j.  
o 3: Selling group – average parameters  cj and rj as above. 
o 4: Selling group – median individual cj and rj for every lottery j. 
For the aggregate specifications 5 and 6, cj and rj are calculated directly from aggre-
gated WTA and WTP answers: 
o 5: cj=(WTAj-WTPj)/2, rj= Ej-(WTAj+WTPj)/2 with mean WTA and 
WTP answers. 
o 6: as in 5, but with median WTA and WTP answers. 
Altogether, we therefore have 12 estimates for every parameter (6 aggregated from 
the individual regressions and 6 from regressions with aggregated data). As we run two 
different specifications for c and one specification for r, this leads to 36 estimates alto-
gether (resulting from 204 regressions). 
 
Results 
Table 17, Table 18 and Table 19 show the resulting parameter estimates (p-values 
are for robust standard errors). In order to include all specifications into the final 
judgements of parameter estimates, we have calculated confidence intervals for every 
parameter, given the 12 different parameter estimations. Mean and median parameters 
are shown in columns 17 and 18. Columns 19 and 20 show upper and lower bounds of 
the 5 %-confidence interval, given this sample of 12 parameters.  
The simple specification of c (Table 17) shows a significant influence of the payoff 
H  with the parameter lying between 0.061 and 0.078. The mean coefficient of 0.069 
shows that, when the payoff variation50 is increased by 1 €, the WTA-WTP-gap (=2c) 
increases by approximately 0.14 € (1 · 0.069 · 2 = 0.138 €). 
This second specification of c shows that, although p and p2 are significant at 5 % in 
less than half of the individual regressions, the adjusted R2 increases in the aggregate 
and individual regressions (from means of 80 % - aggregate – and 56 % - individual – to 
                                                 
50 Here corresponding simply to the payoff H, as the low payoff L=0. 
 Chapter 2: Can we predict Preference Reversal? 
 123
89 % and 71 %). In the sample of 12 parameter estimates, all mean parameters are sig-
nificantly different from zero. 
Result 1: The risk of a lottery, expressed as a low winning probability and a high payoff 
variation, has a strong positive influence on the WTA-WTP-gap. 
Result 1 confirms our hypothesis 1 stated above. 
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Table 17: Estimation of gap parameter c (specification 1) 
Column no: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
 Aggregated data Ind. Reg., Buying group, n=30 Ind. Reg., Selling group, n=32 Aggregation over estimates 
 
Buy 
mean
Buy 
med 
Sell 
mean 
Sell 
med mean med med mean std err swted sig05 med mean std err swted sig05 mean median cf(up) co(low) 
H 0.076 0.08 0.076 0.043 0.076 0.047 0.077 0.076 0.005 0.077 27 0.047 0.076 0.017 0.083 20 0.069 0.076 0.078 0.061 
p-values 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.000 0.015 0.009    0.003 0.095 0.036    0.011 0.000 0.030 -0.007 
Constant 0.462 0.508 0.462 0.739 0.462 0.785 0.458 0.462 0.084 0.511 25 0.602 0.464 0.152 0.516 23 0.536 0.486 0.600 0.471 
p-values 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.000 0.107 0.047    0.001 0.110 0.040    0.022 0.000 0.050 -0.007 
Observ. 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30     30 30     30 30.000   
R2 (agg.) 0.9 0.927 0.9 0.557 0.9 0.617             0.800 0.900 0.933 0.667 
R2 (ind.)   0.784 0.716 0.043   0.344 0.387 0.049   0.558 0.551 0.778 0.338 
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Table 18: Estimation of gap parameter c (specification 2) 
Column no: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
 Aggregated data Ind. Reg., Buying group, n=30 Ind. Reg., Selling group, n=32 Aggregation over estimates 
 
Buy 
mean
Buy 
med 
Sell 
mean 
Sell 
med mean med med mean Std err swted sig05 med mean std err swed sig05 mean mdn cf(up) cf(low) 
H 0.099 0.099 0.099 0.078 0.099 0.078 0.101 0.099 0.005 0.100 28 0.076 0.099 0.017 0.107 26 0.094 0.099 0.100 0.089 
p-values 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.000 0.007 0.005    0.005 0.086 0.036    0.010 0.000 0.027 -0.007 
p 3.723 3.12 3.702 5.764 3.702 5.162 4.405 3.723 0.668 4.367 17 3.309 3.721 0.658 4.758 14 4.121 3.723 4.567 3.676 
p-values 0 0.001 0 0 0 0.001 0.028 0.163 0.047    0.122 0.306 0.054    0.062 0.001 0.127 -0.002 
p2 -2.661 -2.256 -2.643 -4.138 -2.643 -3.735 -2.758 -2.661 0.547 -3.036 16 -2.576 -2.657 0.699 -3.490 13 -2.938 -2.661 -2.622 -3.253 
p-values 0 0.002 0 0 0 0.003 0.014 0.136 0.040    0.187 0.319 0.060    0.066 0.003 0.135 -0.003 
Constant -0.835 -0.558 -0.83 -1.254 -0.83 -0.976 -0.882 -0.835 0.150 -1.084 16 -0.778 -0.834 0.317 -0.998 9 -0.891 -0.835 -0.793 -0.989 
p-values 0.002 0.023 0.002 0.004 0.002 0.031 0.028 0.250 0.057    0.259 0.369 0.061    0.097 0.025 0.183 0.011 
Observ. 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30     30 30     30 30   
R2 (agg.) 0.945 0.956 0.945 0.766 0.945 0.769             0.888 0.945 0.962 0.813 
R2 (ind.)        0.856 0.807 0.034    0.613 0.551 0.038    0.707 0.710 0.851 0.562 
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Table 19: Estimation of absolute risk aversion r  
Column no: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
 Aggregated data Ind. Reg., Buying group, n=30 Ind. Reg., Selling group, n=32 Aggregation over estimates 
 
Buy 
mean
Buy 
med 
Sell 
mean 
Sell 
med mean med med mean std err swted sig05 med mean std err swed sig05 mean mdn cf(up) co(low) 
H 0.009 0.008 0.009 0 0.009 0 0.008 0.009 0.002 0.011 14 0.001 0.009 0.004 0.015 8 0.007 0.009 0.010 0.005 
p-values 0.001 0.016 0.001 0.937 0.001 0.953 0.0785 0.236 0.057    0.392 0.400 0.057    0.302 0.157 0.533 0.070 
H2* 0 0 0 0 0 0. 0 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.000 12 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.00024 8 -0.00003 0.000 0.000 0.000 
p-values 0.009 0.043 0.009 0.458 0.009 0.608 0.084 0.246 0.055    0.281 0.358 0.056    0.210 0.165 0.343 0.078 
p 0.645 0.626 0.666 0.535 0.645 0.507 0.668 0.645 0.053 0.670 24 0.545 0.646 0.083 0.708 19 0.626 0.645 0.661 0.590 
p-values 0 0 0 0 0 0.001 0.001 0.061 0.023    0.021 0.121 0.035    0.020 0.000 0.046 -0.005 
p2 -0.163 -0.152 -0.176 -0.167 -0.163 -0.145 -0.146 -0.163 0.051 -0.227 11 -0.157 -0.163 0.068 -0.224 5 -0.170 -0.163 -0.155 -0.186 
p-values 0.049 0.1 0.034 0.109 0.049 0.156 0.127 0.286 0.059    0.213 0.318 0.051    0.144 0.118 0.206 0.082 
Constant -0.255 -0.235 -0.263 -0.116 -0.255 -0.099 -0.234 -0.255 0.022 -0.265 25 -0.139 -0.255 0.060 -0.328 12 -0.225 -0.255 -0.186 -0.264 
p-values 0 0 0 0.038 0 0.121 0.002 0.056 0.030    0.217 0.255 0.048    0.069 0.020 0.129 0.009 
Obs. 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30     30 30     30 30   
R2(agg.) 0.954 0.937 0.956 0.89 0.954 0.88             0.929 0.946 0.956 0.901 
R2 (ind.)        0.868 0.828 0.024    0.773 0.766 0.022    0.809 0.800 0.856 0.761 
*coefficient estimates for prize2 are so small that they were rounded to zero, although they are significant in most regressions. 
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Figure 14: Probability-weighting in the estimation  
[probability (horizontal) vs. probability-weight (vertical)] 
 
Chapter 2: Can we predict Preference Reversal? 
 128
Table 19 shows that the explanatory power of the regressions to calibrate r is both 
large (mean adjusted R2 from aggregate regressions of 93 % and from individual regres-
sions of 81 %) and all coefficients are highly significant. The resulting probability-
weighting function can be seen in Figure 14 (plotted for different stakes from 5 € to 40 
€). The function must be seen as discontinuous at p=0 and p=1 (where the correspond-
ing weights are 0 and 1). 
Result 2: The conventional risk aversion in buying and selling is strongly influenced by 
probability-overweighting that is weakening when payoffs grow larger. 
Result 2 confirms our hypothesis 2 outlined above. 
 
Predicting preference reversal 
To predict the frequency of type 1 and type 2 reversal (expressed in “frequency of 
type 1 reversal minus frequency of type 2 reversal”, as above), we first have to establish 
a relationship between the original pricing data and the preference reversal frequency. 
For the two reversals to happen, the following must be true:  
Type 1 reversal: Choice: U(P)>U($) ⇔ Pricing: CE(P)<CE($) 
Type 2 reversal: Choice: U(P)<U($) ⇔ Pricing: CE(P)>CE($) 
The first part of both conditions is always true for roughly half of the participants, as 
the lotteries are designed such that the “average subject” is indifferent between the two 
lotteries of a pair, i.e. half of the subjects choose either of the two. Therefore, we can 
focus on the second part of both conditions. Keeping in mind that we are processing ag-
gregate data (means), we can nevertheless predict the following tendencies: 
1. No strong reversal if certainty equivalents (WTA and WTP) are equal for both 
lotteries of a pair (difference = 0). 
2. If CE(P)<CE($) [CE(P)>CE($)], type 1 reversal [type 2 reversal] dominates. 
The larger the difference CE($)-CE(P) [CE(P)-CE($)], the more type 1 reversal 
[type 2 reversal] dominates. 
The first statement can be verified for lottery pair 3 and 4, which have quite similar 
mean WTP answers and show neither strong dominance of type 1 nor type 2 reversal in 
the buying treatment. 
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To quantitatively test the second statement, it might be necessary to relate the differ-
ence in certainty equivalents to the expected value of the lotteries: 
Relative valuation difference: ($) ( )
2
($) ( )
E E P
CE CE P
+
−   (30.) 
Figure 15 shows that this relative valuation difference bears a relatively strong rela-
tion with the type of preference reversal in the buying treatment: For a high relative 
valuation difference (i.e. the price for the risky lottery being much larger than the price 
for the relatively safe lottery), type 1 reversal strongly dominates. For the points to the 
right of the vertical axis, i.e. the price of the relatively safe lottery being higher, type 2 
reversal dominates. 
Figure 16 shows that the same relation exists for the selling treatment, yet appears to 
be weaker. Keep in mind, however, that the maximum score for “type of preference re-
versal” is 100, so the relationship has to be non-linear at some point. 
 
 
Figure 15: Preference Reversal in the buying treatment and the relative valuation difference 
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Figure 16: Preference Reversal in the selling treatment and the relative valuation difference 
 
The pattern of type of preference reversal is the following: 
• Selling treatment: Subjects on average indicate a much higher WTA for the 
$-lottery, type 1 reversal dominates in all lottery pairs. 
• Buying treatment: For small payoffs and medium to small probability of win-
ning in the $-lottery, subjects indicate larger WTP for the $- than for the P-
lottery, leading to a domination of type 1 reversal. 
• Buying treatment: The larger the payoffs and the higher the winning probabil-
ity in the $-lottery, the more WTP($) is depressed in comparison to WTP(P). 
This leads to a decreasing frequency of type 1 reversal and a larger frequency 
of type 2 reversals. 
 
Result 3: The differences in aggregate valuation can explain which type of preference 
reversal dominates.  
Result 3 confirms our hypothesis 3 outlined above that the variation in WTA/WTP-
answers is sufficient to generate a pattern that follows the path similar to the observed 
data of type of preference reversal. 
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Predictions for other settings:  
The observation that was so far unexplained, that the use of the buying treatment and 
relatively large payoffs (such as used by Casey, 1991 and Schmidt and Hey, 2004) leads 
to “type 2” reversals, is consistent with the model: For small payoffs, probability-
overweighting leads to WTP($)>WTP(P) (and therefore “type 1” reversals) despite the 
WTA-WTP-gap being larger for $. When payoffs grow larger, the importance of prob-
ability-overweighting decreases, leading to WTP($)<WTP(P) and type 2 (“unpredicted“ 
or “reversed”) preference reversal. 
Hamm’s (1979) payoffs seem to have been rather small51, leading the model to cor-
rectly predict type 1 reversal strongly dominating, as well as in Casey’s (1991) control 
setting with small payoffs. 
 
                                                 
51 He mentions as a typical lottery: (8,50 US$, 0.3; -1.50 US$, 0.7; p. 85). 
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Conclusion 
The preference reversal phenomenon has been observed in many experiments and 
consists of contradicting preferences measured directly, via a choice between two lotter-
ies, and indirectly, via pricing of the same lotteries. 
Anomalies like preference reversal or the endowment effect seem to challenge the 
economic assumptions of rational preferences. For these two anomalies, it seems never-
theless possible to stick to the transitivity assumption and therefore to rational prefer-
ences. An extension of the economic model that restores transitivity must account for 
different forms of evaluation in choice, buying and selling. 
The preference reversal phenomenon could so far not be explained in its entirety. In 
particular, an explanation of different types of preference reversal observed when a buy-
ing treatment is used, has so far not been achieved. This paper links the preference re-
versal and endowment effect phenomena, showing that the insights won from the latter 
can help predicting the former.  
The hypothesis of “aversion to risk changes” links the gap between maximum buy 
prices and minimum sell prices to the risk of the lotteries and takes size-dependent over-
weighting of small probabilities into account. The model successfully predicts the oc-
currence of both types of preference reversal and can therefore fill the explanatory gap 
left open by other endowment effect theories.  
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Appendix 
Additional Figures and Tables 
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Figure 17: type 1 reversal for WTA and overweighting of low probabilities 
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Figure 18: The move from „type 1 reversal” to “Type 2 reversal” for WTP (10 € stake) 
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Figure 19: The move from “type 1 reversal” to “type 2 reversal” for WTP (20 - 40 € stake).  
For a given probability, type 2 reversal is 35 percentage points more likely than for smaller stakes.  
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Choosing and  probability-overweighting
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Figure 20: No significant correlation between the winning probability in $ and the choice preferences 
 
 
 
 
 
 Joke: Intransitivity? 
Say, what do you think is better, Spike, a cheese sandwich or complete happiness?" 
"I'd say complete happiness, of course." 
"Then you'd be wrong, my friend. You see, nothing is better than complete happiness, 
but a cheese sandwich is better than nothing. Logically, that means a cheese sandwich 
is better than complete happiness." 
"Eh, that's logic?" 
"So it is, Spike, so it is." 
(From an old comedy sketch) 
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Chapter 3:  
The WTA-WTP-gap  
in Contingent Valuation Studies 
 
Abstract: A large body of evidence confirms that the difference between willing-
ness to accept (WTA) and willingness to pay (WTP) measured in surveys with the 
contingent valuation method is much larger than in experiments with real transac-
tions. A survey with 60 respondents about improving water quality in the Isar 
River sheds light on the reasons for the discrepancy that has so far not been well 
understood. 
The survey confirms our hypothesis that, in the WTA-style question, respondents 
do not take the proposed money transaction from the government to them as a real 
possibility. Therefore, instead of reporting their “true economic preferences”, they 
answer as in an opinion poll, with the answers on a monetary scale. As most peo-
ple can be assumed to be in favour of ameliorating public goods, these answers are 
quite large and can even be infinite, if respondents want to express their general 
support for the cause.  
In the WTP-style question, in contrast, respondents do not completely disregard 
the possibility of having to make a future payment connected to the cause. There-
fore, their answers are closer to their “true economic preferences”. Reasonable 
doubt remains that even the WTP answers are useful input for policy decisions or 
damage litigation. Expert advice and rule-based damage assessment seem more re-
liable alternatives. 
 
Keywords: Contingent Valuation Surveys, WTA-WTP-gap, Endowment Effect 
JEL classification: C93 
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Introduction 
“Contingent valuation” is a method used in surveys to value public goods. It consists 
of putting the respondent into a hypothetical situation where she shall decide whether to 
“buy” or “sell” a public good. Contingent on such a market-like setting, the respondent 
is supposed to truthfully reveal the value she assigns to the public good. The method has 
been mainly used to assess the value of environmental goods in policy debates and 
damage assessments in pollution litigations. 
There are two main versions of the valuing question: “What is the maximum you 
would pay for the good (being bought/saved)?”;  this elicits the (hypothetical) willing-
ness to pay (WTP) or maximum buy-price. The opposite of this question is: “What is 
the minimum payment you would accept for the good (being sold/destroyed)?”, eliciting 
the (hypothetical) willingness to accept (WTA) or minimum sell-price. 
Contingent valuation surveys demonstrate that these answers to the two types of 
questions differ dramatically: Reported willingness to accept (WTA) is much larger 
than reported willingness to pay (WTP). By comparing the results of contingent valua-
tion studies with an experimental setting where real goods and money changed hands, it 
turned out that the gap is much larger in the hypothetical setting of the surveys (see 
Table 20 below). 
The notion of real WTP or WTA is used in an experimental setting where goods are 
traded for real money. The notion of hypothetical WTP or WTA is used in the context 
of contingent valuation (CV) studies, where respondents are asked to imagine a market 
for the good, but real payments are not made, at least not during the course of the sur-
vey. 
The question that this article tries to answer is the following: Given that a significant 
gap between WTA and WTP exists in real experimental settings, what widens the gap 
so dramatically in the hypothetical setting of a CV survey? 
We postulate here that the WTA-WTP-gap in the experimental setting (treated in 
chapter 1) is of a different nature than the additional gap in the hypothetical CV setting. 
The gap should be seen as consisting of two layers: one existing in the real setting and 
an additional effect in the hypothetical CV setting. This article tries to explain the latter 
effect.  
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I. History of Contingent Valuation Surveys 
An unexpected event in 1989 suddenly brought a lot of attention and controversy to 
the contingent valuation method: The oil spill of the supertanker Exxon Valdez. The 
damage to the Prince William Sound in Alaska, a natural reserve, led to the question 
how much Exxon would have to pay as compensation. What was the value of the envi-
ronment that the 11 million gallons of crude oil polluted? 
Originally, CV studies were used to value environmental goods in policy decisions.  
Portney (1994, p. 4) provides an overview on the history of CV studies. When the 
Exxon Valdez oil disaster occurred, the CV method was already part of US law to 
measure damages in natural resource cases where “use-values” (direct economic losses) 
were not available. Although the Exxon case was settled out of court for $1.15 billion, 
there is no doubt that the agreement was influenced by a CV study on the topic, estimat-
ing lost “existence value” at nearly $3 billion (Portney, 1994, p. 11, citing Carson et al., 
1992). 
What followed under the attention of large companies and US-congress was a con-
troversy among economists whether and how the CV method should be applied. A panel 
of experts appointed by the federal Department of Commerce for the National Oceanic 
and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) was called to decide on this issue. It con-
sisted of some of the best-known economists like Nobel laureates Kenneth Arrow and 
Robert Solow. The panel concluded that “CV studies can produce estimates reliable 
enough to be the starting point of a judicial process of damage assessment” (Arrow et 
al., 1993). Nevertheless it added a set of guidelines that CV studies would have to fol-
low, including the use of willingness to pay (WTP) instead of willingness to accept 
(WTA, also called “compensation demanded”): 
“The conceptually correct measure of lost passive-use value for environmental dam-
age that has already occurred is the minimum amount of compensation that each af-
fected individual would be willing to accept. Nevertheless, because of concern that re-
spondents would give unrealistically high answers to such questions, virtually all previ-
ous CV studies have described scenarios in which respondents are asked to pay to pre-
vent future occurrences of similar accidents. This is the conservative choice because 
willingness to accept compensation should exceed willingness to pay, if only trivially.” 
(Arrow et al., 1993, p. 4)  
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The panel also suggests the use of the referendum-style question, which is more real-
istically asked in the WTP-version (Arrow et al., 1993, p. 4): "Would you be willing to 
contribute (or be taxed) D dollars to cover the cost of avoiding or repairing environ-
mental damage X?" The use of this referendum-style excludes from the answers any 
kind of “strategic motives” of participants who might give high WTA and low WTP an-
swers just to influence a possible payment in a direction that would be profitable for 
them. As respondents to a referendum question can only say yes or no for a fixed pay-
ment, they cannot influence the amount of this payment. 
The panel followed a pragmatic way and suggested a method of applying CV that did 
not produce extremely high values. Among other guidelines it proposed to include re-
minders that stating a willingness to pay for the policy in question would reduce the re-
sponder’s amount available to spend on other things. The aim of including reminders 
like this was probably to lower the answers somewhat, as the tendency of the CV 
method of producing large values (also in the WTP setting) was seen as not desired. 
In the heated debate following the report of the NOAA panel, the question of using 
WTP or WTA seemed not to matter so much. Most arguments for and against using the 
CV study were about the reliability of the WTP referendum-question and what it actu-
ally measures (cf. Hanemann, 1994 and Diamond and Hausmann, 1994, for two oppos-
ing views). 
 
II. Empirical Evidence  
A pragmatic reason for excluding the WTA-style question, already in most earlier 
CV studies, was probably the fact that WTA answers in CV studies seemed unreasona-
bly high: In our own study, subjects value an upgrade for local sewage works on aver-
age 428 € in the WTA condition, while they value it at an average of 52 € in the WTP 
condition (see below). 
If there is only one true value, the question is whether hypothetical WTA answers are 
too high, hypothetical WTP answers too low, or both? To get a real willingness-to-pay 
or willingness-to-accept, one has to set up an experiment where real trades take place. 
Yet it is difficult to have real trades with public goods, which are usually treated in CV 
studies. The easiest work-around is to use private goods like consumptions goods that 
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can easily be traded, and about which one can of course also ask hypothetical valuation 
questions. 
The following section will briefly go over the most important studies, which are also 
displayed in Table 20. A more detailed overview can be found in Table 24 in the appen-
dix of this chapter. 
Table 20: Comparison of hypothetical and experimental valuations 
Study Good Result 
Public goods  
Brookshire and 
Coursey, 1987 
Trees in public park WTA/WTP falls from 21 (hyp) to 1.8 (real) 
Cummings et 
al., 1995a 
Contribution to 
Citizens guide 
Real WTP < hypothetical WTP 
  
Private goods - group I: “pure” private goods 
(without “no-payment-scenario”) 
List and 
Shogren, 2002 
Christmas gifts Real WTA 1.4 times higher than hypothetical WTA 
(opposite true for low-valued goods, real/hyp=0.75) 
Nape et al., 
2003 
Wall calendar Real WTA somewhat lower than hypothetical 
WTA. 
Cummings et 
al., 1995b 
Juicer, chocolate, 
calculator 
Real WTP lower than hypothetical WTP. 
Simonson and 
Drolet, 2004 
Toaster, phone, 
backpack, radio 
headphone 
No hypothetical WTA-WTP-gap - WTA even 
sometimes smaller than WTP. 
Coursey et al.,  
1987* 
Right to avoid bitter 
liquid 
WTA/WTP falls from 4 to 1.8 when moving from 
hypothetical to real condition 
   
Private goods - group II: with relevance for public 
(with “no-payment-scenario”) 
Rankin, 1990 Hunting permit Hyp. WTA much higher than real WTA, no differ-
ence for WTP.  
Dubourg et al., 
1994 
Car safety No hyp. compensation high enough for 20 % of re-
spondents.  
= infinite gap for some respondents 
Viscusi et al., 
1987 
Injury risk caused 
by toilet bowl 
cleaner and insecti-
cide 
No hyp. compensation high enough for all respon-
dents.  
= infinite gap for all respondents 
*Study could be classified into group II, see text. 
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Public Goods 
Brookshire and Coursey (1987) found a way to trade with a public good: They ask 
respondents about the number of trees that should be included in a new public park. 
Questions start in a hypothetical CV-style, where respondents should state the maxi-
mum that they would be willing to pay to increase the number of trees (e.g. from 200 to 
225) or the minimum compensation they would demand for a corresponding decrease in 
the number of trees. Median answers52 to the hypothetical WTP-question ($9.60) and to 
the hypothetical WTA-question ($200) differ drastically. In the next step, a detailed auc-
tion process was explained to the respondents that would take place, yet the questions 
were still hypothetical, so no binding commitment had to be made. This way to make 
real payments more probable drastically reduced “semi-hypothetical” WTA-answers to 
$30, while “semi-hypothetical” WTP-answers remained around the same level ($11.80). 
In the third step, real auctions took place. In the WTP-setting subjects were submit-
ting bids which they finally contributed to a special fund set up to finance the park. In 
the WTA-setting, subjects were submitting asks they would (and did) get out of the 
funds’ money. Up to five bidding/asking rounds took place in the groups under incen-
tive-compatible conditions53. In the final rounds, answers in both groups had signifi-
cantly decreased: WTP to $5.10, WTA to $7.25. If one calculates the WTA-WTP-gap 
as a ratio of WTA over WTP, this ratio decreased from 20.8 in the hypothetical setting 
to 1.854 in the experimental setting. This change was mainly driven by a decrease of 
WTA, the more the option of receiving a payment became real. 
The finding of hypothetical WTP being somewhat, yet not drastically, higher than 
real WTP is confirmed by Cummings et al. (1995a) who ask about (and collect) pay-
ments for providing a citizen’s guide about groundwater pollution to poor households.  
 
Private Goods 
The picture for private goods does not follow, at first sight, the same pattern. Con-
cerning WTP, the finding is quite similar: real WTP, elicited in experiments with real 
                                                 
52 For an increment of 25 trees. 
53 So-called “Smith auction”, going back to Vernon Smith. For a list of the various references for the de-
velopment and testing of this type of auction cf. Brookshire and Coursey, 1987, p. 557. 
54 Over all different treatments, of which only one is displayed here. 
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trades, is also observed to be somewhat lower than hypothetical WTP, elicited in the 
CV-style. Yet for WTA, findings differ within the group of private groups. It is there-
fore helpful to split the studies into two groups according to the question whether there 
could be public interest in the good (group II) or the goods must be seen as “pure” pri-
vate goods..  
 
Classification according to a “no-payment-scenario” 
Some of the private goods can be seen as having relevance to the general public. In 
order to decide for which goods this is the case, we define the relevant technical crite-
rion as follows: Can the answer to the valuing question have relevance for a decision, 
even if the proposed transfer of money (and eventual ownership rights) to/from the re-
spondent does not take place?  
While the relevance of this no-payment-condition generally holds for public goods, it 
can also be true for goods that are conventionally classified as private goods55. Take 
hunting permits, as used by Rankin (1990) as the best example of a private good that 
fulfils the “no-payment-scenario” criterion and can therefore have relevance for the 
public: After a survey about valuing hunting permits, a public authority could very well 
decide on increasing or decreasing the number of issued permits without making any of 
the direct money transactions that were proposed in the survey.  
The clearest example for “pure” private goods are those used by List and Shogren 
(2002): Subjects are asked (in a hypothetical setting and a real auction) whether they 
would sell their Christmas gifts. If this transaction does not take place, there is no mean-
ingful importance of the answers that a subject could imagine (other than research on 
the mechanism itself).  
Of course, judgement about this criterion is not always obvious. For details on classi-
fications of the studies in Table 20, see in the appendix of this chapter. It is worth noting 
that the study by Coursey et al. (1987) could also be classified into group II (with rele-
vance for the public), but was not, in order to remain conservative with respect to our 
research hypothesis. 
 
                                                 
55 according to the standard criteria of “rivalry in consumption” and “excludability” 
Chapter 3: The WTA-WTP-gap in Contigent Caluation Studies 
 143
Group I vs. Group II 
After classifying the private good studies into the groups, a clearer pattern emerges 
concerning WTA answers: Studies in group II (with relevance for the public) find a pat-
tern similar to the one observed for public goods: Very high hypothetical WTA that de-
crease drastically in a real experimental setting. 
Rankin (1990, p. 216) concludes from his comparison between a CV study and real 
transactions with hunting permits: The WTA responses from the experiment and the 
contingent valuation study “seem to result from very different processes.” WTP answers 
in the hypothetical and real setting seem similar.  
In group I studies (“pure” private goods), WTA responses do not show the same pat-
tern. List and Shogren (2002) even find that their subjects on average understate WTA 
for their Christmas gifts in a hypothetical situation, compared to a real auction. 
 
Summary of findings: 
Subjects in public good studies and private good studies with relevance for the public 
(group II) give much larger WTA answers in hypothetical than in experimental settings. 
Subjects in studies about “pure” private goods (group I) do not drastically overstate 
their WTA in a hypothetical setting. WTP answers in all studies are usually somewhat 
higher in a hypothetical than in an experimental setting, though only on a moderate 
scale. 
 
The question following from this finding is: What is it that leads to respondents giv-
ing these extremely high hypothetical WTA answers in CV studies about public goods 
and private goods in group II? 
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III. Hypotheses 
In this chapter, we give an overview over the different hypothesis that try to explain 
different facts known from the CV method. The following hypotheses can be classified 
into two groups: 
1. Explaining the WTA-WTP-gap for CV studies: Loss Aversion in Riskless 
Choice, Substitution Effects, Decision Uncertainty. 
2. Explaining other facts of CV studies that are perceived as irregularities: 
Warm Glow Hypothesis, Opinion Poll Hypothesis, Hypothetical Bias. 
Our own hypothesis (diplayed at the end of this chapter) tries to explain the WTA-
WTP-gap, yet draws on some of the arguments used by the hypotheses under 2. 
 
 
Hypotheses explaining the WTA-WTP-gap: 
Loss Aversion in riskless Choice 
Brookshire and Coursey (1987) see a strengthening of “loss aversion” as the underly-
ing force behind the increase of the gap in the hypothetical setting. Loss aversion goes 
back to Thaler (1980) and Tversky and Kahneman (1991) who took it out of the uncer-
tain setting of Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Loss aversion states 
that people are more sensitive towards losses than towards gains. Therefore they de-
mand higher compensation when selling than what they are willing to spend when buy-
ing.  
When applying this concept to the CV method, four problems appear: 
• Details: The exact reason why loss aversion should be more pronounced in a 
hypothetical than in a real setting remains unclear; at least Brookshire and 
Coursey (1987) do not give any details. 
• Hypothetical setting and ownership: In a hypothetical setting, ownership over 
a good is not real, so a loss of a hypothetical endowment could as well be 
perceived as less severe than a loss of a real endowment.  
• Public goods and ownership: For public goods, the concept of ownership is 
hardly feasible, as public goods usually belong to the public by definition. 
Nevertheless, the proposed move in the WTA case is usually a deterioration 
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of a public good, so it can be defined as a loss. The proposed amelioration of 
the public good in the WTP case can be seen as a gain. If we define two 
states, one good and one bad, the prices and associated moves are: “WTA for 
the move from the good to the bad state” and “WTP for the move from the 
bad to the good state”. 
Yet it is unavoidable that one of the states “good” and “bad” is only hypo-
thetical compared to reality. It is usually the case in CV studies about public 
goods that in reality, the bad state exists and should be compared to a possible 
good state that could be achieved56 through the appropriate actions.57 There-
fore, although the wording in the WTA case points to a possible “loss”, the 
only possible move in reality is in the opposite direction. The argument of re-
spondents considering a possible loss in the WTA situation only holds if they 
take the starting point they should imagine for real and care more about this 
hypothetical situation than about reality. If they would be interested more in 
the possible action in reality, the WTA task must be seen as assigning a 
monetary value to the proposed action that can in reality only happen in the 
other direction. 
• Pattern for private goods: As outlined above, the hypothetical setting has dif-
ferent effects in different studies with private goods. Loss aversion cannot ac-
count for this pattern. 
 
Substitution Effect 
Hanemann (1991) formally shows that the substitution effect can lead to WTA being 
much58 larger than WTP, if there are hardly any substitutes for the public good. This 
hypothesis is not consistent with the WTA-WTP-gap decreasing so dramatically when 
moving from a hypothetical to an experimental setting (see above). If respondents 
                                                 
56 In the case of a pollution that has already happened, achieving the good state is not possible literally, 
but only in the sense of preventing future pollutions by setting a high fine/litigation sum. 
57 It is theoretically possible to have the opposite situation where the good state exists and the policy pro-
posal is to deteriorate the public good, although no such study is known to the author. In this case, the 
bad state would be hypothetical. 
58 A simulated setting shows WTA being up to 5 times larger than WTP. 
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would accept no or only a very high compensation in a hypothetical setting due to a 
substitution effect, this should be true in an experimental setting as well. 
 
Decision Uncertainty 
Li et al. (2002) state that “decision uncertainty” causes WTA to be higher in a hypo-
thetical setting. They assume that the individual does not have a fixed true valuation in 
his or her mind, but may rather perceive the value to be within a certain interval. Com-
pared to the “true” value, the individual can therefore give a “wrong” answer with a cer-
tain probability. This concept seems close to that proposed by Kahneman and Tversky 
(1984, p. 16) who see individuals forming a “decision value” at the time of the decision 
and later forming an “experience value”, according to the experience of consum-
ing/using the good. While it is very probable that this effect plays a role for the endow-
ment effect measured in experiments (cf. chapter 1 & 2), it seems not to be an appropri-
ate predictor of behavior in CV studies: If one assumes that the decision uncertainty is 
larger in a hypothetical setting than in a real one, this would lead to a larger WTA-
WTP-gap in all CV studies. Yet as shown above, this is not true for several studies with 
private goods – a pattern which cannot be explained by this hypothesis. 
 
The following hypotheses do not intend to explain the WTA-WTP-gap, but concern 
other outcomes of CV studies that are perceived as irregularities. As our own hy-
pothesis contains some elements similar to these hypotheses, a brief overview seems 
necessary.  
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Other Hypotheses: 
Warm Glow / Insensitivity to Scope 
The “warm glow” hypothesis (mentioned for example by Arrow et al., 1993) states 
that respondents do not assign a money value to the exact action or situation proposed in 
the  CV question, but to a more general cause, e.g. of protecting the environment. Re-
spondents are seen to give a monetary value of the “warm glow” that they experience 
when thinking about this more general cause. 
The main supporting facts for this warm glow hypothesis stem from so-called “in-
sensitivity to scope”. Insensitivity to scope means that the money answers do not follow 
the pattern one would expect from real prices when changing the number or size of the 
object to be evaluated. In real pricing, one expects that WTP as well as WTA increases 
and decreases with the number/size/quality of the object evaluated. Even if these price 
moves will not always be proportional to the change in the object, one can hardly argue 
that the porperty of “sensitivity to scope” is not met in reality. Yet many economists 
(e.g. Diamond and Hausmann, 1994) argue that when changing the size/scope of an ob-
ject in a CV question (e.g. “how much are you willing to pay for saving 100 birds” vs. 
“…saving 1,000 birds”), answers do not change in a way similar to real pricing. Propo-
nents of the CV method (e.g. Hanemann, 1994) dispute that this insensitivity to scope 
can be inferred from the answers in CV studies.  
If the answers do in fact not change with the scope of the object, there must therefore 
be some determining factor that underlies the answers. The “warm glow” hypothesis 
states that people have a general will to support a good cause. Whether the question is 
about saving 100 or 1,000 birds, they feel the same “warm glow” that leads to a similar 
answer in money terms. 
 
Opinion Poll Hypothesis 
Kahneman and Ritov (1994) and Kahneman et al. (1999) make an argument similar 
to the warm glow hypothesis, yet much more specific: They claim that the answers to 
CV questions do not reflect economic preferences – real intentions to pay (or receive) 
money – but instead attitudes that can also be recorded as ratings of political support, 
importance and personal satisfaction. They even claim that by using psychological 
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scales, one can discriminate better between different propositions, because they measure 
that problem-related variance is two to four times larger for the opinion ratings and so 
allows for more significant and precise rankings. They see the reason for this difference 
in the fact that conventional attitude measures use a bounded scale whereas the money 
scale is both unbounded and unfamiliar. 
Kahneman et al. (1999) also argue that the move towards referendum questions is not 
well-founded. They see the higher valuations one can infer from referendum questions 
compared to open-ended questions not as the result of a decreased incentive problem, 
but as the result of a strong anchoring effect.  
 
Hypothetical Bias 
Economists have undertaken efforts to single out a systematic force that predictably 
changes respondents’ answers when moving from an experimental to a hypothetical set-
ting. This hypothetical bias is generally seen to increase answers, but as Table 20 
shows, this is not always true.  
Cummings et al. (1995b, 261, fn 5) state a form of misunderstanding as one reason 
for an upward hypothetical bias for WTP: “Subjects might view the hypothetical ques-
tion as asking one type of question (e.g., “would you ever pay $ X for this good?”), 
whereas the real question elicits responses to a different type of question (e.g., “would 
you pay $ X for this good right now?”).”  
 
Summary of existing hypotheses: 
• Even if one overlooks semantical problems concerning loss aversion in a hy-
pothetical setting and with public goods, the problem remains that loss aver-
sion – as well as a large substitution effect or “decision uncertainty” – cannot 
explain the entire empirical evidence of hypothetical answers in comparison 
to experiments.  
• Other hypotheses like the “Warm Glow”, “Opinion Poll” and “Hypothetical 
Bias” hypotheses state that respondents in CV studies do not take the ques-
tion they are facing exactly as economists suppose they do. Instead they 
might have their own interpretation to which they formulate an answer. 
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Own Hypothesis: 
Disentangling of Payment and Decision 
As the hypotheses cited above cannot convincingly explain the WTA-WTP-gap in 
CV studies, we propose a different explanation. Our hypothesis builds on the assump-
tion that respondents do not only consider the proposal in conjunction with the proposed 
possible payment, but also without the payment like in an ordinary opinion poll. 
 
Hypothesis: Respondents consider it possible that a decision on the issue is made, yet 
without payment to/from the respondent. The possibility of a real payment is 
seen as more unlikely in the WTA situation. Therefore in the WTA situation, 
more respondents try to influence the supposed decision by giving a high value 
without paying too much attention to risking a monetary loss59. 
 
One can imagine three scenarios following a CV study: 
1. Nothing happens: After the study is completed, neither a decision on the issue 
treated in the CV study (e.g. improve a public good) nor a money transaction is 
made. 
2. Full transaction: Either in the study/experimental setting or at some point af-
terwards, a decision is made and the corresponding money transactions with the 
respondent/concerned people is made. 
3. No-payment scenario: After the study is completed, only the decision  is made, 
but no direct money transactions with people take place. 
 
If scenario 1 (“nothing happens”) is true, a respondent’s answer clearly does not mat-
ter at all and she might even try to answer in the easiest way in terms of cognitive effort. 
In scenario 2 (“full transaction”) respondents would like the decision and the money 
payment to follow their true “economic preferences”, so would give the money values 
that they really associate with the proposed options. 
                                                 
59 More precisely, by stating WTA too high, they would risk not receiving a monetary gain. 
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In scenario 3 (“no-payment-scenario”), respondents would like the decision to follow 
their attitude toward the proposed options. This attitude might either be in favour or 
against an action, indifference towards the decision or some attitude in-between these 
extremes. If the attitude corresponds to “strongly in favour” or “strongly against”, this 
would translate into an infinite or zero monetary answer, because a simple “yes” or “no” 
like in an opinion poll is not possible on the monetary scale. As the question asked in 
CV studies mostly concerns improvements of public goods and most people can be as-
sumed to be in favour of this, answers with high values would be very likely in this sce-
nario. 
The hypothesis forwarded here is that in a study or an experiment, respondents form 
beliefs about the intention and consequence of the study, corresponding to scenarios 1-3 
above. In a survey about buying or selling a mug, the no-payment-scenario does not 
hold much relevance. If the question is about valuing a proposal to protect the environ-
ment, the no-payment-scenario is not only possible but might very well be considered 
very likely60. Therefore, in all real (experimental) settings and hypothetical settings for 
“pure” private goods, the no-payment-possibility is discarded that would dramatically 
increase the WTA-WTP-gap. 
Yet how does the no-payment-scenario increase the WTP/WTA-gap? The crucial as-
sumption here is that respondents’ attitude towards scenario 2 (“full transaction”) 
involving payments is different in the WTP and WTA setting.  
In the WTA case, respondents consider this scenario where they receive money from 
the government or a public authority as very unlikely, as examples of such behavior are 
very rare. Especially receiving large sums seems almost impossible to ever happen. Re-
spondents focus on possibility 3 (“no-payment-scenario”). Saying “no” to a deteriora-
tion of public goods means giving a high value as an answer – so even a “refusal” or 
almost infinitely high value can make sense here, in contrast to economists thinking of 
these answers as irrational. In our study, 6 of 30 subjects refused to name a value in the 
WTA treatment, while only 1 of 30 subjects refused in the WTP treatment. One subject 
in the WTA treatment indicated that “no compensation would be high enough” (and 5 
                                                 
60 Experimenters usually do not state their true intention of researching the method, as they probably are 
afraid this would erode people’s motivation (they would perceive it as scenario 1 – „nothing happens“). 
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subjects simply refusing to state a WTA amount without comment, compared to no 
missing WTP answers). 
In the WTP situation, this “full transaction”-scenario is not seen as completely im-
possible. Paying money to the government or other public entities, also for special 
causes, is not completely unlikely and happens every now and then in reality. Respon-
dents might also associate ordinary tax increases with the proposed payments which are 
certainly not unrealistic at all. 
If respondents to the WTP question consider the payment scenario 2 (“full transac-
tion”) as more likely than the WTA group, this will lead their answers to be a compro-
mise between answers to scenario 2 (considering the real monetary value) and to sce-
nario 3 (giving an answer in an opinion poll). Respondents to the WTA-question will 
weight the opinion poll answer more, leading to much higher answers, as most people 
will want to say “yes” to an amelioration of a public good (corresponding to an infinite 
answer to the value question). WTA-respondents only focussing on the opinion-poll 
might very well refuse to accept any payment. 
Evidence exists that WTP-respondents do not exclude scenario 2 (“full transaction”) 
from happening: Jorgensen et al. (1999, p.141) report that about half of their respon-
dents to their CV study refuse payment. When these respondents are asked for the rea-
son, at least 85 % of the answers are consistent with the notion of respondents taking the 
possibility of having to pay for real61, indicating that at least 40 % of respondents of the 
whole sample take the payment scenario for real.  
 
Summary of Own Hypothesis: 
Subjects take the possibility of receiving a payment less serious than the possibility 
of having to make a payment. Therefore, in the WTA setting, their answers rather re-
flect their general opinion on the matter, expressed on a monetary scale. As people can 
be assumed to have a positive attitude towards ameliorating a public good, these an-
swers are higher than the WTP answers, for which respondents take the possibility of a 
real expenditure into account and therefore must consider reducing this possible expen-
diture. 
                                                 
61 The most frequent types of answers were „I pay enough already” and “I can’t afford to pay at the mo-
ment”. 
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IV. Own Survey 
Research Question  
Do people consider having to pay to the government for an improvement in a public 
good as more likely than receiving a payment from government in case the project is 
rejected?  
 
Method  
A survey with the Contingent Valuation method was carried out at the beginning of a 
behavioral experiment with 60 participants (that is examined in chapter 1). As subjects 
answered the 2-page survey at the beginning of the experiment, any influence of the 
content of the experiment on the outcome of the survey can be excluded (except that 
they were recruited for an “economic study of behavior”). 
A translation of the instructions and the original instructions in German can be found 
in the appendix. Design of the questions followed a WTA and a WTP design, including 
an additional manipulation (“no-payment-reminder”):  
The questionnaire first described that a project exists to improve the water quality of 
the Isar River that crosses Munich. Sewage works in Munich should be upgraded with 
disinfecting devices in order to make bathing in the Isar safe at almost any time. 
The questions then followed both the referendum and open question form: Subjects 
were first asked how they would vote in a referendum about a payment to the govern-
ment of 50 € for the upgrade (WTP treatment) or in a referendum about payment of 50 € 
from the government if no upgrade is undertaken (WTA treatment).  
The second question directly asked for the maximum (minimum) they would accept 
as a payment in such a referendum. Clearly, these answers are biased (“anchored” ac-
cording to Kahneman et al., 1999) by the amount of 50 € given in the referendum. Yet, 
as this bias influences all settings, this is not a problem for our research question. 
After the valuation question, subjects were asked how likely they considered that the 
proposed payment (to the government in the WTP setting, from the government in the 
WTA setting) would indeed one day take place together with the proposed measure. 
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(Table 21 below gives an overview over the possible results of the proposed referen-
dum.)62  
 
Table 21: Consequences of referendum in WTP vs. WTA setting 
 WTP-style question WTA-style question 
Upgrade Payment from people & 
upgrade 
No payment (from govern-
ment) & upgrade 
No upgrade No payment (from people) 
& no upgrade 
Payment from government 
to people & no upgrade 
 
No-payment-reminder: In 2 of the 4 treatments (half of the WTP and half of the 
WTA treatments), a special reminder was added to the text of the question: “Please be 
aware of the fact that there are no plans to ask for payments (offer payments) for doing 
the upgrade (not doing the upgrade). This question solely intends to measure how much 
people in Munich value the water quality in the Isar.” 
 
Results 
Table 22 provides an overview over the main results. The general pattern of our re-
sults follows that of the results of many other contingent valuation studies reported in 
the literature: Rejection of the public project in the WTP referendum is significantly 
higher (10 of 29 answers) than in the WTA referendum (3 of 29 answers). Note that an-
swers to a referendum-style question cannot be attributed to “strategic motives” (trying 
to decrease payment in the WTP setting and increase payment in the WTA setting): Re-
spondents could just say “yes” or “no” to the project at a fixed price of 50 €, so they 
could not influence this price. From significantly higher rejection rate in the WTP refer-
endum, one can conclude that respondents have on average lower WTP than WTA: 10 
of 29 respondents have WTP < 50 €, while only 3 of 29 respondens in the other group 
have WTA ≤ 50 €. 
                                                 
62 The probability questions did not ask for the same state concerning the upgrade, as the alternatives (no 
upgrade & no payment for WTP, upgrade & no payment for WTA) must be considered familiar types of 
decisions. The focus here was on the more unusual states which involve the payment. 
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Answers given to the open question (where “strategic motives” cannot be excluded) 
are also significantly lower in the WTP-setting (mean 52 €, median 50 €) than in the 
WTA setting (mean 428 €, median 200 €; for test scores see Table 22).  
The answers to the question “How likely do you think it is that the proposed payment 
will take place?” show three stark outliers in the WTA-treatment with “no-payment”-
reminder at 80, 80 and 90 % (see Figure 21). All other answers in this treatment to-
gether have a mean of only 3.3 percent. A report of one subject during the survey might 
hint at the source of these outliers: The subject asked whether the question was about 
the payment being made given that such a referendum would take place. This miscon-
ception might have rose because the “no-payment”-reminder together with the already 
unlikely WTA setting let people believe that the question could only be of hypothetical 
nature and not about whether they would expect such a payment in reality. 
In the presence of these outliers (which increase the mean probability answer in the 
WTA-no-payment treatment by 16 percentage points), looking at medians is helpful: 
Both WTA samples show comparably low medians of 1 and 0.01 percentage points. 
The median of the whole WTA sample (1 %) is also much lower than the mean answer 
(14 %), while for the WTP sample these two measures are much closer (mean 24 %, 
median 20 %). 
Table 23 shows the results of several tests: Our hypothesis that probability answers 
are lower in the WTA than in the WTP treatments is confirmed by a Wilcoxon Rank-
Sum test of different medians. After deleting the 3 outliers named above, the signifi-
cance-level of the t-test also falls below 5 % (from 5.4 % to 0.0 %). 
As the “no-payment”-manipulations did not lead to a significant decrease in the per-
ceived likelihood of a payment in both WTP and WTA treatment (t-tests and Wilcoxon-
rank-tests fail with only the t-test for the WTP-manipulation with p=0.09 being some-
where close to significance), only results for the whole WTP and WTA samples, includ-
ing in both groups answers with and without “no-payment reminder” are shown. 
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Table 22: Answers in own contingent valuation survey 
  WTP WTA 
Referendum for upgrade 19 26
 
against up-
grade 10 3
 (abstention) 1 1
 answers 30 30
2*2 Chi-sq test Chi-sq   4.858
  p-value   0.028
Max/Min Amount Mean 52 € 428 €
 (std. error) 6.93 118.80
  Median 50 € 200 €
Probability of pay-
ment Mean 24 14
 (std. error) 4.39 4.75
  Median 20 1
 
Table 23: Testing of hypotheses 
 setting mean 
t-test: p-
value (one-
sided) median 
Wilcoxon rank-
sum test  
(p-value) 
WTA 428 €  200 €  WTA vs WTP 
amount (max/min) 
  WTP 52 € 0.002 50 € 0.000
probability of pay-
ment WTA 14  1  
  WTP 24 0.054* 20 0.002
    *0.000 without 3 outliers  
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Figure 21: Histogram of probability answers in both WTA settings 
Normal treatment (left) and “no-payment” treatment (right) with the outliers at 80, 80 and 90. 
 
Discussion 
Our hypothesis outlined above is confirmed: In the WTA setting, respondents do not 
really expect that the proposed payment could happen in reality: the median answer to 
the probability question is 1 %. In contrast, the perceived likelihood of such a payment 
happening in reality is significantly larger in the WTP-setting (median answer 20 %). 
Our conclusion is that subjects in the WTA-setting answer more like in an opinion poll, 
leading to higher answers than in the WTP-setting, as most people can be assumed to be 
in favour of ameliorating public goods.  
Also for private goods that can be relevant for the public, respondents will tend to 
give extreme answers if they want to express their opinion on the issure (e.g. are in fa-
vour of increasing the number of hunting permits issued, improving safety for cars, or 
decreasing the poisoning risk of toilet bowl cleaners). For “pure” private goods, subjects 
are not concerned that the valuations they report in the survey might influence a relevant 
decision. There is simply no relevance of the value reported for, say, a toaster, other 
than a person buying or selling this toaster in reality.  Therefore, even when respondents 
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do not think the payment that is proposed in the survey question will ever take place, 
there is no reason to believe that this leads to extremely high answers, as stated above. 
Taking our results and those of Brookshire and Coursey (1987) together, suggests the 
following: When respondents are asked in a purely hypothetical setting, they do not take 
payment in the WTA question seriously, while they do not completely disregard the 
possibility of payment in the WTP question. When the survey is altered in order to make 
payment seem more likely (as in Brookshire and Coursey’s “semi-hypothetical” setting 
where an auction was described, yet did not take place), respondents take payment also 
in the WTA treatment more seriously, so answers decrease. When a real auction takes 
place, e.g. the payment option is certain in both cases, WTA decreases further. As re-
spondents’ attitude in the WTP treatment also changes from taking the payment more 
seriously to taking it for granted, WTP decreases as well when moving from a “semi-
hypothetical” to  a real setting. 
Although subjects in the hypothetical WTP-setting take the possibility of a real pay-
ment more serious, our median probability answer of 20 % indicates that they attach 
more weight to the no-payment-scenario than to the possibility of the full transaction. 
The inevitable conclusion that both WTA and WTP answers do not reflect true eco-
nomic preferences leads to the question whether there are alternatives to the contingent 
valuation method. 
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V. Alternatives to Contingent Valuation 
Even if one does not take answers to CV studies as expressions of “real economic 
preferences”, one could still use them as a cheap substitute for a general referendum. 
Diamond and Hausmann (1994, 60) argue against this and state that public policy 
should take public concern into consideration, but also rely on advice of experts. They 
cite evidence that answers to referendum-style CV-questions are not a good predictor 
for a real referendum that is usually preceded by campaigns intended to inform and per-
suade voters.  
Kahneman and Ritov (1994, p. 230) even argue against the jury system to assess 
damages. “It is remarkable that the jury system appears designed to enhance rather 
than minimize the deficiencies of human judgement.” They propose that juries only 
agree on a statement about the severity of punishment that the judge translates into an 
amount of money. This might sound reasonable, yet might inevitably lead to one of two 
problems: If the judge’s transformation of the jury’s statement into an amount of money 
is strictly rule-based, the jury will know in advance the amount of money it sets, de 
facto retaining this power. If this transformation is not strictly rule-based, the judge will 
de facto get this power, reducing the power of the jury to a statement of “guilty” or “not 
guilty”. 
Another option might be a generally more rule-based method to assess damages in 
litigation, for example taking into account the costs that avoiding the damage would 
have caused. A multiple, say 50 or 100, of this yearly cost63 for a firm of an average 
size, could be considered the appropriate damage sum.64 The advantage of such a sys-
tem over a fixed regulation in every area is that it requires less regulating effort ex-ante 
and that innovations in the technology of avoiding accidents are automatically taken 
into account. 
                                                 
63 If an accident happens that could have been avoided without costs, this must be considered purely hu-
man error. The costs to be considered in this case would be the introduction of a control or check system 
that would do the best to avoid the human errors that could lead to disaster, such as the checklist-systems 
for pilots. 
64 This should in the optimum lead to a situation where firms incur the costs if they otherwise expect an 
accident to happen with a probability of at least 1/50 (1/100) per year. 
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Conclusion 
A large body of evidence confirms that the gap between willingness to accept (WTA) 
and willingness to pay (WTP) in contingent valuation surveys is much higher than eco-
nomic theory would suggest. A closer look at the evidence shows that it is the WTA an-
swer measured for public goods that is unreasonably high, compared with all other an-
swers, including control answers from experiments and answers for private goods. 
A key issue to understand the disparity is respondents’ attitude towards the possibil-
ity of a real payment. Subjects in our study thought of a real payment in the WTA set-
ting being extremely unlikely. In the WTP setting, in contrast, subjects did not consider 
a real payment as completely unlikely.  
The fewer the respondents take the payment scenario seriously, the more they will 
behave like in an opinion poll – with the only difference that they give their answer on a 
monetary scale. As most people can be assumed to be in favour of improving public 
goods, this biases their answers upward. This “hypothetical bias” is stronger for WTA 
answers, yet also exists for WTP answers. 
In the light of this bias, the neglect of WTA in most CV studies does not seem to 
have been the worst choice. It is, however, questionable whether the answers one gets 
from WTP questions are a useful input for public policy or damage assessment in envi-
ronmental litigation. It seems more advisable to rely on expert advice in both cases and 
on real referenda for public policy, while a more rule-based damage assessment in court 
seems advisable. 
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Appendix 
Details and Classification of Studies 
Table 24: Details for studies shown in Table 20. 
Study Good Hyp/real WTA Hyp/real WTP ratio 
Public goods    
Brookshire and 
Coursey, 1987 
Trees in pub-
lic park 
Hyp: $200, less 
hyp: 30, real: 
7.3 
Hyp: 9.6, less hyp: 
11.8, real 5.1 
20.8 (hyp) to 
1.8 (real) 
Cummings et 
al., 1995a 
Contribution 
to Citizens 
guide 
 Prob. of WTP>$10 is 
19 % higher in hyp 
 
    
Private goods - group I: “pure” private goods 
(without “no-payment-scenario”) 
List and 
Shogren, 2002 
Christmas 
gifts 
WTA 
Real/hyp=1.4! 
(hyp lower!) 
Low-valued 
goods: 0.75 
  
Nape et al., 
2003 
Wall calendar WTA<x in real 
treatment 27 
perc pts more 
likely 
  
Cummings et 
al., 1995b 
Juicer, choco-
late, calcula-
tor 
 hypothetical to real, 
WTP falls: Juicers: 
Yes-responses fall from 
41 % to 16 % (buy at 
$8), Chocolates – from 
42 % to 4 % ($3.50) 
and Solar Calculator 
from 21 % to 8% ($3). 
 
Simonson and 
Drolet, 2004 
Toaster, 
phone, back-
pack, radio 
headphone 
Hyp. WTA Hyp. WTP WTA/WTP 
from 0.75 to 1 
Æ WTA 
lower!  
Coursey et al.,  
1987 
Right to avoid 
bitter liquid 
Hyp: 9.5 
Hyp (informed): 
10.5 
Real: 4.6 
2.5 
2.5 
2.6$ 
Hyp: 3.8 
4.2 
 real 1.8 
     
Private goods - group II: with relevance for public 
(with “no-payment-scenario”) 
Rankin 1990 Hunting per- Hyp:22 % sold Real & hyp: 75 % not No common 
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mit Real: 59 % sold bought (same result) basis for 
real/hyp 
WTA, but for 
WTP 
Dubourg et al., 
1994 
Car safety Refusals: 20 %.  2 to 6.2* 
Viscusi et al., 
1987 
injury risk 
caused by toi-
let bowl 
cleaner and 
insecticide 
Refusals: al-
most all re-
spondents!** 
$0.65 to 1.84  
* Answers of subjects excluded who report that no WTA would be sufficient 
** p. 477: In pretests for the experiment, subjects were not willing to accept any price reduction 
(WTA setting) even for the smallest of several proposed increases in the risk that the product might poi-
son the user. For the experiment, the proposed risk increase was reduced further. Nevertheless, ¾ of the 
respondents still refused any amount of price reduction (i.e. would not even take the product for free).  
 
Classification of Private Good Studies 
• Nape et al. (2003) offer a wall calendar and ask about (real and hypothetical) 
selling prices. The only possible relevance of a no-payment-scenario could be 
that of deciding whether or not to introduce such a calendar into the market – 
even if subjects’ concern about this question existed, it is probable that it 
would not be strong. 
• In the study done by List and Shogren (2002) there clearly is no meaning of a 
no-payment-scenario, as explained above. As questions are about objects that 
belong to the respondents already, nothing could be undertaken with them 
without permission of the responder. 
• Cummings et al. (1995b) ask for valuations of a juicer, chocolates and a cal-
culator. As in Nape et al. (2003) above, the only meaning in a no-payment-
scenario would be that of introducing such a product with the same weak im-
plications to relevance of such a decision to respondents. 
• Coursey et al. (1987) ask subjects to consider tasting a bitter liquid, an un-
pleasant but harmless experience. As the hypothetical questions precede the 
real experimental setting for all subjects, it cannot be excluded that subjects 
would consider it possible that they might later be asked to taste the bitter 
liquid without monetary compensation. In the second part of the experiment, 
they were indeed asked to taste the liquid, if only a few sample drops instead 
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of holding the full one-ounce-cup in the mouth for 20 seconds. By assigning a 
high monetary value to the option of not tasting the liquid, subjects might 
have thought to avoid drinking the liquid. As this seems a possibility, yet not 
a strong one, the study is still classified as without no-payment-scenario. 
• Duburg et al. (1994) ask subjects to value safety features of cars that affect 
the probability of accidents and injuries. One can imagine easily that in real-
ity, these safety features could be altered without any payment to/from peo-
ple, so again the no-payment-scenario makes sense. Respondents might be 
concerned that, if they value the safety features very low, car manufacturers 
might diminish their efforts to improve these saftery features. Therefore, re-
spondents might abstract from payments they would consider when really 
buying a car and rather answer as in an opinion poll asking “do you want car 
manufacturers to improve safety features?”. 
• Viscusi et al. (1987) ask subjects to value risks connected to a toilet bowl 
cleaner and an insecticide. Similarly to the study by Dubourg et al. (1994) 
just mentioned, features of these products could of course be altered without 
the proposed money transactions. 
 
Other comments to the studies 
Duburg et al. (1994) and Viscusi et al. (1987) are seen as evidence of an increase of 
the WTA-WTP-gap in a hypothetical setting, although they do not experimentally elicit 
real answers. Yet it can be seen as common sense that the attitude of no compensation 
(i.e. reduction of the purchase price) being sufficient for decreased safety features does 
not carry through in reality. People buy products such as toilet bowl cleaners, insecti-
cides and cars even without exact knowledge of safety statistics and even at the full 
price. 
Simonson and Drolet (2004, researching on the anchoring effect) find hypothetical 
WTA answers being lower than hypothetical WTP answers for ordinary consumer 
goods. This could lead to one of two conclusions: in a corresponding experiment, the 
gap would also not be present (or even be reversed), or if it would be present as usual, 
hypothetical WTA answers would have been lower than the true answers (and/or the 
opposite for WTP answers). 
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Instructions of own Study 
Questionnaire 
* Comments between asterisks * 
 
Survey 
Water Quality of the Isar River  
(* The Isar River runs through Munich, where the survey took place *) 
 
Since the year 2000, there has been an ambitious government project in the state of 
Bavaria to improve the water quality of the Isar River. The aim of the project is to en-
sure bathing in the Isar without any health considerations. To that aim, sewage works 
are being upgraded with disinfection devices, starting in Bad Tölz (* a town further up 
the Isar River *). The disinfection device kills almost all germs in the sewage with ul-
traviolet light without any harmful effect on people and the environment, as extensive 
studies have shown. Where sewage is cleaned by the new system, the water quality of 
the Isar has indeed reached bathing water quality (except in times of heavy rainfalls).  
(* The program does indeed exist in reality exactly as described here.*) 
 
However, the upgrades are quite costly.  
 
Our question: 
 
Imagine you were an elective resident of the city of Munich and would be asked in a 
referendum as follows: 
 
*WTP-Treatments:* 
 
„Do you agree to upgrade sewage works with cost sharing by the residents of Mu-
nich? In case of approval of the referendum, every resident of Munich over 18 years 
would have to pay a one-time cost sharing fee of 50 €. In case the referendum is re-
fused, the upgrade would not take place.“ 
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*Optional („no-payment-reminder“)* 
Note: The possibility of a payment connected to the upgrade of the sewage works is 
purely hypothetical and is only assumed for the purpose of this survey. There are no 
plans to propose payments for the upgrade of sewage works in Munich or even to intro-
duce such payments. The purpose of this survey is exclusively to measure how impor-
tant water quality of the Isar River is to the residents of Munich. 
 
 
Please indicate, how you would answer in such a referendum: 
 
1. Answer (please mark with a cross):        Approval        Rejection       Ab-
stention 
 
What would be the maximum that you would be willing to pay as a resident of Mu-
nich for the upgrade of the sewage works, if every resident would have to pay this 
amount and the upgrade could not take place otherwise?   
 
2. Answer:   ______  € 
 
 
How likely do you consider it that all residents of Munich aged 18 and over will in-
deed one day have to pay 50 € for the upgrade of the sewage works?  
 
Answer: Probability of ___________ % (0 to 100) 
 
How likely do you consider that the amount you gave as the 2nd answer will have to 
be paid?  
 
Answer: Probability of ___________ % (0 to 100) 
(* These answers were not analysed. *) 
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*WTA-Treatments* 
 
„Proposal A: Upgrade of the sewage works in the city of Munich with UV-devices.  
Proposal B: Waiving of the upgrade of sewage works in Munich with UV-devices. 
Payout of 50 € to every resident of Munich aged 18 years and over.“ 
 
*Optional („no-payment-reminder“)* 
Note: The possibility of a payout in case of no upgrade is purely hypothetical and is 
only assumed for this survey. There are no plans to propose or even make payments in 
case of not upgrading sewage works in Munich. The purpose of this survey is exclu-
sively to measure how important water quality of the Isar River is to the residents of 
Munich. 
 
Please indicate how you would answer in such a referendum: 
 
1. Answer: I am for              Proposal A           Proposal B            Absten-
tion 
 
What would be the minimum payout to every resident of Munich that would let you 
accept proposal B?  
 
2. Answer: _________ € 
 
How likely do you consider it that all residents of Munich aged 18 and over will one 
day indeed receive a payout of 50 €, because the upgrade has been waived?  
 
Answer: Probability of ___________ % (0 to 100) 
 
How likely do you consider that the amount you gave as the 2nd answer will be paid 
out?  
 
Answer: Probability of ___________ % (0 to 100) 
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* Original version in German * 
 
Umfrage 
 
Wasserqualität der Isar 
 
In Bayern gibt es seit dem Jahr 2000 ein ehrgeiziges staatliches Projekt, um die Was-
serqualität der Isar zu verbessern. Das Ziel des Programms ist es, dass das Baden in der 
Isar für jedermann bedenkenlos möglich ist. Hierzu werden, beginnend in Bad Tölz, 
Klärwerke mit Desinfektionsanlagen ausgerüstet, in denen ultraviolettes Licht die 
schädlichen Keime im Abwasser fast vollständig abtötet. Das Verfahren hat für Mensch 
und Umwelt keine schädlichen Nebenwirkungen, wie umfangreiche Untersuchungen 
belegen. In dem Bereich, in dem die Abwässer durch das neue System gereinigt werden, 
ist die Wasserqualität der Isar tatsächlich zum Baden uneingeschränkt geeignet (ausge-
nommen in Zeiten von starken Regenfällen). 
 
Die Aufrüstung des neuen Klärsystems ist jedoch kostspielig.  
 
Unsere Frage: 
 
Stellen Sie sich vor, Sie seien wahlberechtigte/r Bewohner/in Münchens und würden 
in einem Referendum wie folgt befragt: 
 
* WTP-Treatments * 
 
„Stimmen Sie der Aufrüstung der Kläranlagen mit UV-Anlagen bei Kostenbeteili-
gung der Bürger in München zu? Im Falle einer Annahme des Referendums müsste je-
der Bewohner Münchens über 18 Jahre eine einmalige Kostenbeteiligung von 50 € zah-
len. Im Falle der Ablehnung würde die Aufrüstung nicht stattfinden.“ 
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* Optional („no-payment-reminder“) * 
Hinweis: Die Möglichkeit einer Zahlung in Verbindung mit der Aufrüstung der Klär-
anlagen  ist rein hypothetisch und wird nur für diese Umfrage angenommen. Es gibt 
keinerlei Pläne, tatsächlich Zahlungen für die Aufrüstung der Kläranlagen in München 
vorzuschlagen, geschweige denn durchzuführen. Durch diese Umfrage soll lediglich 
gemessen werden, wie wichtig den Münchnern/-innen die Wasserqualität der Isar ist. 
 
Bitte geben Sie an, wie Sie in einem solchen Referendum antworten würden: 
1. Antwort (bitte ankreuzen):            Dafür          Dagegen          Enthaltung 
 
Was wäre das Maximum, das Sie bereit wären als Bürger/in Münchens für die Auf-
rüstung der Kläranlagen zu bezahlen, wenn jede/r Münchner/in diesen Beitrag leisten 
müsste und die Kläranlagen ansonsten nicht aufgerüstet werden könnten?   
2. Antwort:   ______  € 
 
Für wie wahrscheinlich halten Sie es, dass alle Bürger/-innen Münchens über 18 Jah-
re tatsächlich irgendwann einen Beitrag von 50 € für die Aufrüstung der Kläranlagen 
bezahlen müssen? 
Antwort: Wahrscheinlichkeit von ___________ % (0 bis 100) 
 
Für wie wahrscheinlich halten Sie es, dass der von Ihnen als 2. Antwort genannte Be-
trag gezahlt werden muss? 
 
Antwort: Wahrscheinlichkeit von __________ % (0 bis 100) 
* WTA-Treatments * 
„Vorschlag A: Aufrüstung der Kläranlagen im Stadtgebiet Münchens mit UV-
Anlagen. 
Vorschlag B: Verzicht auf die Aufrüstung der Kläranlagen in München mit UV-
Anlagen. Ausschüttung von 50 € an jeden Bewohner Münchens über 18 Jahre.“ 
 
* Optional („no-payment-reminder“) * 
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Hinweis: Die Möglichkeit einer Ausschüttung bei Nicht-Aufrüstung der Kläranlagen 
ist rein hypothetisch und wird nur für diese Umfrage angenommen. Es gibt keinerlei 
Pläne, tatsächlich Auszahlungen für die Nicht-Aufrüstung der Kläranlagen in München 
vorzuschlagen, geschweige denn durchzuführen. Durch diese Umfrage soll lediglich 
gemessen werden, wie wichtig den Münchnern/-innen die Wasserqualität der Isar ist. 
 
Bitte umkreisen Sie die Antwort, die Sie in einem solchen Referendum geben wür-
den: 
 
1. Antwort: Ich bin für             Vorschlag A           Vorschlag B            Ent-
haltung 
 
Was wäre das Minimum an Ausschüttung für jede/n Bewohner/in Münchens, das 
Sie dazu bewegen würde, Vorschlag B zu akzeptieren? 
 
2. Antwort: _________ € 
 
Für wie wahrscheinlich halten Sie es, dass alle Bürger/-innen Münchens über 18 Jah-
re tatsächlich eines Tages die Summe von 50 € erhalten, weil auf die Aufrüstung der 
Kläranlagen verzichtet wird? 
 
Antwort: Wahrscheinlichkeit von ___________ % (0 bis 100) 
 
Für wie wahrscheinlich halten Sie es, dass der von Ihnen als 2. Antwort genannte Be-
trag pro Person ausgeschüttet wird? 
 
Antwort: Wahrscheinlichkeit von ___________ % (0 bis 100) 
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